







THE 8468.aaa.36.  
**ARTE OF  
LOGICKE.**


Plainly taught in the *English* Tongue,  
according to the best approoued

**AVTHORS.**

Very necessary for all **STVDENTS** in any  
*Profession, how to defend any Argument against all  
subtill Sophisters, and cauelling Schismatikes, and  
how to confute their false Syllogismes, and  
captious Arguments.*

**By M. BLYNDEVILLE**

*Blyndeville*  
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LOOKER

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all the Booksellers.  
1841.



## To the Reader.



Inding here to treat of the Art of  
Logicke in our vulgar tongue, for  
the profit of those my Countrey-  
men, that are not learned in for-  
raine tongues: I thinke it no shame  
nor robberie to borrow termes of  
the said Art from the Latines, as  
well as they did from the Greekes: and specially such  
termes as cannot bee aptly expressed in our native  
speech: and yet therewith I doe not forget plainly to  
shew the signification of euery such terme, so as euery  
man may easily vnderstand what each terme signi-  
fieth: thinking it much better so to doe, then to faime  
new words vnproper for the purpose, as some of late  
haue done. And as my minde is hereby to please the  
vnlearned, that are desirous of learning, hauing both  
good wits, and also good disposition with aptnesse to  
learne. So my hope is not to offend the learned, who,  
I am sure doe well allow of Aristotle, in saying, that  
euery good thing, the more common it be, the better it  
is: neither are they ignorant, that in old time past,  
as well the Greekes as the Latines, of what Aris-  
totle

## To the Reader.

uer they wrote, each one wrote the same, for the most part, in his owne vulgar speech. Euery man is not able in these costly dayes, to find either himselfe or his Childe at the Vniuersitie, whom if God notwithstanding hath indued with a liuely wit, and made him so apt to learning, as hauing some helpe at home, he may by his owne industry, attaine vnto right good knowledge, and be made thereby the more able to glorifie God, and to profit his Countrey. Truly, I see no cause why the learned should disdain, or bee discontent that such Man or Child should bee freely taught this or any other good Arte, without any cost or charge. Wherefore arming my selfe with assured hope, that with this my labour, I shall greatly profit and pleasure the vnlearned, and not hinder or displease the learned, I will boldly follow mine enterprise, and here briefly shew the order of my said Worke, which is diuided into sixe Parts or Bookes: for sith Logicke is chiefly occupied in discussing of Questions, and that such Questions, both simple and compound doe spring of words, the first Part of my Booke shall treat of Words, shewing which bee Simple, which bee Compound, and also which comprehend more, and which comprehend lesse: and which be of affinitie, and which bee not: leauing out no necessary Rules belonging thereunto, that are taught either by Aristotle, or by any other Moderne Writer.

## To the Reader.

Secondly, because all simple Questions consisting of single words, are to bee discussed by Definition and Diuision : the second Part treateth of them both, and therewith sheweth also with what methode and order such simple Questions are to be handled. Thirdly, because all compound Questions are to bee discussed by reasoning or argumentation, and that euery kind of argument doth consist of Propositions : the third Part treateth of a Proposition, and of all things belonging thereunto. Fourthly, because no sound argument can be made to proue or disprooue any thing that is in question, vnlesse the Disputer know from whence to fetch his proofes : the fourth Part of my Booke treateth of all the places from whence any argument is to be fetched. And the fifth Part treateth of Argumentation, and of all the kinds thereof, teaching how euery kind is to be performed. The sixth and last Part treateth of Confutation, shewing how all Sophistical arguments are to be confuted.





*A Postscript.*

**T**Hough I wrote this Booke many yeeres past, whilst I sojourned with my most deare Brother in Law, Master *William Hurnel*, a man of most singular humanitie, and of great hospitalitie, at his house in Winkborne in Nottinghamshire, not farre from Southwell: yet notwithstanding vpon diuers necessary considerations (as I thought) since that time moouing me thereunto, I still stayed it from the Presse, vntill now of late that I was fully perswaded by diuers of my learned friends, to put it in print, who hauing diligently perused the same, and liking my plaine order of teaching vsed therein, thought it a most necessary Booke for such Ministers as had not beene brought vp in any Vniuersitie: to many of which Ministers though God had given the gift of vtterance, and great good zeale to set forth in good speech the true Christian doctrine: yet, if they should haue to deale with subtil Sophisters and cauelling Schismatikes (whereof in these dayes, the more is the pittie, there are too many) they were not able without the helpe of Logicke, to defend the Truth of Gods Word, and orderly to confute such false Conclusions as peruerse Schismatikes and Heretikes are wont to gather out of the very words of holy Scripture: wherefore, through my said friends perswasions, I haue now at length committed my said Booke to the Presse, praying all those that shall vouchsafe to reade it, as  
thankfully to accept the same, as  
of my part it is friend-  
ly offered:

*Vale.*

The



# The Contents of the Chapters contained in these sixe Bookes of *Logicke.*

## THE FIRST BOOKE.

Treating of a Question, and of Words, both Singular and Vniuersall.

**VV** *hat Logicke is, of what parts it consisteth, and whereto such parts doe serue. Which bee the two chiefe offices of Logicke, and wherein Logicke is chiefly occupied, that is, in discussing of Questions, which is done by Definition, Division, and Argumentation.* Chap. 1.

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- Of the ten Predicaments in generall, which be these, Substantia, Quantitas, Qualitas, Relatio, Actio, Passio, Vbi, Quando, Siue est, and Habere. Chap. 6.
- Of the foure predicaments, and shewing which they be, and to what end they serue. Chap. 7.
- Of the ten Predicaments in speciall, shewing what substance is, and how many kinds there be, and what properties it hath, whereto is added the Table of Substance. Chap. 8.
- Of Quantity, both whole and broken, called in Latine, Quantitas continua, & discretas, and of the diuers kinds of both quantities, and what properties quantity hath, whereto is added a Table of quantity. Chap. 9.
- Of Quality, and of the foure kinds thereof, and in this Chapter are defined be foure intellectuall habits, that is, Intelligence, Science, Prudence, Art, and Science: is sheweth also what properties quality hath, and is every of the foure kinds of quality is added his proper Table. Chap. 10.
- Of Relation, and of the kinds thereof, together with a Table shewing every kind, and finally what properties Relation hath. Chap. 11.
- What Action is, and how it is divided, and what properties are belonging thereto. Chap. 12.
- What Passion is, and what properties are belonging thereto. Chap. 13.
- What the Predicament Vbi is, and how it is divided, and what properties are belonging to that Predicament. Chap. 14.
- What the Predicament Quando is, how it is divided, and what properties belonging thereto. Chap. 15.
- What the Predicament Siue est is, what it comprehendeth, of what Description: and how farre it is fetched from this Predicament, and what things are said to alter their Situation, and finally what properties hath, to which Predicament is added a briefe Table. Chap. 16.
- The diuers significations of the Predicament Habere, also what words comprehendeth, with a Table shewing the same, and finally what properties hath. Chap. 17.

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*How many wayes things are said to be one before or after another, and to what end that Postpredicament serveth.* Chap. 20.  
*Of the Postpredicament Simul, shewing how many wayes things are said to be together.* Chap. 21.  
*Of the Postpredicament Motus, shewing how many kinds of motions there be.* Chap. 22.  
*How many wayes the word Habere is to be understood.* Chap. 23.
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*Of Division, and of the diners kinds thereof.* Chap. 3.  
*How many Precepts are to be observed to make a true Division.* Chap. 4.  
*Of Method, and of the three kinds thereof, that is, Compositive, Resolutive, and Divisive, and Methode is to be observed in handling either of a simple, or of a compound question.* Chap. 5.
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Treating of a Proposition.

- O**F a Proposition, shewing of what parts it consisteth, and how many wayes it is divided, and what questions are to be asked of

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*Of the ten Predicaments in speciall, shewing what substance is, and how many kinds there be, and what properties it hath, whereto is added the Table of Substance.* Chap. 8.  
*Of Quantitie, both whole and broken, called in Latine, Quantitas continua, & discreta, and of the diuers kinds of both quantities, and what properties quantity hath, whereto is added a Table of quantitie.* Chap. 9.  
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*How many wayes the word Habere is to be understood.* Chap. 23.
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## THE SECOND BOOKE.

Treating of Definition, and of Diuision, and of Methode.

- O**F Definition, and shewing how many kinds of Definitions there be. Chap. 1.  
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*Of Diuision, and of the diuers kinds thereof.* Chap. 3.  
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*Of Methode, and of the three kinds thereof, that is, Compositiue, Resolutiue, and Diuisiue, and Methode is to be obserued in handling either of a simple, or of a compound question.* Chap. 5.
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Treating of a Proposition.

- O**F a Proposition, shewing of what parts it consisteth, and how many wayes it is diuided, and what questions are to be asked of
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Of the three properties belonging to a simple Proposition, that is, Opposition, Equivalency, and Conversion. Chap. 2.

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### Treating of Logicall places.

**W**Hat a place is, and that it is twofold, that is, eyther of Persons or of Things. Againe, the places of things bee eyther artificiall or inartificiall, and the artificiall places of things are eyther inward, outward, or meane: and the inartificiall places of things are sixe in number, comprehended vnder the place of authoritie, as the Table of places set downe in the beginning of this Chapter doth plainly shew. Also this Chapter sheweth to what end such manifold

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Of meane places, giuing examples, and shewing how Arguments are to be fetched from such places, together with the Rules belonging thereunto. Chap. 5.

Of the sixe inartificiall places comprehended under the place of authoritie, whereunto is added a Table of authoritie. And in this Chapter is not only declared to what end the knowledge of all the foresaid places doe *serue*, but also it sheweth by one example how to use them when need is, either to prooue or to dilate any Theame, which example is taken out of Hunneus. The Theame whereof is this: Man ought to embrace Vertue. Chap. 6.

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What that matter and forme is, and that the matter consisteth of

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Of an Enthimeme, shewing what it is, of what parts it consisteth, and from whence that kinde of Argument is to be fetched. Chap. 24.

Of an example, shewing what it is, and wherein it differeth from all the other formes of Arguments, and to what end it serueth, and what

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*Of the seven Fallaxes consisting in Things, and sheweth by examples how to confute the same.* Chap.6.




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# THE ARTE OF LOGICKE.

*The first Booke.*

## CHAP. I.

*Of the Arte of Logicke, and of the parts and offices thereof.*

*What is Logicke?*



Logicke is an Art, which teacheth vs to dispute probably on both sides of any matter that is propounded.

*Of what and how many parts doth it consist?*

Of two: that is, Inuention and Iudgement.

*Where to serue these parts?*

Inuention findeth out meete matter to prooue the thing that yee intend: and Iudgement examineth the matter, whether it be good, or not; and then frameth, disposeth, and reduceth the same into due forme of argument.

*What is the chiefe end or office of Logicke?*

The chiefe end or office of Logicke is twofold: The one to discusse truth from falshood in any manner of speech; the other is to teach a compendious way to attaine to any Art or Science.

**B**

And



And therefore it is defined of some, to be the Art of Arts, and Science of Sciences; not for that it teacheth the principles of every Art or Science (for those are to be learned of the Professors of such Arts or Sciences) but because it sheweth the method, that is to say, the true order and right way that is to bee observed in seeking to come to the perfect knowledge of any Art or Science. Of which methodicall part, mine olde friend *M. Iacomo Aconiso Tridentino* hath written in the Latine Tongue a very proper and profitable Treatise. And therefore I minde here to deale onely with the first office, which is to discusse and to discern truth from falshood in any speech or question that is propounded.

*How is that to be done?*

By three speciall instruments: that is, by Definition, Diuision, and Argumentation: whereof we shall speake hereafter in their proper places. In the meane time, because questions are the matter wherein Logicke is chiefly occupied, wee will speake first of a question.

## CHAP. II.

*Of a question, and of certaine diuisions of words.*



*What is a question?*

A question is a speech whereof some doubt is made and vttered with some interrogatorie: as, How, What, or Whether: and such question is either simple or compound.

*Which call you simple, and which compound?*

It is called simple, when the question consisteth onely of one word: as when I aske what Iustice is, or what Fortitude is, and such like; and is to bee discussed by defining and diuiding the same. It is called compound, when it consisteth of many words ioyned together by rules of Gramar, to make some perfect sentence; as when I aske whether it bee lawfull for the Christians to make warre vpon the Turkes, or not: and such like questions, which are to bee discussed by arguing and reasoning on both sides: for Definition, Diuision, and Argumentation, as I said before, are the three especiall instruments whereby Logicke findeth out the truth in any doubtfull matter.

*Of*

*Of what parts doth a compound question consist?*

Of two, that is, the subiect and the predicate.

*What means you by these words, subiect and predicate?*

The subiect is the word or sentence, whereof another word or sentence, called the predicate, is spoken: as when I say, Man is a sensible body; here this word Man is the subiect, and sensible body is the predicate: or each of them may containe many words, as this, To be learned in the Law requireth a long study; here To be learned in the Law is the subiect, and all the rest is the predicate.

*How shall I know in long speeches, and specially being propositiously, of which is the subiect, and which is the predicate?*

By asking this question, Who, or What: for that which answereth to this question, is alwaies the Subiect, as in this example: It were meet to learne my Grammar perfectly, before I entered into my Logicke: here if you aske, What is meet, you shall find that to learne my Grammar perfectly is the Subiect, and all the rest to bee the predicate. And note that these two words, Subiect and Predicate, are said to bee the termes, limits, or extreme bounds of a proposition, whereof we shal speake hereafter.

*Sith every question doth consist of words, we thinke it were necessary to shew how words are divided.*

Of words the Schoolemen make diuers and manifold diuisions, of which I mind here to recite but three onely, whereof the first is this: Of words some be simple, which they call *Incplexa*; and some bee compound, which they call *Complexa*. Simple or single words, are such as are sole or seuered one from another, not making any sentence, as Man, Horse, Wolfe. The compound are wordes ioyned orderly together by rules of Grammar, to make some perfect sentence, as Man is a sensible body. And hereof the questions are said to bee either simple or compound, as hath beene said before.

*What is the second diuision of words?*

Of words, some be of the first Intention, and some of the second.

*Which are they?*

Words of the first Intention are those, whereby any thing is



signified or named by the purpose and meaning of the first Author or Inuentor thereof, in any speech or language whatsoever it be: as the beast whereon wee commonly ride, is called in English a *Horse*, in Latine *Equus*, in Italian *Canallo*, in French *Cheual*. Words of the second Intention are termes of Art, as a Noun, Pronoun, Verbe, or Participle, are termes of Grammar: likewise *Genus*, *Species*, *Proprius*, and such like, are termes of Logicke.

*What is the third diuision of words?*

Of words some be called *Individua*, that is to say, particular, or rather singular; and some be called *Vniuersalia*, that is to say, vniuersall, common or generall.

### CHAP. III.

*Of singular and most particular words, called Individua.*



*What is Individuum?*

*Individuum* is that which signifieth but one thing only, and can be applyed but to one thing only; as this name, *Iohn*, or *Robert*, signifieth but one certaine man, and not many.

*How many kinds of Individuums be there?*

Four, that is, *Individuum determinatum*, *Individuum demonstratiuum*, *Individuum vagum*, and *Individuum ex hypothesis*.

*What is Individuum determinatum?*

*Individuum determinatum*, that is to say, certaine or determined, is the proper name of some one certaine thing, whatsoever it be; as *Iohn* or *Thomas* is the proper name of some or one man: againe, *Bucephalus* is the proper name of great *Alexander* his Horse: and *London* is the proper name of the chiefest Citie in England.

*What is Individuum demonstratiuum?*

*Individuum demonstratiuum*, which is as much to say, as shewing or pointing is a common word or name ioyned with a Pronoun demonstratiue, to signifie some one certaine thing onely, as when we say, this man, or that horse: and *Individuum demonstratiue* be more redy to signifie particular things, as well in accidents,

dents as in substances, then are *Individua determinata*: for This, or That, and such like Pronounes, doe point out a thing, as it were, with the finger, when proper names oftentimes doe faile: yea, the Pronounne demonstratiue is of such force, as being ioyned to the most generall word that is, maketh it *Individuum*, as well as when it is ioyned to the most especiall: for, this substance or this body is *Individuum*, as well as this man or that horse.

*What is Individuum vagum?*

*Individuum vagum*, that is to say, wandering or vncertayne, is a word betokening some one certaine thing but not certainly: as when I say, There was a certayne man here to seeke you; by this speech is meant but one man, and yet vncertayne who it was: and therefore, to make the thing more certayne, we vse to adde some token or marke; as we reade in the *Acts* of the Apostles, *There was a certayne man which was halt and lame from his mothers wombe, whom they laid daily before the gate of the Temple, &c.* And note, that like as we doe vse *individa, demonstratiua*, and *determinata*, in declaring things either present, or certainly knowne: so in speaking of things absent, or vncertainly known, we expresse our minds oftentimes by *individa vaga*.

*What is Individuum ex hypothesi?*

*Individuum ex hypothesi*, that is to say, by supposition, is a word which of his owne naturall signification being common and vniuersall, is made notwithstanding by supposition a singular word, and to signifie but one thing onely: as for example, this word, *The sonne of Marie*, is a common terme, and yet by supposition is made to signifie none but *Christ* onely: likewise when we say, *The Greeke Poet*, we meane none but *Homer*.

### CHAP. IIII.

*Of words vniuersall or generall.*



*What words are said to be vniuersall or generall?*

Those words are said to be vniuersall, which are spoken of many things, that is to say, which may be applyed to many things, or comprehend many things, as this word *Animal* (which is as

much to say as a sensible body) comprehendeth both Man; bruite Beast, Fish, Fowle, Bird, and euery thing else that hath feeling and mouing.

*How are such words diuided?*

Into Predicables and Predicaments.

*Of the five Predicables.*

**W**hat call you Predicables?

*Predicables* are certayne degrees, or rather pedigrees of words that be of one affinitie, shewing which comprehend more, and which comprehend lesse.

*How many such be there?*

There be five, that is to say, *Genus, Species, Differentia, Proprium, & Accidens*: which may be Englished thus, Generall kind, Speciall kind, Difference, Propertie, and Accident. But we thinke it best to begin first with *Species*, because it is next to *Individuum*.

*Of the speciall kind, called in Latine Species.*

**W**hat is *Species*?

*Species* is a speciall kind, which is spoken of many things, that is to say, it comprehendeth many things differing only in number, in asking the question, what the thing is: as when I aske, What is *John*? it is rightly answered, to say, A man: for this word *Man* is an vniuersall word, comprehending both *John, Thomas, Robert*, and all other singular men.

*How manifold is Species?*

Twofold, that is, *Infima* and *Subalterna*. *Infima*, that is to say, the lowest or most especiall kind, is that which comprehendeth many things differing only in number, and therefore cannot be a generall kind, as *Man, Horse*, and such like speciall kinds. *Species subalterna*, is that which comprehendeth many things differing in kind, and in diuers respects may be both *genus* and *species*, as these words, *Animal* or sensible body, *Bird, Fish*: for this word *Bird*, in that it comprehendeth diuers kinds of birds, as a *Blackbird, a Mauys, a Goldfinch*, and many other kinds of birds,

it is a generall kind : but in respect of these words, Substance, Body, or *Animal*, it is but *species*.

*How is species called of the Greeks?*

It is called *Idea*, which is as much to say, as a common shape conceiued in the mind, through some knowledge had before of one or two *Individuums* hauing that shape: so as after wee haue seene one Wolfe, or two, we beare the shape thereof continually in our minds, and thereby are able to know a Wolfe whensoever we find him, or (if need be) to paint him. But *Genus* extendeth too farre, and comprehendeth too many speciall kinds to be so easily painted. And note that such shapes or *Idea* are said also to be perpetuall.

*Why are they said to be perpetuall?*

Because they continue in the mind, though the things themselves cease to haue any being: as the shape of a Rose continueth in our minds in the cold heart of Winter, when there is no Rose indeed. And this is the true meaning of *Plato* touching *Idea*, that is, to be perpetuall in the mind, not separate from mans intelligence, as some men faine: for vniuersalities are alwayes to bee comprehended in mans mind, but not *Individua*: which, because they are infinite, there can be had of them no certayne science or knowledge.

*Of the generall kind, called Genus.*

**W***hat is Genus?*

*Genus* is a generall kind which may be spoken of many things differing in speciall kind, in asking the question, what the thing is: as if I aske, What is man, or horse? It is rightly answered, to say, *Animal*: for this word *Animal* comprehendeth both man, horse, Ivn, and many other speciall kinds of beasts.

*How is it diuided?*

Into two, that is, *Genus* most generall, and *Genus* subalternate.

*What is Genus most generall?*

It is that which in no respect can be *species*, as these, Substance, Quantitie, Qualitie, and all the rest of the ten Predicaments, which be the highest kinds, comprehending all other kinds, and are comprehended of none.

*What*





|                       |  |                            |   |
|-----------------------|--|----------------------------|---|
| Living,               | { Body com-<br>pound is ey-<br>ther  | { Or unliving,<br>as       | { Stones,<br>Metals,<br>Liquors.  |
| Sensible,             | { Against the<br>living bodie<br>is eyther   | { Or unsensi-<br>ble, as   | { Tree,<br>Herbe,<br>Shrubbe.   |
| Reasonable,<br>as man | { The sensible<br>body, called<br>in Latine<br>Animal,<br>is eyther  | { Or unreason-<br>able, as | { Four footed beasts<br>Creeping beasts,<br>Fish,<br>Fowle, or<br>Bird. |
|                       | { The reason-<br>able body is<br>man, called<br>in Latine<br>Homo,<br>which is a<br>most especie-<br>all kind: | { As                       | { Socrates, Plato,<br>and every other<br>singular man.                  |

Of Difference, called of the Latines, Differentia.

**W**Hat is difference?

Difference is that whereby things doe differ one from another, or any thing from it selfe.

How many kinds of differences be there?

According to Porphyrius, there be three kinds, that is to say, common, proper, and most proper or especiall, called of the Latines, *Differentia specifica*.

What call you a common difference?

A common difference is some separable accident, whereby one thing differeth from another, or from it selfe: as a hot man from a cold, or a man standing from himselfe sitting.

*What is proper difference?*

A proper difference is some inseparable accident, whereby one thing differeth from another, or from it selfe: as the Swan by whitenesse differeth from the Crow, the gray-eyed man from another man that hath blacke eyes, or from himselfe, as hauing now an vnmooueable skarre in his face, whereas before hee had none.

*What is the most proper difference?*

The most proper difference, only receiued and allowed of the Logicians, is that which is spoken of many things differing in kind or number, in asking the question what manner of thing any thing is, as this word reasonable or vnreasonable: for if I aske the question, what manner of thing this man or that man is, as *John, Thomas, or Richard, &c.* it is rightly answered, to say, A reasonable body. Likewise if I aske what manner of thing a Horse is, it is truly answered, to say, An vnreasonable body: for these be the most proper and especiall differences, whereby men and bruit beasts doe differ one from another.

*How manifold is the office of a Logickall difference?*

Twofold: the one to diuide the generall kind into his especiall kinds, and the other to constitute or make the selfe-same speciall kinds. Wherefore such differences are said in diuers respects to be sometimes diuisiue, and sometimes constitutiue, yea and sometimes both; as these differences, corporate and vncorporate, liuing and vnliving, sensible and vsensible, reasonable and vnreasonable; which, in that they do diuide some generall kind into other kinds, eyther more speciall, or not so generall, they may be called differences diuisiue: but in that they constitute or make any speciall kind, as this difference reasonable being added to a sensible body, maketh the speciall kind, many such difference may be well called a difference constitutiue, or rather specificatiue, as the former Table of generall kinds and differences doth plainly shew.

*What other diuision doe the Schoolemen make of this Logickall difference?*

They say, that of these differences some do extend further then some, for some may be applyed to many speciall kinds, as liuing,  
and



and vnliving, sensible and vnreasonable, but the difference to be applied but to one speciall kind onely, which is

*Of Propertie, called in Latine Proprium.*

**VV** *What is propertie?*

It is a natural inclination or property incident to one especiall kind, which is to be vnderstood foure māner of waies.

*Shew how.*

First, it is called *Proprium*, which is proper to one onely kind, but not to the whole kind, as to be a Poet or Musician, is proper to man, but not to euery man: Secondly, it is called proper that belongeth to all the kind, but not to that kind alone: as to bee two-footed, belongeth to all mankind, but not to that kind alone: for all flying Fowles are also two-footed: Thirdly, it is said to be proper, when it belongeth to one only kind and to all that kind, but yet not alwayes: as to be hore-headed or bald, is proper to man in olde-age, but yet not alwaies: Fourthly, it is said to bee proper, or rather most proper, which is incident to one kind alone, to all that kind and alwaies, as to haue a naturall aptnesse to laugh or to speake is proper to man onely, to euery man, and alwayes, and therefore this kind of property is said to bee conuertible. with the kind whereunto it belongeth, as whatsoeuer hath naturally power to speake or laugh, the same is man, and whatsoeuer is man, the same hath power to speake or laugh.

*Of an accident, called in Latine, Accidens.*

**VV** *What is an accident?*

An accident is a voyce or word signifying things casuall, cleauing to substances or subiects, without which subiects they haue no being at all, and it is thus defined. An accident is that which may bee absent or present without corruption of the subiect whereto it cleaueth, because it is no substantiall part of the subiect, and of such accidents some bee called separable, and some vnseparable.

*What is a separable accident?*

A separable accident is that which may bee easily separated

from

*What is proper difference?*

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*Of Propertie, called in Latine Pronrium*

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*What is a separable accident?*

A separable accident is that which may bee easily separated from

from the subiect, as heat or cold from a mans body, whitenesse or blacke from a wall.

*What is an vnseparable accident?*

An vnseparable accident is that which cannot bee separated from his subiect in deed, but only in thought or imagination, as heat from the fire, heauinesse from lead. And such accidents bee either incident to certaine subiects, or substances in particular, as some men to bee gray-eyed, or red-headed; or else to some whole kind in generall, as to all Rauens to be blacke, and all Swannes to be white.

*Of the manifold vses of the aforesaid five Predicables.*

**T***O how many vses doe the Predicables serue?*

To these foure necessarie vses: First, they shew which words doe comprehend more, or extend furthest, and which comprehend lesse or least, and what affinitie is betwixt word and word, so as in making any definition, a man may easily perceiue how euery word ought to be expounded one by another, that is to say, the lesse common by that which is more common; as if you would define a Spaniell, you must say that he is a dog: for this word dogge is a more common word then Spaniell, because it comprehendeth both Spaniell, Grey-hound, Hound, Curre, Mastiffe, and euery other kind of dogge. Secondly, they shew the nature of propositions, which be necessary, and which be casuall or accidentall.

*Which call you necessary, and which casuall?*

That proposition is said to be necessary, whereof the predicate is eyther a generall kinde, a speciall kinde, a speciall difference, or propertie, and is necessarily coupled to his subiect; as when I say, *Iohn* is a sensible body, *Iohn* is a man, *Iohn* is reasonable, *Iohn* is apt to speake.

*When is a proposition said to be accidentall?*

When the predicate is an accident, as when I say, *Iohn* is learned or vnlearned, white or blacke. Thirdly, they yeeld matter meet to make definitions and diuisions: for Logicall definitions be made of the nighest general kinds ioined together, with their true differences or properties; as in defining a man, we say that

man

man is a sensible body endued with reason; and in making diuisions, wee either diuide the generall kinds into their especiall kinds, as a sensible body into man and bruite beasts, or the speciall kinds into their *Individuums*, as man into *Iohn*, *Thomas*, &c. or else we diuide subiects into their accidents, as of men, some be free, and some be bound, and such like. Fourthly, they helpe much towards the inuention of arguments: for arguments bee fetched from the common places, as from the generall kinde, the speciall kinde, the difference, the propertie, and from other like places of inuention, as shall be taught hereafter in his proper place. And note, that of these Predicables doe spring certayne Predications, whereof we come now to speake.

CHAP. V.

*Of Predication, and of the diuers kinds thereof.*



*What is Predication?*

*Predication* is a certayne kinde or phrase of speech, whereby one word is spoken of another, and aptly applyed to another, as when wee say, *Iohn* is a man; for this word man is a generall word, and is spoken of *Iohn*, *Thomas*, *Richard*, and euery other singular man.

*How many kinds of Predications be there?*

Two, that is, Essentiall and Accidentall.

*What is essentiall predication?*

It is a naturall and vsuall kind of speech, whereby one thing is naturally and properly spoken of another, or as the Logicians say, when words superiour are spoken of their inferiors being of one selfe affinitie, as when the generall kinde is spoken of any his speciall kinds, or the speciall kind of any his *Individuums*, or when the difference or propertie is spoken of their speciall kinds, or of any of the *Individuums* comprehended vnder the said speciall kinds; as when we say, Man is a sensible body, or that *Iohn* is a man, or, *Iohn* is reasonable, or, *Iohn* is apt to speake, or such like: for such speeches are both naturall, and of necessitie, because the predicate is aptly applyed to his subiect. To this



kinde of predication some men doe also referre two other kinds of speeches.

*Which be they?*

Predication, Identicall and vnsuall.

*What is Identicall predication?*

It is a kinde of speech, whereby one selfe thing is spoken of it selfe, as when we say, *John is John*, which though it be essentiall, yet because nothing is expounded thereby, it is not allowed of the Logicians.

*What is vnsuall Predication?*

It is a kinde of speech seldome vsed, as when we reade in the holy Scriptures, God is man, The Word was made flesh; for these be most essentiall and necessarie speeches, though not vsuall in any other science then in Diuinitie.

*What is predication accidentall?*

Predication accidentall is, when an accident is spoken of his subiect, as, Wine is sweet, or, Wine is sowre, *Socrates* walketh; for this is a casuall kinde of speech, imploying no necessitie, as doe the other essentiall or naturall speeches before recited. To this also may be referred Predications by way of similitude, as when we say, One man is a God or Deuill to another, A Tyrant is a Wolfe or Fox, that is to say, like a Wolfe or Fox, which are otherwise called figuratiue or metaphorical speeches. But whilst we talke here of accidentall predications, it shal not be amisse to shew you that the Schoolemen, the more distinctly to expresse the nature of accidents, doe vse two termes, *Abstractum* and *Concretum*. *Abstractum* is the bare shape of any subiect separated by imagination from the same, as the whitenesse or blacknesse of a wall, or any other thing that is either white or blacke, which abstract cannot be properly spoken of his subiect; for it were no proper speech, to say, that this wall is whitenesse: wherefore we must vse the adiectiue called *Concretum*, signifying the shape, together with the subiect, as when we say, This wall is white.



*What are Predicaments?*

Predicaments are certayne Titles or Tables containyng all things that be in the world: for every thing, whatloeuver it be, is either a substance, or accident: and if it be a substance, it is found in the Table of substance hereafter following: if it be an accident, it belongeth either to quantitie, qualitie, relation, action, passion, time, place, to be scited, or to haue: for these be the Tables of accidents, in one of the which euery accident is easie to be found. So that in all there be ten Predicaments or Tables, one of substance, and nine of accidents, and these be called the highest and most generall kinds, albeit there be others indeede higher then they, called of the Schoolemen, *Transcendentia*, that is to say, surpassing, as these, *Res, ens, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum*: which may be Englished thus; a thing, a being, one, somewhat, true, good. But forsomuch as these be not spoken of the other higher kinds according to one selfe signification, but may be diuersly applyed, they are excluded from the order of Predicaments.

*What other words are excluded from the order of Predicaments?*

All compound words, called of the Schoolemen *Complexa*, as Goodman, *Plato* disputeth: and all doubtfull words hauing diuers significations, otherwise called Equiuokes, and also termes of Art; as a Noun, a Pronoun, a Verbe, which be termes of Grammar, and as *genus, species, differentia*, which be termes of Logicke, and such like: which termes of Art are called of the Schoolemen, names of the second intention, as hath beene said before. Notwithstanding, differences constituting especial kinds, doe belong to the Predicament of the same speciall kinds, and the parts of any whole thing doe belong to the Predicament wherein the whole is containd: and first, principles doe belong to the Predicament or Table of those things whereof they be principles, as a point or pricke belongeth to the Predicament of quantitie, all which shall be plainly declared vnto you, immediately

diately after that wee haue somewhat talked of those things which the Schoolemen call *Antepredicamenta*, that is to say, Forepredicaments.

## CHAP. VII.

## Of Forepredicaments.



*What meane you by Forepredicaments?*

Forepredicaments be certayne definitions, diuisions, and rules taught by *Aristotle* before the Predicaments, for the better vnderstanding of the same, and therefore are called *Antepredicamenta*, that is to say, Forepredicaments.

*What, and how many things defineth he?*

Three, that is, Equiuokes, Vniuokes, and Denominatiues.

*What call you Equiuokes?*

*Equiuokes* be such things as haue one selfe name, and yet be diuers in substance or definition; as a naturall Dogge, and a certayne Starre in the firmament, are both called by one name in Latine, *Canis*, yet they be nothing like in substance, kind, or nature. And note that the Schoolemen doe call the word or name it selfe, *Equiuocum Equiuocatum*, and the thing signified by the word, *Equiuocum Equiuocatum*. They make also two kinds of Equiuokes, that is, Equiuokes by chance, and Equiuokes of purpose. The first is, when one selfe name is giuen to many things by chance, and not for any likenesse that is betwixt them, as in English this word Hart signifieth as well the Hart of a man or beast, as a certayne beast called a Hart in the Forrest. The second is, when one selfe name is giuen to diuers things of purpose, for some likenesse that is betwixt them, as a painted man is called man as well as the living man; for wee will commonly say, Here is King *Henrie* the Eighth, when indeed it is but his picture. But yee must note, that all Equiuokes being generally pronounced without addition, ought to be vnderstood according to their chiefe and most principal signification, as this word man being generally spoken, ought to be taken for a living man, and not for a painted man: but no Equiuokes ought to be placed in any Predicament, neither can it bee defined, vnlesse it bee first brought

brought to one certaine signification; and therefore all Equiuokes are viterly barred from all manner of Discipline.

*What call you Vniukes?*

Vniukes bee those things that haue one common name, which is spoken of them essentially, or really, as a man, a horse, a Lion, whose common name is *animal*, or sensible body; for in asking what either of them is, it is rightly answered, to say, *animal*. And I say here really, because it is not enough for Vniukes to haue a common name, vnlesse the same be also reall or essentiall, whereby are excluded all common names or vnderstandings that be accidentall: for though white or blacke, swift or slow, or such like, is a common name, and is commonly applyed both to man and beast, yet that is accidentally, and not really or substantially. Moreover, the Schoolemen doe call the common word it selfe *Vniuocum Vniuocans*, and the thing signified by the word *Vniuocum Vniuocatum*.

*What call ye Denominatiues?*

Denominatiues are those accidents that be of like name, and differ only in case, or finall termination; as humble, humilitie; proud, proudnesse: for of humilitie, a man is said to be humble; and of pride, to be proud: and according to the Schoolemen, that word whereof the name doth spring, is called *Denominator*, and the name it selfe *Denominatiue*, and the thing or person so called, the *Denominated*; as if I should say of valiantnesse, *Peter* is said to be valiant; here valiantnesse is the Denominator, valiant the Denominatiue, and *Peter* the Denominated: for *Peter* is the subiect whereunto the Denominator doth cleaue. The Grammarians doe call the Denominator *Abstractum*, that is, a substantiue, and the Denominatiue *Concretum*, that is, an Adiectiue.

*To what end doth Aristotle chiefly vse these definitions?*

To shew the differences of predications, or kinds of speeches, which are to be allowed, and which not; againe, to know which be predications essentiall, and which bee accidentall: for according to the three definitions before rehearsed, there bee three Predications, that is to say, Predication Equiuocall, Vniuocall, and Denominatiue.

*What is Predication Equiuocall?*

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Predication Equiuocall, is when the Equiuocall is spoken of any of the things that it signifieth, as to say, His Letter was a Letter of the matter, meaning perhaps a hinderer of the matter: but such kind of speeches ought to bee reiected from all good discipline, as hath beene said before.

*What is Predication Vniuocall?*

It is when the generall kinde is spoken of his especiall kinds, or the especiall kinde of her inferiours, or the speciall difference of that speciall kinde which it maketh, or of the Indiuiduums containd vnder the same speciall kinde, as when wee say, Man is a sensible body, Man hath reason, or, *Iohn* is a man.

*What is Predication Denominative?*

It is when some accident is spoken of his subiect, as when we say, *Peter* is proud, humble, or valiant.

*What, and how many diuisions be there?*

Two: The first diuision is touching words simple and compound, whereof though we haue said somewhat before, yet it shall not grieue vs, here againe to set it downe in such order as the Logicians vse.

*Shew how.*

Of words, some be simple, called in Latine, *Incomplexa*, and some be compound, called *Complexa*. Simple words bee distinct and seuerall words, not set together by any rule of Grammar, to make any perfect sentence, as, good, iust, a man, a horse, to stand, to goe. Compound words be words significatiue, which are ioyned together by rules of Grammar to make some perfect sentence, as, *Iohn* is learned.

*What is the second diuision?*

The second diuision is fourefold, as followeth: First, of things that be, some be spoken of a subiect, and yet be in no subiect, as, man, horse, and such like vniuersall natures or substances: for they be no accidents. Secondly, some be in a subiect, and yet be not spoken of any subiect, as all particular accidents, as this or that colour, for these be Indiuiduums, and therefore not predicable. Thirdly, some be in a subiect, and also be spoken of a subiect, as all vniuersall accidents, as Science, Grammar, Logicke, and such like: for of these some be generall, and some be speciall kinds,



kinds, and therefore are said to be predicable accidents. Fourthly, some be neither in a subiect, nor spoken of a subiect, as *Iohn, Thomas*, this man, or that man, this horse, or that horse; for these bee first natures or substances, and therefore are subiects themselves not predicable.

*Whereto serueth this diuision?*

By this diuision ye may learne the diuersity of these two speeches, to be spoken of a subiect, and to be in a subiect: for to be spoken of a subiect, is to be spoken really or essentially of some thing that is part thereof, as this word *animal*, or sensible body, is really spoken of man, horse, & of euery other thing that hath life and feeling; for they bee substantiall parts of that generall kinde: for if it be demanded what a man or horse is, it is rightly answered, that he is a sensible body. But to be in a subiect, is to be spoken of another thing accidentally, and not essentially, as this word white or blacke is spoken accidentally of man, or of any other subiect, and not essentially; for neither is man any essentiall part of white, nor white any essentiall part of man, and therefore cannot be in man, or in any other subiect, but accidentally: and for that cause it is spoken of his subiect accidentally, and not really.

*Now tell how many, and what those rules bee, whereof you spake before.*

There be two rules. The first is thus: When one thing is spoken of another essentially, as of his subiect, then whatsoeuer may be spoken of that predicate, must needs be also really spoken of the same subiect: for as this word sensible body is spoken of man or horse essentially, as when wee say that man is a sensible body; so this word liuing body, being spoken essentially of a sensible body, as when wee say that euery sensible body is a liuing body, is also as really spoken of the foresaid subiect, man, in saying that man is a liuing body; for this word, liuing body, is a more generall kind then sensible body is.

*What is the second rule?*

The second rule is thus: Diuers generall kinds not contained one of another, nor both of a third, haue diuers speciall differences, which doe make diuers speciall kinds, as a sensible body and

science: for the speciall differences of a sensible body are these; reasonable and vnreasonable, making both man and bruit beast: but the differences of science be these, contemplatiue and disputatiue, and such like, whereby are made speciall kindes of knowledge: for the difference contemplatiue maketh naturall Philosophie, and the difference disputatiue maketh Logicke.

*To what end serue these rules?*

To the end it might be easily knowne what words are of affirmatie, and which bee of one selfe predicament, and which not. Thus farre as touching fore-predicaments. Now to the predicaments themselues. And first we will speake of substance.

### CHAP. VIII.

#### *Of Substance.*



*What is substance? and how many kindes of substances be there?*

Substance is a thing consisting of it selfe, and needeth no helpe to sustaine the being thereof: and yet it is clad with accidents; for otherwise we could not discern with our outward senses, whether it were a substance, or not: for we cannot see the substance of any thing with our bodily eyes, but only with the eyes of our mind & vnderstanding; but we may see the shape, the quantitie, the colour, and such like accidents cleauing to the substance, without the which those accidents haue no being at all: and therefore in seeing such accidents, we may assure our selues that there is a substance sustaining those accidents, which doth alwayes remaine, though the accidents doe faile or change neuer so often. As for example: We see in water, that though it be sometime hot, and sometime cold, now of one colour, and now of another, yet the substance of water doth still remaine, so as wee may perceiue those accidents to be one thing, and the substance of water to be another. Now as touching the kindes of substance, according to Aristotle, there be two, that is, first and second.

*What call you first substances?*

First, substances be those substances which the Logicians call

*Individua*, as *Iohn*, *Thomas*, this man, or that man, this horse, or that horse, and by reason of their accidents are to bee discerned with outward senses.

*Which call you second Substances?*

Second substances are those which they call speciall kindes, and generall kindes, as man, a sensible bodie, a liuing bodie, and such like, which are to bee comprehended only by mans reason, and be not subiect to our outward senses, as first substances bee. And these second substances are otherwise called of the Schoolmen, vniuersall natures.

*How many properties doe belong to substance?*

These three: First, substance is contained in no subiect, as an accident is: for though the parts of a mans body be contained in the whole, yet euery such part is a peculiar body or substance, and hath his proper being of it selfe so well as the whole, whereas accidents without substance haue no being at all. Secondly, substances are said to bee diuers, but not contrarie one to another: for neither is fire, as touching his substance, contrarie to water, nor the Wolfe contrary to the Lambe, but onely in respect of their qualitie, whereunto contrarietie doth properly belong. Thirdly, of substances, one cannot be more or lesse then another; for the greatest Giant, as touching substance, is no more a man then the least Dwarfe that is; neither is a man full growne, more a man, then a child newly borne: for more or lesse appertaineth properly to quantitie, and not to substance. But if you will vnderstand how farre the predicament of substance doth extend, and what it comprehendeth, consider well this Table following, whereby you may learne how to define any kind of substance, whatsoeuer it bee: for there you shall find all the kinds, both generall and speciall, together with their differences, most plainly set forth.

# The first Booke

## The Table of Substance.

Substance is either

without body, as

An Angell, as *Gabriel, Michael, &c.*

A spirit or soule separate from the body, as the spirit  
or soule of this or that dead man.

Simple, if it be simple,  
it is either

Celestiall, as the eleuen Heauens,  
and all the starres and planets,  
Or elementall, as *fire, ayre, water,*  
earth.

Reasonable, as  
man, as  
*Socrates, Plato, Virgil.*

Sensible, if  
it be a sensible  
body,  
called in  
Latine,  
*animal*, it is  
either

Or vnreasonable,  
as  
A bird or fowle,  
as a Larke, &c.  
A four-footed beast  
as a horse.  
A fish, as a talmé  
a creeping beast  
as a worme, a  
snake, a viper.

liuing:  
if it be  
liuing,  
it is either

Or with  
body: if it  
be with  
body, it is  
eyther

Or vn-  
sensible, as a  
plant, which  
is eyther

A tree, as an Oke, an Apple-tree, &c.  
A shrubbe, as bryers,  
broome, &c.  
Or herbe, as Thyme, I-lope, Margerum.

Or compound:  
if it be  
compound, it  
is either

Metall, as Gold and Silver,  
&c.

or vn-  
liuing,  
if it be  
vnliuing, it  
is eyther

Perfect, if  
it be perfect,  
it is eyther

Or stone, which is  
eyther  
Naturall, as a precious  
stone, a flint.  
Or artificiall, as a tile or  
bricke.  
Or liquor, as Wine, Honie, &c.

or vnperfect, as

Fiery impressions, as  
thunder, lightning.  
Or watry impressions, as  
raine, haile, snow, &c.

CHAP. IX.

Of Quantitie.




What is quantitie, and how is it diuided?

Quantitie is that which comprehendeth the greatnesse and number or multitude of things, and is diuided into two kindes, that is, whole and broken.

What is whole quantitie?

Whole quantitie, called in Latine, *quantitas continua*, is that whose parts are ioyned together with some common bound or limit, which is the ending of one part, and the beginning of another, as the parts of the line here set downe in the margin, marked with the letters *a. c.* are coupled together with the middle point *b.* which point is the ending of *a. b.* & the beginning of *b. c.*



How many kinds of whole quantitie be there?

Of whole quantitie there be three kinds, that is *linea*, *superficies*, and *corpus*.

Shew how they are defined and diuided.

*Linea* (in English, a line) is a length without either bredth or thicknesse, which is either right, or crooked; right, as a yard, an ell, or pole; crooked, as a hoope, or circle.

*Superficies* (which wee may properly interpret to be the vpper face of any thing) is a length and bredth without depth or thicknesse; and that is either plaine, or bowing; plaine, as a plain or smooth floore; bowing or compassing, as a vault or ouen, whereof the outward side is called conuex, and the inward side concaue or hollow.

*Corpus* (which is as much to say as a body) is that which hath both length, bredth, and depth, and that is either round, or with angles; round, as a bowle or ball; with angles or corners, as a square die, or such like thing. All which three kinds of quantitie are to be considered onely with the minde mathematically, as things abstract, and separated from all kind of matter, that is to say, as things that haue no being at all, but imaginatiuely, & yet so necessarily inueted by man, as nothing can be measured with-

out



out them. To these three kinds of whole quantitie may bee also added two other kinds, that is to say, mouing, and time, being taken for the measure, space, or distance of place or time wherein any thing is moued.

*How many kinds of this mouing be there, and which be they?*

Of this mouing there be three kindes, that is, right, circular, and mixt. The right belongeth to the foure Elements, and to bodies without life: for their natural mouing is either right vpward or else right downward, as the fire, whose proper mouing is alwayes to ascend right vp, and the mouing of a stone, or such like heauie thing, is to fall right downward; for (according to the rules of Philosophie) all light things doe moue vpward, and all heauie things downward. Circular or round mouing, belongeth to the Heauens, and celestiall bodies, which do turne round like a Cart wheele. The mixt mouing (that is to say, partly right, and partly round) belongeth to all liuing beasts, that goe sometime forward, sometime backward, or sidelong, sometime vpward, and sometime downward.

*How is time diuided?*

Time is diuided into three kinds, that is, into time past, time present, and time to come: and vnder time are comprehended yerres, moneths, weekes, dayes, houres, and all other words signifying distance or difference of time.

*What is broken quantitie?*

Broken quantitie, called of the Latines, *quantitas discreta*, is that, whose parts are not ioyned with any common bound or limit, but be loose and seuerall one from another; which quantitie is diuided into two kinds, that is, number and speech.

*What is number, and how is it diuided?*

Number is a multitude or summe of vnities or ones gathered together: and such number is either simple, respectiue, or figurative: Simple, as two, three, foure, fiue, &c. Respectiue, as halfe, double, treble, quadruple, and such like: Figurative, as a three-square or foure-square number, like to these here figured . $\Delta$ . :: and such like.

*What things are comprehended vnder broken quantitie?*

All names of measures, whereby we measure any thing, either  
dry

drie or liquid, as gallon, quart, pint, bushell, pecke, pound, dram, scruple, graine, &c.

*How is speech here taken?*

Speech is taken here for the measure or quantitie of syllables, wherof some be long, and some be short: and such quantitie is to be considered either in harmonie, in rythme, or verse; of which things, the generall and speciall kindes, together with the rest that haue beene said touching quantitie, are orderly set forth in the table of quantitie here following.

*What, and how many properties doe belong to quantitie?*

To quantitie belong three properties: First, to haue no contrarietie; for great and small be not of themselves contrarie, but only by way of comparison. Secondly, to be greater or lesser, but not more or lesse, spoken aduerbially; for a little quantitie is a quantitie as well as the greatest quantitie of all. The third and chiefeft propertie of quantitie, is, to be equall or vnequall.

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# The first Booke

## The Table of Quantitie.

The Table of Quantities.

|                     |   |   |                                |   |   |
|---------------------|---|---|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Quantitie is either | whole, if it be whole it is either                  | permanent, if it be permanent, it is either   | A line, which is either        | Right, as a yard, an ell.<br>Or crooked, as a hoop, or bow, &c.<br>Plaine, as a smooth floor, &c.<br>Or bowing, as a vault, or oven, &c.<br>Round, as a bowle or ball.<br>Or with corners, as a square die, &c. |   |
|                     |   |   | A superficies, which is either |   |   |
|                     | Or broken: if it be broken quantitie, it is either. | Or measure of speech, which consisteth either | Motion, which is either        | Or time, and that is either   | Right,<br>Circular,<br>Or Mixt.<br>Time past,<br>Time present,<br>Or time to come.  |
|                     |   |   |                                | Or mutable, if it be mutable, it is either  |   |
|                     |   |   |                                | Number, which is either   | Simple, as even or odde, &c.<br>Respectiue, as double, treble, &c.<br>Or figuratiue, as three-cornered, foure-cornered, &c.   |
|                     |   |   |                                |   |   |
|                     |   |   |                                |   | In composition of syllables, as Dauidus, Spondus, &c.<br>In harmonie, as a third, a fifth, &c.<br>In rhyme, as charme, harme.<br>Or in verse, as hexameter, pentameter, lambicks. |
|                     |   |   |                                |   |   |



*What is qualitie?*

Qualitie is an affection, shape, or forme of the minde or bodie, whereof the thing so affected or formed taketh his name: as of wildome a man is said to be wise, and of iustice hee is called iust.

*How many kindes of qualitie be there?*

Of qualitie there be foure kinds, that is, habit and disposition, naturall power and impotencie, passion and passible qualitie, figure and forme.

*What is habit, and how is it diuided?*

Habit is a constant and absolute perfection in any thing, not giuen by nature, but gotten by long vse and exercise; and it is twofold, that is, of the minde, and of the body: againe, habit of the minde is twofold, whereof the one is called intellectuall, belonging to the reason and vnderstanding of man, and the other morall, belonging to the will of man. Of intellectuall habits, according to *Aristotle*, there be fiue, that is, Intelligence, Science, Prudence, Art, and Sapience.

1 Intelligence is the knowledge of speculatiue principles, as 2. and 2. make 4. the whole is more then his part; take equall from equall, and equall remaine, and such like.

2 Science is the knowledge of true conclusions, consisting of most certaine and infallible propositions; as, Man is a sensible body, Man is apt to learne: and vnder Science are comprehended the sciences rationally, as Grammar, Rhetoricke, and Logicke; also the sciences Mathematicall, as Arithmeticke, Geometrie, Musicke, and Astronomie, which are otherwise called Quadrivials, that is to say, the foure waies or kindes of mathematicall discipline; and finally, the science physicall, that is to say, naturall, as the naturall philosophie of *Aristotle*, or of any other Writer treating of the secrets of nature.

3 Prudence is an habit working with true iudgement and according to right reason in all things appertaining to man, be they good or euill. Prudence may be diuided into prudence morallicall,

nasticall, domesticall, and politicall. Monasticall teacheth to gouerne one sole person: domesticall, to gouerne a household or familie; and politicall, to gouerne a Common. wealth.

4 Art is an habit of knowledge consisting of assured and certaine rules, tried and approued by experience, and learned by exercise, teaching to do or to make something that is profitable to mans behoofe: and Art comprehendeth all Arts, both liberall and mechanicall, that is to say, handie-crafts. 5. Sapience, consisting both of intelligence, and of science, is the head and chiefe of those knowledges that be most honourable in nature, comprehending two notable Sciences, that is, the Christian Diuinitie, and the Philosophers Diuinitie, otherwise called Metaphysical, that is, supernaturall. And all these intellectuall habits are contained vnder a certaine and most sure knowledge, which is alwaies true: for vncertaine knowledge is sometimes true, and sometimes false: whereto belongeth opinion, suspicion, coniecture, and such like. Thus much of habit intellectuall.

*What is morall habit, and how is it diuided?*

It is a qualitie of the minde, gotten by custome and doctrine, teaching and inuiting mans will to worke, either well or euill; and is twofold, that is, either good, or euill: to the good belong all kinde of vertues, as iustice, liberalitie, fortitude, temperance, &c. to the euill al kinde of vices, as pride, couetousnesse, cowardlinesse, and such like. And note, that of vertues, some bee called morall, and some theologicall, that is to say, diuine.

*Which call you theologicall or diuine?*

Those that be not gotten by custome, or mans industrie, but are the meere gifts of God, as faith, hope, and perfect charitie, and all other gifts of the holy Ghost, as the gifts of the tongues, of prophecying, of healing, and such like: which some doe attribute to habit infused, making a difference betwixt habit infused, & habit acquired or gotten, as you may see in the Table following.

*What is habit of the bodie?*

Habit of the bodie is a certain aptnesse & agility of doing any thing with the bodie, not giuen by nature, but gotten by custome & exercise, as to ride well, to run, to leape, to daunce, to wrestle, to shoot, to fence, to dart, to swim, to write, to paint, and such like.

The



The Table of Habit.

|                 |   |  |                                     |   |
|-----------------|---|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| Habit is either | Of the body, as                                       | <p>To fence,<br/>To dart,<br/>To shoot,<br/>To wrestle,</p>  | Intelligence,                       | <p>Rational, as Grammar, Logicke, Rhetoricke.</p>   |
|                 | Infused, as   | <p>Faith,<br/>Hope,<br/>Charitie,</p>  | Science, which is                   | <p>Mathematicall, as Arithmetick, Geometrie, Musick, Astronomie.</p>  |
|                 | Or of the minde, if it bee of the minde, it is either | <p>Knowledge certain, if it be certaine it containeth the true intellectuall habits before defined, that is,</p> | Prudence is either                  | <p>Monasticall, Domesticall, Politicall, which are before defined.</p>  |
|                 | Or acquired, if it bee acquired, it is either         | <p>Intellectuall, intellectuall apprehendeth both</p>  | Art is either                       | <p>Libervall, as Husbandrie, Architecture.</p>  |
|                 |   |  | And Sapience, which containeth both | <p>or Mechanicall, as Tailors craft, Shoemakers craft, Carpenters craft.</p>  |
|                 |   |  | And knowledge uncertaine, as        | <p>Christian Divinitie, &amp; also Philosophers Divinitie, otherwise called Metaphysicall and supernaturall wisdom.</p> |
|                 |   |  | Virtue, as                          | <p>Opinion, Suspition, Conjecture.</p>  |
|                 |   |  | Or Morall, which comprehendeth both | <p>Injustice, Fortitude, Temperance, &amp;c.</p>  |
|                 |   |  | And vice, which is either           | <p>By excessive, as Rash boldnes, Prodigality.</p>  |
|                 |   |  |                                     | <p>By defective, as Cowardlines, Conetousnes.</p>   |

*What is disposition, and how is it divided?*

Disposition is an habit begun, but not perfected; and it is either of the body, or of the minde: for to disposition may be referred whatsoeuer was before attributed to habit (perfection in the thing only excepted) in which they differ for lacke of continuance, by reason whereof, disposition is said to bee easily remooued, but habit not so, because it is thorowly grounded: as for example, of the disposition that a man hath to learning, he is said to be studious: but of perfect habit, gotten by continuall studie in learning, hee is said to bee learned, which importeth a perfection, which is more then a disposition.

*Of naturall power and impotencie, the second kinde of Qualitie.*

**W***hat is naturall power?*


It is a naturall abilitie to doe, to suffer, or to resist, not gotten by exercise, but giuen by nature to the minde or body: to the minde, as to haue a good wit or memorie, to be apt to learning, and such like: to the body, as to bee healthfull, nimble, strong, and such like.

*What is naturall impotencie?*

It is a naturall weaknesse either of the minde or body: of the minde, as to bee dull of wit, to bee forgetfull, or vnapt to bee taught, and such like: of the body, as to be sickly, to bee weake and feeble, and vnapt to suffer any thing that an able body can doe or suffer.

*What is comprehended vnder this second kind of qualitie?*

To this kind may be referred all the naturall powers and impotencies of the soule vegetatiue, sensitiue, and intellectuall: also all naturall powers or vertues of herbs and stones, and the naturall influences of the Heauens, Stars, Elements, and of all the superiour or vpper bodies. All which things you may see plainly set forth in this Table following.



*Of passion and passible qualitie, the third kinde of qualitie.*

**W**Hat doth <sup>the</sup> third kinde of qualitie comprehend?  
 Passion and passible qualitie.

*What is passion?*

It is a sudden motion of the minde or body, that endureth not long, and therefore easie to be removed. Passion of the minde is a sudden feare or ioy conceiued of some euill or good that is offered: and of the body, as palenesse of colour, blushing, or trembling of the flesh.

*What is passible qualitie?*

It is an inueterate affection or motion of the minde or body, not easie to be removed: of the minde, as madnesse growne of some continuall sorrow or melancholie: of the body, as blacknesse of the face by continuall boiling heat of the bloud, or palenesse by continuall sicknesse of the body: and therefore passible qualitie is compared and likened to habit, and sudden passion to disposition.

*What is comprehended vnder passible qualitie?*

All the objects of the five outward senses, as colours, light, brightnesse, which be the objects of the sight; sounds, voices, and noises, the objects of hearing; saours, the objects of tasting; odours and smells, the objects of smelling; tangible qualities, which be the objects of feeling: of which tangible qualities some are said to be first, and some second; the first be these, heat, coldnesse, moistnesse, drinessse: the second be hardnesse, softnesse, heauinesse, lightnesse, roughnesse, smoothnesse, and such like.

*Which be the chiefe passions or affections of the minde?*

The chiefe affections be these foure, ioy, lust, sorrow, feare.

*How is ioy defined, and what good or euill branches doe spring thereof?*

Ioy is a sweet and delectable motion of the heart, wherewith it is stirred and delighted, whilest it enioyeth some good that is present, or (at the least) seemeth good: and hereof springeth delight, boasting, maleuolence, reioicing at other mens euill.

*What is lust, and what affections doe spring thereof?*

Lust is a motion of the minde, stirred vp by thinking of some  
 good

good indeed, or seeming good, that is absent, whereof do spring these affections, Hope, Desire, Loue, Anger, Wrath, & Hatred.

*What is sorrow, and what affections doe arise thereof?*

It is a grieuous motion of the heart, causing it to shrink together, whilst it flyeth some present euill, that is euill indeed, or seemeth euill: and hereof spring these affections, Enuie, Slandering, Mercy, Agony, Lamenting, Calamitie, Carefulness, Griefe and Desperation.


*What is feare, and what affections doe rise thereof?*

Feare is a grieuous motion, causing the heart to shrink together, whilst it flyeth some euill that is to come: and hereof spring these affections, Heauinesse, Shame, Terrour, Sownding, and such like: all which things you may see briefly set forth in the Table next following.


*November*

The Table of passion and passible qualitie.

XX



All the inneterate passions both of minde and body before set downe:



*Why are these objects of the senses called passible qualities?*

Because they make the senses to suffer, as the colour of any thing, by striking into the eye, maketh the sight to suffer, and



causeth eyther pleasure or griefe to the sight: so likewise the sweetnesse of hony in striking the taste, delighteth it: and contrariwise, the bitternesse of Gall, or such like thing, endued with a bitter savour, offendeth the taste.

*Of figure and forme, the fourth kind of qualitie.*

**VV** *What difference is betwixt figure and forme?*

Figure, according to some, is that which is inclosed with one bound or limit, or with many, as a Circle enuironed with one round line, called the circumference, or as a triangle or foure-square figure, whereof the one is enclosed with three lines, and the other with foure, and such like: but forme is the drawing or describing of the said figure. Againe, according to the opinion of some, figure is compared to an image representing some liuely thing: and forme is said to be the due proportion and feature of the same. Some againe doe attribute figure to things without life, and forme to things that haue life, briefly set downe in this Verse following:

*Formam videntis, pili dic esse Figuram:*

Englished thus:

The shapes of painted things they Figures call:

But living things (they say) are formed all.

*What doth this fourth kind of qualitie comprehend?*

It comprehendeth the accidentall figures and formes, as well of naturall, as artificiall things: of naturall, as the shape of man, beast, or fowle: or artificiall, as the shape or figure of a House, Temple, Ship, or such like: also it comprehendeth all Geometrical figures, as well perfect as vnperfect.

*Which call you perfect?*

Those that are inclosed within such bounds as nothing can be added or taken away from them, without marring or altering the same, as a Circle, a Triangle, a Square, and such like: whereof some are plaine, inclosed only with Lines, as Circles, Triangles, Squares, and such like: and some are solid or whole bodies, enclosed with vpper faces, either one or many, as round Spheres, sharpe Pinacles, Cubes, as a Dye, and round Pillers.

*Which call you vnperfect?*

Those

Those which are not so enclosed with their bounds, but that some one thing may bee added or taken away from the same, without changing or altering of the figure, as the rightnesse, roundnesse, concavities, or convexities of vnperfect figures, may be lengthned or shortned, and yet the former shape thereof shall still remaine, and not be altered, but only in quantitie.

A Table of figure and forme.

|                            |                               |            |   |  |   |  |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|---|--|---|--|
| Figure and forme is cyther | Perfect is either             | Plaine, as | { | A perfect Circle.                                      | { | Isopleurus,<br>Isosceles,<br>Scalenon,<br>Ambligonius,<br>Oxigonius,<br>Orisogonius.             |
|                            |                               |            |   | A Triangule,<br>whereof there be<br>fixe kinds.        |   |  |
|                            |                               |            |   | A quadrangle, as                                       |   | A perfect square,<br>A long square,<br>A square like an A,<br>Thorne-backe, cal-<br>led Rhombus. |
|                            |                               |            |   | Or having many<br>Angles as                            |   | A figure of 5. 6. or 7.<br>Angles, or more.  |
| Figure and forme is cyther | Or solid, which is cyther     | {          | { | Sphericall,<br>Pyramidall,<br>Cubicke, or Pillar-like. |   |  |
|                            |                               |            |   |  |   |  |
| Figure and forme is cyther | Or vnperfect, which is cyther | {          | { | Right,<br>Circular,<br>Convex,<br>or<br>Concave.       |   |  |
|                            |                               |            |   |  |   |  |

But the true descriptions of all the figures containd in this Table, are to be learned of the Geometricians, and not of the Logicians.

*Of the properties of qualitie.*

**H**ow many properties doe belong to *Qualitie*?

Three : First, to bee contrarie, as Vertue is contrarie to Vice, Heat to Cold, White to blacke : yet such contrarietie belongeth not to every kind of *Qualitie* ; for Triangles bee not contrarie to Squares, nor round pillars to sharpe pinacles.

*What is the second property?*

To be more or lesse : for one man may bee more vertuous, or lesse vertuous ; more learned, or lesse learned ; more healthfull, or lesse healthfull ; more or lesse hot or cold. Yet this property belongeth not to every kind of *Qualitie* ; for one Triangle is no more a Triangle then another. The like may bee said of the rest of the perfect Figures, as well plaine as solid.

*What is the third property?*

To be like or vnlike : and this is the chiefeft property belonging to every kind of *Qualitie* : as, two Grammarians be like one to another in their profession, two healthful or vnhealthfull, two white or two blacke, two Triangles or two squares are said to be like or vnlike one to another.

*How define you likenesse or vnlikenesse?*

Likenesse, according to *Boetius*, is when diuers things haue one selfe quality. Vnlikenes is, when they haue diuers qualities.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Relation.*



*What is Relation?*

It is the referring, comparing, or applying of one thing vnto another, for some respect of affinity or likenesse, wherewith they are knit so together, as the one cannot be well vnderstood without the other : and therefore the things so compared are called Relatiues, or rather Correlatiues ; for of things, some are said to be absolute, and some respectiue or relative.

*Which call you absolute?*

Absolute are those which may be vnderstood by themselves, without

without being applyed to any other thing, as substance, quantitie, qualitie.

*Which are said to be relative or respectiue?*

Those that cannot be wel vnderstood of themselves, without hauing relation to some other thing, as the Father and the Son, the Lord and the Bondman, the Master and the Scholer, &c. Here note, that of the Schoolemen the thing from which the application is made, is called in Latine, *Fundamentum*, in English, *The foundation*; and the thing whereunto the relation or application is made, is called in Latine, *Terminus*, in English, *the bound, end, or terme*, as in these Correlatiues, the Father and the Sonne, the Lord and the Bondman, the Schoolemaster and the Scholer. Here, the Father, the Lord, and Schoolemaster, are called, euery of them, *Fundamentum*; but the Sonne, the Bondman, and Scholer, euery of them is called, *Terminus*, that is, the end or terme; and the application of the one to the other is called relation.

*How many kinds of Relatiues be there?*

Two: Relatiues *secundum esse*, that is, indeed, and Relatiues *secundum dicti*, which we may call, Relatiues in name.

*Which call you Relatiues indeed?*

Those which according to their principall signification haue relation to some other thing, without which they cannot bee vnderstood: as a Father is not to be vnderstood, without there bee a Sonne, nor a Sonne, vnlesse there bee a Father. The like may be said of a Tutor and Pupill, the Master and his Scholer, and such like.

*What call you Relatiues in name?*


Those that according to their principall signification may be vnderstood, without hauing relation to any other thing; and yet, because in some respect they haue relation to some other thing, they are called Relatiues, but not properly, for they differ not from the absolute things before defined, as Vertue, Vice, Habit, Disposition, &c.

*What other diuision is there of Relatiues?*

Of Relatiues, some are said to be of one selfe name, and some of diuers: of one selfe name, as like, vnlike, equall, vnequall, schoole-fellow, neighbour, and such like: of diuers names, as the

Father, the Sonne, the Lord and Bondman, &c. And of such, some be more worthy, and some be lesse worthy, as the Father is more worthy, the Sonne lesse worthy; the Master more worthy, the Scholer lesse worthy: which diuisions this Table doth shew.

### The Table of Relation.



*Of the properties of Relation.*

**H**ow many properties doe belong to Relation?

**F**ive: First, to haue contrarietie, as Vertue and Vice, Science and Ignorance. But this propertie belongeth not to all: for double and the one halfe hath no contrarietie, nor the Father and the Sonne.

W/AS



*What is the second proprietie?*

The second is to be more or lesse, as to bee more like, or lesse like; or more equall, or lesse equall. Yet this belongeth not to all: for double hath neither more or lesse, nor one Father is said to be more or lesse then another.

*What is the third proprietie?*

The third is, that all Relatiues (which are Relatiues indeed) are conuertible: for he is a Father, that hath a Sonne, and he is a Sonne, that hath a Father, &c.

*What is the fourth proprietie?*

The fourth is, that one Correlatiue is not before another, but are both together: as the Father is called no Father, vntill he hath begotten a childe, and a childe is called no Sonne, before he be begotten of the Father. For this is a generall rule of Correlatiues: If the one be, the other must needs be: If the one be taken away, the other must also be taken away.

*What is the fifth proprietie?*

The fifth is, that whosoever assuredly knoweth the one Correlatiue, must needs know the other: for whosoever certainly knoweth that I am a Father, must needs also certainly know that I haue a childe. The like may be said of all that be Correlatiues indeed, to whom this proprietie only belongeth, as Aristotle saith.

## CHAP. XII.

### Of Action.

*What is action?*



Action is some accidentall forme or shape, whereby any thing is said to doe or to worke vpon his subiect.

*What meane you here by this word subiect?*

The thing that suffereth, as the water is the subiect whereon the fire induceth the shape of heating: for here the water is said to be passiue, and the fire actiue.

*How is action diuided?*

Into actions of the soule, and of the body. The actions of the soule, are those which the soule doth: for, according to his power  
vege-

vegetative, his actions are to nourish, to increase, and to ingender; and according to his power sensitive, to see, to heare, to smell, to taste, to feelee; and according to his power intellectuall, to vnderstand, to will, to nill, and such like.

The actions of the body are those that doe immediately belong to some body or corporall accident, as to cut, to strike, to heat, to coole, to moysten, to dry, to make white, to make blacke, and such like.

*Is there no other diuision of action?*

Yes diuers, but such as doe rather belong to naturall Philosophers, and to Diuines, then to Logicians: and therefore wee leaue to speake any further of them.

*What doth this predicament comprehend?*

All Nounes and Verbes of the actiue signification: as these Nounes, generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, moouing from place to place, and such like: also all Verbes actiue, as, to engender, to corrupt, to increase, to diminish, to alter or change, and to mooue from place to place, and such like Verbes of the actiue signification.

*How many properties doe belong to action?*

Two: First, to admit contrarietie, not simply, but *per accidens*, as to kindle, and to extinguish: secondly, to bee more or lesse, and yet accidentally, as one fire to burne more, and another lesse, one water to coole more, and another lesse.

## CHAP. XIII.

### Of Passion.



*What is Passion?*

It is the relation or application of the Patient to the Agent: as for example, whilst the water suffereth to be heated by the fire, this sufferance is called Passion.

*What doth this predicament comprehend?*

All Verbes of the passive signification, as to bee engendered, corrupted, increased, diminished, or altered, and such like.

*What properties doe belong to Passion?*

The same that haue beene said before to belong vnto action.

## CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Predicament Where, called in Latine, Vbi.



Now define you the predicament Vbi?

*Vbi* is to bee in some place, as when a body is inclosed within a place, and therefore is defined of some, to bee the description of the place wherein any thing is said to bee, or to be done or made, as in the Heauens, in the Earth, in the Temple, in the House, and such like.

How is this predicament diuided?

Into *Vbi simplex*, and *Vbi compositum*, that is to say, simple and compound.

When is it said to be simple?

When a thing indiuisible is in some indiuisible place, as an Angell in *Puncto*; or when a thing indiuisible is in a place diuisible, as an Angell in the Temple; for the Temple may bee diuided into many parts, though the Angell cannot.

When is it said to be compound?

When some diuisible body is contained in a place diuisible, as the being of things corporal in the water, or in the ayre; for corporall things be so diuisibly placed in their places, as euery part of the thing placed, is answerable to euery part of the place wherein they are contained; and so contrarily, as to the parts of a mans body enuironed with the aire, one part of that aire is answerable to the head, another to the feet, & so consequently of all the rest: and therefore the Schoolemen say, that *Vbi compositum*, is to be in a place circumscriptiue, but *Vbi simplex*, is to bee in a place definitiue, that is to say, in some certaine place, though not according to the position or order of placing the parts. But when a thing is said to be in a place circumscriptiue, then such place and thing may be both diuided according to the parts of position or placing, as this part here, and the other part there, whereof spring these differences, aboue, beneath, before, behind, on the right side, on the left side, and such like. And finally, this predicament comprehendeth whatsoever answereth to this question, where any thing is said to be or to be done.

*What properties doe belong to the predicament, Where?*

Three: First, to admit no contrarietie; for though to bee above and beneath seeme to be contrary, yet that is to be vnderstood physically, and not dialectically: secondly, it admitteth neither more nor lesse; for to be in the Temple, is no more to be in place, then to bee in the market, or in any house: but the third and chiefest propertie of *Vbi* is to containe.

## CHAP. XV.

*Of the predicament When, called in Latine,  
Quando.*



*How define you this predicament?*

This is said to bee a relation or application of a thing measured by time, vnto time it selfe, and containeth the differences of times, whereby any thing is said to be, to haue beene, or shall be, to doe, or to suffer: and to speake briefly, it comprehendeth all words that answere to this question *When*, as yesterday, to morrow, the next day, and such like.

*How is Quando diuised?*

Two manner of wayes; for sometime it is said to be definite, that is, certaine, as in this or that houre, day, or yeere, which is certaine; and sometime indefinite; that is, vncertaine, as to haue beene, without any limitation of time, which is vncertaine. Secondly, *Quando* may be diuided into his parts of succession, as into time past, present, and to come.

*What properties doe belong to this predicament?*

First, to haue no contrarietie: Secondly, to admit neither more or lesse: Thirdly, to bee alwayes flitting or fluxible, and neuer permanent, which propertie it hath by reason of time which continually passeth away.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

*Of the Predicament, to be situated, called in Latine,  
Situm esse*



*What is Situm esse?*

*Quintilian* saith, that *Situm esse* is as much to say, as to bee situated, ordered, or placed some manner of way; and it is a generall word, comprehending all names that doe expresse the site or ordering of the body and parts thereof, as to stand, to sit, to lye either groueling, or right vp, or on the one side: and finally, it comprehendeth all those words which answer to this question, how any thing is situated, as when it is required how *Norwich* standeth from *London*, either Northward, Southward, Westward, or Eastward.

*How is site divided of the Schoolmen?*

Into site naturall and casuall.

*Which call you naturall site?*

That whereby every part of the body hath his naturall place; as in mans body, the head to stand aboue, the belly in the midst, and the feet beneath; and so in a tree, the root to be lowest, the body in the midst, and the boughes or branches to be highest.

*What call you site casuall?*

That whereby the position or ordering of the parts is altered any way by accident, as, now to stand vpright, now to stoop, now to sit, or to lye downe, this way, or that way.

*What descriptions are to be fetched from this Predicament?*

The descriptions of places.

*What properties doe belong to this Predicament?*

Two: First, to admit no contrariety; for though vprward seemeth to be contrary to downward, yet that is vnderstood physically, and not dialectically. Secondly, it hath neither more, nor lesse; for to stand is no more a site, then to sit, nor sitting more then standing.

*Which things doe alter their situation, and which not?*

All things without life and feeling, doe keepe their site, if by



violence they be not changed: but all things hauing life and feeling, doe alter their site, when and as often as it pleaseth them, as a beast to stand vp, or to lye downe, and so forth.

The Table of Site.

|                |                |  |
|----------------|----------------|--|
| Site is eyther | Naturall, as   | { The head to stand above,<br>The belly to be in the midst,<br>And the feet beneath. |
|                | Or casuall, as | { Going,<br>Standing,<br>Lying crouching, or<br>With the face upward.                |

CHAP. XVII.

Of the predicament, To haue, called in Latine, Habere.



*What doth this word to haue signifie?*

It hath three speciall significations: First, to be clad with garments, Armour, or ornament: secondly, to possesse any thing, as to possesse wife, lands, or goods: thirdly, to containe any thing, as a vessell to containe eyther liquid or dry matter that is powdered therein: and therefore this predicament comprehendeth all such words as are deriued of the names of garments, as to be gowned, cloked, or coated: also of Armour, as well defensiu as offensiu; defensiu, as to be armed with a Corselet, Iacke, or shirt of Male, and such like: offensiu, as to be armed with a Sword, Dagger, Caliuier, Halbert, or Pike. Also beasts and fishes are said to be armed with Nayles, Hornes, Tallons, Beakes, Scales, Finnes, and such like. Also it comprehendeth words of ornament, as to be decked with Chaines, Jewels, and Tablets: also words of possession, as to haue lands or goods: also words of containyng, as to be full of Wine, Oyle, or Hony, as you may see in the Table following.

The.

The Table of the predicament *To haue.*

*To haue is three-  
fold, that is,*

|   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| { | <i>To be clad</i>  | <i>With garments, as to be gowned or cloked.</i>    |
|   |  | <i>With Armour, as with a Corſelet or Halbert.</i>  |
|   |  | <i>Or with ornaments, as with Tablet or chaine.</i> |
|   | <i>To poſſeſſe, as to poſſeſſe lands or goods.</i>             |   |
|   | <i>To containe, as a Veſſell to be full of liquor, &amp;c.</i> |   |

*What properties doe belong to this predicament?*

Two: Firſt, to admit more and leſſe: for a man at Armes is ſaid to bee more armed then a light Horſeman, and a Pike-man more then a Caliuier or Harquebuzier. Againe, hee that is clad with two coats, is more clad then he that weareth but one. Secondly, this predicament admitteth in ſome ſort contrariety: for to be armed and vnarmed, clad and naked, are contraries by priuation, but not otherwiſe.

CHAP. XVIII.

*Of the uſe of the Predicaments.*

*What uſe or end doe theſe Predicaments ſerue?*

**T**O many good vſes. Firſt, if you will define any thing, you ſhall be ſure in ſome of theſe Predicaments to find out the generall kind thereof, together with all the differences (for the moſt part) belonging to the ſame: which if they bee not ſet downe, then they are to bee gathered out of the proper accidents incident to the thing which you would define. Secondly, if you would diuide any thing, here you ſhall find both the generall kinds, ſpeciall kinds, yea, and diuers examples of the Indiuiduums comprehended vnder the ſame kinds. Thirdly, out of theſe Predicaments you may gather matter apt to proue any queſtion, either generall or particular.

## CHAP. XIX.

## Of Post-predicaments.



*What meane you by Post-predicament?*

They bee interpretations of certaine words more plainly expounded after the predicaments, for the better vnderstanding of certaine of the said predicaments.

*Which are they?*

These five, *Oppositio, prius & posterius, simul, motus, & habere*, that is to say in English, *Opposition, before and after, together, moving, and to haue*: euery one whereof may be taken and interpreted diuers wayes.

*What is opposition?*

Opposition is the repugnancy or contrariety of two extremes which are contrary one to another, in such sort as none of them is in like manner repugnant to any other thing: as for example, white and blacke being two extremes, are more contrary one to another, then eyther of them is to any other colour, as to red, yellow, russet, or blue.

*Sith some things are said to be agreeable one to another, and some contrary one to another, and some diuers one from another; it were not amisse, first, here to tell how, and when things are said to be agreeable, diuers, or repugnant one to another.*

Things are said to be agreeable one to another three manner of wayes: First, when they agree in generall kind, as those which are subiect to one next generall kind, as man and horse do agree in generall kind, because this word *animal*, or sensible body, is the next generall kind to them both. Secondly, things are sayd to agree in speciall kind, as *Edward* and *Iohn* are both comprehended vnder this word *man*. Thirdly, things are said to agree in number, as wordes hauing one selfe signification, called in Greeke *Synonyma*, as a blade, a rapier, a curtis or sticke, signifying a sword: also things of like substance or definition, as man, and a sensible body endued with reason. And by these three wayes things are sayd also to differ one from another; for they may

may differ one from another in generall kind, in speciall kind, and in number: in generall kind, as a sensible body, and a tree; in speciall kind, as a Horse, and an Asse: againe, they may differ in number, as the Indiuiduums that be cōprehended vnder one speciall kind, as *Iohn* and *Edward*, doe differ only in number.

*Is it all one, to be diuers, and contrarie?*

No: for those things are said to be diuers, which differ any of the wayes abouesaid, or by any other difference, be it common, proper, or most proper. Yet few or none of these things are contrary one to another: for no substance admitteth contrarietie, nor yet many accidents, vnlesse it bee by reason of qualitie, whereunto contrarietie doth properly belong.

*How many wayes are things said to be contrary one to another?*

Four manner of wayes, that is, relatiue, contrarie, priuatiue, and contradictory, that is to say, by relation, by contrarietie, by priuation, and by contradiction.

*Which things are said to be opposite or contrarie by relation?*

Those things are opposite by relation, which according to their owne significations, haue mutuall relation one to another, neither can they be both verified of one selfe thing in one selfe respect, as the father and the sonne, the Lord and the bondman: for one man cannot be both a father and a sonne in one respect, but in diuers respects hee may: for euery man that hath a sonne, is notwithstanding a sonne to his owne father, and a father to his owne sonne.

*Which things are said to be opposite by contrarietie?*

Those things are said to be contrary, which being comprehended vnder one selfe kind, doe most differ one from another, and yet both may be one after another in one selfe subiect meet to receiue the same, because the one giueth place to the other, vnlesse it be such a thing as is naturally incident to the said subiect: as heat and cold, being containd vnder qualitie, are most contrary one to another, and yet may bee one after another in mans body, or any other subiect apt to receiue the same: for many times heat driueth out cold, and cold heat. Yet in fire it is not so: for heat is alwayes naturally incident to fire, and will neuer giue place to cold, so long as it is fire, and not extinct.

*How*

*How are contraries divided?*

Of contraries, some haue a meane, called of the Schoolemen, *Contraria mediata*, and some haue no meane, called, *Contraria immediata*.

*When are they said to haue a meane?*

When the two contraries are such, as neither of them is of meere necessity, in any subiect meet to receiue the same, as white & black: for that subiect which is apt to receiue them both, may be yellow or russet, & so the subiect is neither white nor blacke.

*When are they said to haue no meane?*

When the one of the two contraries may be alwaies truly affirmed of any subiect apt to receiue the same, as sicknesse and health; for man or beaſt is truly said to be either sick, or whole. Also vice and vertue haue no meane: for a man is said to be eyther good, or euill: yet some make good and euill to haue a meane, called a thing indifferent. Likewise, hot & cold to haue a meane, that is to say, Luke-warme. And betwixt health and sicknesse, *Galen* maketh a meane estate, that is to say, neither whole nor sicke, but betwixt both.

*Which are opposites by priuation?*

Opposites by priuation are two contraries belonging to one selfe-subiect apt to receiue the same, in the which subiect, when the one is wanting at such time as nature doth appoint, the other must needs bee, as sight and blindness in the eye, hearing and deafenesse in the eare, light and darkness in the skie, or in any other thing meet to receiue both.

*Wherefore doe you adde this clause, at such time as nature doth appoint?*

Because it is not needfull that one of these opposites be in the subiect in all times: as for example, the whelp which is not nine dayes old, though as yet he seeth not, yet is hee not said to bee blind, because Nature hath appointed him no sooner to see.

*Which be opposite by contradiction?*

They be two contraries, hauing no meane, and doe consist in contradiction, that is to say, in denying the one the other: and such contradiction consisteth either in propositions, or else in simple or single tearmes.



*Give Examples of both.*

In propositions thus: *Iohn* is honest, *Iohn* is not honest: *Plato* disputeth, *Plato* disputeth not: in which kinde of propositions, there is no meane of truth or falshood; for of necessitie the one of them must alwayes be either true or false, in such sort, as both cannot be true together, nor both false together. In simple terms thus: a man: to know, not to know: to be, and not to be: and therefore opposites by contradiction be most contrarie, and doe differ from all the rest; for in all the other Opposites, it is easie to find out some meane subiect, whereof neither of them can be truly spoken or affirmed.

C H A P. XX.

*Of before and after, called in Latine, Prius & Posterius.*



*On many wayes is a thing said to bee before and after?*

Five manner of wayes, that is, by time, nature, order, honour, and cause, contained in these two Latine Verses:

*Tempore natura, prius ordine dic & honore:  
Et causa effectus dicitur esse prior.*

*Give Examples of every one.*

First, by time, *Cicero* is said to be before *Quintilian*, and *Socrates* before *Aristotle*, and such like. Secondly, by nature, that thing is said to bee first, or before, from which the consequent cannot returne backward: by which way all generall kinds are said to be before their speciall kindes, and speciall kindes before their Individuums: for if man be, then sensible body (which is the generall kinde) must needs be, but not contrarily: so likewise, if *Iohn* be, man must needs be, but not contrarily; for it followeth not of necessitie, Because it is a sensible body, *Ergo*, it is a man, or because it is a man, *Ergo*, it is *Iohn*. Thirdly, by order one thing is said to be before another, as one before two, and two before three, letters before syllables, and syllables before words, and words before speech. To this also appertaineth that which is said

to be before by situation, as in going from *Norwich* to *London*, *Thetford* is before *Newmarket*, and *Newmarket* before *Ware*, and so forth. Fourthly, by honour or dignitie, an Emperour is said to be before a King, a King before a Duke, a Duke before an Earle, an Earle before a Baron, &c. Fifthly, the cause is said to be before his effect, as the rising of the Sunne is said to be before day; so the difference is said to be before his speciall kinde, and the speciall kinde before his proprietie. And these be conuertible: for if it be day, the Sunne must needs be vp: and if the speciall difference be, the speciall kinde must needs be, and so contrarily.

*To what end serueth this manifold way, of before, and after?*

To the intent that wee may the better vnderstand what hath beene said before touching opposites by relation, that is to say, that Relatiues are alwayes together by order of nature, and not one before another, but only by their fourth way, that is to say, by honour or worthinesse, which way, as *Aristotle* saith, of all the other wayes, is most vnproper, and least to the purpose.

## CHAP. XXI.

*Of the word Together, called in Latine, Simul.*



*How many wayes are things said to be together?*

Two wayes, that is, by order of time, and by order of nature. First, by order of time, the heat and shining of the Sunne are said to bee in the Sunne together, that is, at one time: also the Angels were created all together, and at one time. Secondly, those things are said to bee together by order of nature, which haue naturall relation one to another, and bee conuertible, neither is the one cause of the other, as the father and the sonne, single and double, and such likes: and many doe adde hereunto diuers speciall kindes and differences subiect to one selfe generall kind, as man and bruit beast; reasonable and vnreasonable, are subiect to the generall kinde, sensible body, or animal.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

*Of Mouing or Motion, called in Latine, Motus, and  
of the kindes thereof.*



*Herefore is mention made here of Mouing?*

For the better vnderstanding of the Predicament Action, whereunto Mouing belongeth.

*How many kinds of Motion or Mouing be there?*

Six, briefly touched before in the predicament of Action, that is to say, Generation, Corruption, Augmentation, Diminution, Alteration, and Mouing from place to place.

*Define these kindes.*

1 Generation is a proceeding from the not being of a substance, to the being of the same, as from an Acorne to an Oke.

2 Corruption (contrariwise) is a proceeding from a being to a not being, as from an Oke to chips or ashes.

3 Augmentation is the increasing of a great quantitie in the whole: as from a childe to a man.

4 Diminution is contrariwise a decreasing or diminishing of quantitie in the whole, as a bodie that consumeth or pineth by disease or otherwise.

5 Alteration is a proceeding or changing from one qualitie into another, as from hot to cold.

6 Mouing from place to place, is, as the mouing of the Sun out of the East into the West.

CHAP. XXIII.

*Of the word Habere, that is, to haue, and how many  
wayes it is to be vnderstood.*



*How many significations hath this word, to haue?*

Eight.

1 First, to haue a qualitie, as Science, Vice, or Vertue.

2 To haue a quantitie, as to bee six, seuen or eight foot long.

3 To be clad, as to haue a Cloke or Coat.


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4 To

- 4 To haue some part of the body clad or decked with some thing, as the finger with a ring, the necke with a chaine.
  - 5 To haue a part, or member, as a hand, a head, or foot.
  - 6 To containe, as a hogshhead that hath therein beere or wine.
  - 7 To possesse, as to haue lands, tenements, or goods.
  - 8 To haue a Wife, which (according to *Aristotle*) is vnproperly said, because nothing can be properly said to haue, which is had it selfe of the same: for the wife hath the man, as well as the man the wife; and therefore this way of hauing serueth to little purpose.
- 

*Here endeth the first Booke of Logicke.*

THE



# THE ARTE OF LOGICKE.

*The second Booke.*

## CHAP. I.

*Of Definition.*



Having hitherto sufficiently spoken of the Predicables and Predicaments, and of all things belonging vnto them, without the knowledge whereof, no true definition, nor good diuision can bee well made; me thinkes it were meete now to treat of definition and diuision.

*What is Definition, and how manifold is it?*

Definition is a speech, whereby either some name or thing is declared: and it is twofold, that is, of a name, and of a thing.

*What is definition of a name, and how manifold is it?*

Definition of a name, is a speech whereby the signification of some word is declared: and it is ten-fold.

1 Definition verball, as when a word lesse knowne is declared by a word more knowne, as thus, To imitate, is as much to say, as to follow, or to counterfeit: againe, to accomplish, is to fulfill.



2 Definition by difference; as, He is a King, which ruleth by Law; but he that ruleth by force, is a Tyrant.

3 Definition metaphoricall, or by figure; as, Adolescence is the flower of mans age: Good Preachers are the salt of the earth.

4 Definition by contrarie; as, Vertue is, to flee vice.

5 Definition by circumlocution; as, The writer of the *Troian* Warre, that is to say, *Homer*.

6 Definition by example, as to say, that this word reasonable or vnreasonable is a speciall difference.

7 Definition by want, or defect; as, That is three quarters, which lacketh a quarter of a yard, or any such like thing.

8 Definition by prayse, or disprayse: by prayse, as, Logicke is an Art of Artes, and Science of Sciences: Iustice is the Queene of all Vertues. By disprayse, as, Idlenesse is the corruption or destruction of youth.

9 Definition by similitude; as, The Sunne is the eye of the World; A Citie without a Magistrate, is as a Ship without a Gouvernour.

10 Definition by Etymologie; as, He is rightly called good-man, because he is a good man indeed, and full of good workes.

*When is definition of the name needfull to be used?*

When some doubtfull word is cause of the controuersie.

*Of the definition of a thing.*

**W**Hat is the definition of a thing?

It is a speech, which declareth briefly, plainly, and aptly, the very nature and substance of the thing which is defined.

*How is the definition of a thing diuided?*

Into these six kinde, that is to say, into definition essentiall, causall, by the Relatiue, by the effects and offices, by numbering vp of the parts, and by heaping vp of accidents.

*What is definition essentiall?*

It is that which consisteth of the next generall kinde, ioyned with some speciall difference or property belonging to the same kinde; as when I define a man to be a sensible body, endued with reason, or apt to speake; and this is the Logicall definition most sure

sure of all others, but not easie to bee made of euery thing, for lacke of speciall differences and naturall properties.

*When is it said to be a causall definition?*

When it is made of the generall kinde, and of the proper causes of the thing defined.

*How many chiefe kind of causes be there?*

Four, that is, matter, forme, cause efficient, and end.

*How define you matter?*

Matter is that whereof any thing is made, as cloth is the matter whereof a cloake or coat is made, and wooll is the matter of cloth.

*What is Forme?*

Forme is the shape whereof any thing taketh both his being and his name: and therefore the Schoolemen do define forme to be that which giueth a being to any thing, bee it naturall or artificiall, as in the Examples before recited, the coat or cloake hath both his being and name of the shape which it hath, and not of the matter.

*What is the cause efficient?*

That which maketh or worketh any thing, and is the author thereof, as the Carpenter is the cause efficient of the house, and Shipwright of the Ship.

*What is the end or finall cause?*

It is that for whose sake any thing is done, as the end of warre is to haue peace, the end of studie is to get learning and knowledge.

*Giue Examples of definitions made of euery one of these causes.*

Of matter let this bee your Example: Beere is a Drinke made of Mault, Water, and Hops. Of forme thus: Man is a sensible bodie, endued with a Soule intellectuall or reasonable, which is the true shape of man. Of the cause efficient thus: That is a Decree of the Senate, which the Senate commandeth and ordaineth; for the Senate is the cause efficient of the Decree. Anger or wrath is the boyling of the blood about the heart, through the stirring vp of choler. Of the end thus: A house is a building made to defend our bodies from the iniuries of the aire and weather.

May

*May not a good definition be made of many of these causes ioyned together?*

Yes indeed.

*Giue Example.*

Lo here the example of *Demoſthenes*, in defining what Law is, Law (ſaith he) is the inuention and gift of God, and the decree of wiſemen, the correction of crimes, either raſhly or aduiſedly committed, and a common covenat or conſent of the Citie, according to the which all men ought to liue. In this definition, the firſt and chiefeſt cauſe efficient is God, the ſecond cauſe efficient is the common covenat or conſent of the Citie: the matter is the decree of the wiſe: the end is the correction of crimes, and the keeping of the Citizens in good order of life.

*When is a definition ſaid to be made by the Relatiue?*

When one Relatiue is interpreted by another; as thus, He is a Father, which hath a Sonne; and he is a Maſter, which hath a Seruant.

*When is a definition ſaid to be made by the effects, vertues, or offices of the thing defined?*

When the nature of the thing is plainly declared by ſhewing the ſaid effects or offices, as thus: An adamant ſtone is that which being laid nigh to Iron or Steele, draweth the Steele vnto him: Juſtice is a vertue which giueth euery man his right.

*When is a definition ſaid to be made by numbering vp of the parts?*

When it containeth either the chiefe, or all the parts of ſome whole thing, or elſe all the ſpeciall kindes of ſome generall kinde,

*Giue Examples of both theſe wayes.*

Of the firſt thus: Houſe is a building, hauing a foundation, walles, and couering. Of the ſecond way thus: A ſenſible bodie is that which comprehendeth both man and bruit beaſt.

*When is a definition ſaid to be made by heaping vp of accidents?*

When a thing is rather deſcribed, then defined, by ſuch common and proper accidents as doe belong to the ſame, as fire is an Element that is hot and dry, and exceedeth all other Elements in lightneſſe: and therefore this laſt kind of definition ought rather to be called a deſcription then a definition, which is yſuall to the

Poets,

Poets, Orators, and Historiographers, in describing either person, fact, or thing: also to the Physicians, in describing their similes, as Roots, Plants, Herbes, and such like.

CHAP. II.

*Of the precepts to be observed in Definition.*



*How many precepts are to be observed in making a true definition?*

These three: First, that it briefly expresse the whole power and nature of the thing defined: Secondly, that there bee nothing therein superfluous, nor any thing wanting: Thirdly, that the definition bee not common to many things, but proper to that thing only which is defined, so as it may make it to differ from all other things.

*What order is to be observed in making a dialecticall definition?*

First, you must know in what predicament the thing is contained which you would define, to the intent that in descending from the most generall kinde, downe towards the most speciall kinde of the same predicament, ye may find out by the way that which is next generall kinde to the thing that is to bee defined: which next generall kinde being found out, yee must then seeke out the speciall difference or propertie, the proper cause, effect, or common accidents belonging to the same: as for example, if ye would define what vertue is, ye must resort to the predicament of qualitie, wherein vertue is contained: then in descending from quality, proceed to habit, from habit to habit of the mind, which is two-fold, that is to say, intellectuall and morall, & not finding it vnder habit intellectuall, proceed to habit morall, for that is the next generall kind to vertue: that done, seeke out the difference or propertie, true cause or effect: the difference is to bee good, wherein it differeth from vice, for vice is also a morall habit as well as vertue: the effect of vertue is to incline mans will to doe alwaies according to right reason or true iudgement: so shal you make a true definition of vertue, in saying that vertue is a good morall habit, inclining mans will to doe alwaies according to

true iudgement. And after this sort yee may learne to define any other thing.

### CHAP. III.

#### *Of Diuision.*



*What is Diuision?*

Diuision is the parting or diuiding of a word or thing that is more generall, vnto other words or things lesse generall: for Diuision is twofold, that is, of a name, and of a thing.

*When is it said to be the diuision of a name?*

When some Equiuoke or doubtfull word is diuided into his manifold significations, as this word Wolfe into a man hauing that name, into a foure-footed beast, into an vlcereous sore, and into a certaine fish, each one called by the name of Wolfe: which kind of distinction or diuision is very necessarie, to auoid ambiguitie of speech, which ambiguitie causeth many times great error.

*How manifold is the diuision of a thing?*

It is threefold, that is, substantiall, partible, and accidentall.

*When is it properly said to be substantiall?*

When any generall kind is diuided by his speciall differences into his proper speciall kinds: as thus; of sensible bodiēs, one is reasonable, as man, & another is vnreasonable, as a bruit beast.

*When is this kind of diuision to be vsed?*

When the speciall kindes lacke proper names, as most commonly the speciall kindes subalternate doe, which may be diuided againe as generall kindes into more speciall kindes: as for example, of vnreasonable beasts some bee terrestriall, some bee aquaticall, and some aerie: againe, euery one of these may bee diuided into their speciall kinds, euen vntill ye come to the lowest of all, and vnto the *Individuums* comprehended vnder the same; and that not only of things contained in the predicament of substance, but also in any other predicaments of accidents, as of magnitudes, one is long, as a line, another is broad, as a superficies, and another is thicke, as a body. This diuision, though it be



be of accidents contained in the predicament of quantitie, yet it is called a substantiall diuision, because the generall kind here is diuided by his speciall difference into his proper speciall kinds.

*What call you a partible diuision?*

I call that a partible diuision, which diuideth some whole thing into his parts, which is called of the Latines, *partitio*; as if yee would diuide the Romane Common-wealth into Senators, Knights, and Commons. You may also diuide a house into his principall parts, as into the foundation, wals, and roose thereof. But the better to vnderstand this kind of diuision, it shall not be amisse to shew you here what kindes of whole, and what kindes of parts there be: for there is whole substantiall, and whole integrall: againe, of parts, some are called substantiall, and some integrall; and of parts integrall, some are called similar or like, and some dissimilar or vnlike: againe, of the dissimilar, some are called principall, and some not principall: of all which things I minde here briefly to speake.

*First, I pray you tell what you meane by whole substantiall, and whole integrall.*

Whole substantiall, is that which consisteth of substantiall parts cleauing wholly together, and not seuerally distinct in number, as whole man, consisting of soule and body: but whole integrall is that which consisteth of integral parts, which though they cleaue together, yet they are distinct and seuerall in number, as mans body, consisting of head, brest, belly, legs, &c.

*How define you substantiall parts?*

Substantiall parts are the first and chiefe parts whereof any thing is compounded, of which parts if any bee wanting, the whole must needs perish, and loseth his name, as the matter and forme of any compound thing, be it naturall or artificiall, as the body and soule are the first and chiefe parts of man; the metall and fashion of a siluer cup are the first & chiefe parts of the cup, whereof neither can be wanting: for the soule without the bodie is a spirit, and not man; and the body without the soule is but a dead carcasie: againe, the cup without matter or shape, is no cup at all.

*Which be called integrall parts?*

Certaine secondarie parts, which being all gathered together, do make the whole perfect, as the head, brest, belly, armes, hands, thighes, legges, and feet, are the integrall parts of mans body: and of these integrall parts, some are called similar, and some dissimilar, that is to say, like and vnlike.

*Which are similar, and which dissimilar?*

Similar, or like, are those that be of one kind, and of one selfe name; and being diuided into parts, euery such part, be it neuer so small, beareth also the name of the whole, as flesh, bone, sinew, skin, and such like: for euery little part of the flesh is called flesh, and euery part of bone is called bone; and so of all the rest. Hitherto also may be referred water, fire, gold, iron, or any other simple metall, wine, wood, stone, and such like: for euery drop of water is called water, and so of the rest.

*Which call you dissimilar or vnlike?*

Those parts that differ both in kinde and name, as the head, brest, belly, armes, and legges, are the parts dissimilar of a mans body: likewise a house, a ship, and many other things, haue also such parts, of any one of which parts the whole cannot be spoken: for you cannot say, Because here is the head of a man, *Ergo* here is a man. Againe, of these dissimilar parts, some are called principall, whereof if any be wanting, the whole must needs perish: as without the head, belly, heart, liner, or guts, mans body cannot be. The not principall, are those parts, without the which the body may be: for though those parts bee wanting, yet the body is counted a whole thing, though not perfect in euery point, as without armes, hands, legges, or feet, the body may liue: that building also that hath a foundation, walles, and roose, is counted to be a whole house, though it hath neither doores nor windowes, yet not perfect in euery respect.

*Wherein doth partition and diuision differ?*

In diuers points: for in diuision any generall kinde may bee rightly spoken of euery speciall kind contained vnder the same; as this word, *sensible body*, which is spoken both of man & beast. But in partition, the whole cannot bee spoken of euery part: for you cannot say that the soule or body of man is whole man, nor that the head or foot is his whole body. Again, diuision diuideth

vni-

vniversall things into their particulars, and partition diuideth particulars into their parts, and most commonly followeth diuision, helping to make subdiuisions: as for example, when diuision hath diuided a sensible body into man and beast, then followeth partition, and diuideth man into soule and body, and the body into his integrall parts, as head, brest, belly, legges, and such like.

*How manifold is diuision accidentall?*

Threefold: for by that we either diuide some subiect into his accidents, or some accident into his subiect, or some accident into his accidents.

*Give Examples of all these three ways?*

Of the first let this be your Example: Of men, some be free, and some be bond; some be vertuous, and some be vicious: and after this sort you may diuide the predicament of substance into as many accidents as you will, running thorowout all the nine predicaments of accidents. Of the second way thus: Of goods, some are said to be of the minde, some of the body, and some of fortune. Of the third thus: Of good things, some are said to be honest, some profitable, and some pleasant or delectable: which kind of diuision is much vsed of the Orators. To this also may be referred the common order of diuiding any speech or oration into his parts, which the Orators call partition or distribution, whereby is set downe in what order euery thing shall be vttered and declared, which first, and which last, and so forth.

### CHAP. IIII.

*Of the precepts to be obserued in Diuision.*



*How many precepts are to be obserued in making a true diuision?*

Three: First, that the generall kind be diuided into his next speciall kindes; by such speciall differences as are merely repugnant one to another, and doe comprehend the whole nature of the thing diuided: as thus; Of sensible bodies, some be reasonable, and some be vnreasonable: for it were no good diuision, to say, of sensible bodies, one is reasonable, & another is two-footed.

*What is the second precept?*  
 That the parts, being ioyned together, may bee equall to the whole, and may comprehend neither more nor lesse then the thing which is diuided, as reasonable soule, and carnall bodie, being the chiefe parts of man, do comprehend neither more nor lesse then whole man.

*What is the third precept?*

That no part or speciall kinde be vsed as a generall kinde, nor the generall kinde as a part or speciall kinde: as in this diuision which *Cicero* reprobeth. I will shew that through the concupiscence, boldnesse, and couetousnesse of our aduersaries, all mischiefs haue chanced to the Common-wealth: here couetousnesse is mingled with concupiscence, wherof it is a part: for concupiscence is the generall kinde of all lusts or desires. But this precept seemeth rather to appertaine to a Rhetoricall partition, then a Dialecticall diuision.

*To what end serueth Diuision?*

To diuers good ends. First, as *Cicero* saith, it helpeth greatly to teach plainly to define, & to make things that be compound, intricate, or confused, to appeare simple, plaine, and certaine: Secondly, by diuiding things orderly into their parts, it greatly helpeth memorie: and thirdly, it helpeth to amplifie any kind of speech, and to make it more copious.

## CHAP. V.

### Of Method.



Having hitherto sufficiently spoken of words, both singular and vniuersal, & also of Definition and Diuision, which are the two chiefe instruments wherby all simple questions are discussed, I minde here to shew with what order or method every such question is to be handled.

*What is Method?*

Method is a compendious way of learning or teaching any thing: and it is three-fold, that is to say, Compositiue, Resolutive, and Diuisiue or definitiue.

*What*

*What is method compositiue?*

It is that whereby we compound the whole of his parts, beginning at the smallest, and so proceed from greater to greater, vntill we come to the chiefe end whereto we tend, which kinde of order or method we obserue here in writing this Logick: for first we treat of words or terms, then of a proposition, and last of all of a Syllogisme. So likewise hee that will teach the nighest way from *Norwich* to *London* by order compositiue, will bid him first go to *Windham*, from *Windham* to *Atleborough*, from *Atleborough* to *Thetford*, from *Thetford* to *Newmarket*, from *Newmarket* to *Barkway*, from *Barkway* to *Ware*, from *Ware* to *London*.

*What is method resolutiue?*

It is that whereby any whole thing is resolued into his parts: or when wee proceed from the end to the next and immediate cause therof, and from that to the next cause of that, and so from one to another, vntill we come to the first cause of all, and most remote & furthest off: as when we resolue a Syllogisme into his Propositions, and a Proposition into his vttermost bounds or termes, which are the subiect and the predicate: and this way is vnlike to the other before recited, because it goeth backward, as in the former example. If ye will teach the way from *Norwich* to *London* by method resolutiue, ye must say that there is a Towne called *Ware*, twentie miles from *London*: next to that is a Towne called *Barkway*, and so till yee come to that which was first in method compositiue, To these two methods *Galen* addeth the third method, that is, method diuisiue or definitiue.

*What is that method?*

It is, when in defining and diuiding we descend orderly from a most generall kind to all the special kinds contained vnder the same, and so to the lowest of all: as hauing to speake of qualitie, we define it, and diuide it into his foure speciall kinds, and euery such speciall kind into his parts and members, euen till we come to the lowest of all, as you see in the Table of quality before described. Which kinde of method is more fully handled by my friend *Aeccontia*, in his little Treatise which hee wrote in Latine, *de methodo*: the effect of which Booke I thinke it not out of purpose to set downe euen here.

The



*The effect of Accountius his Booke, de methodo, which he affirmeth to be the second part or office of Logicke.*

**F**Or the first office of Logicke teacheth how to finde out the truth in any speech: but method teacheth how to attaine to the Arte or knowledge of any thing. In which method, three things (as he saith) are to be considered: First, what method is: Secondly, what is the effect or vntermost end thereof: Thirdly, what be the causes of that end or effect.

Method is a certaine right way, whereby we may search out the knowledge of any thing; & hauing attained it, how to teach the same commodiously to any other, without examining whether it bee true or false; for that belongeth to the first part of Logicke.

The effect or vntermost end of method, is the knowledge of any thing.

The causes of that end are these three, forme, matter, and cause efficient.

Forme here seemeth to bee that which is knowne by all the parts of such knowledge, being gathered together (as it were) into one selfe body: which parts are these; first, what the thing is; secondly, what be the causes thereof, and also what bee the causes of those causes, euen to the last or vntermost cause: thirdly, what be the effects, and also what bee the effects of those effects, as well when the thing is taken generally, as for some whole thing, or as when the whole is diuided into all his parts, euen vnto the parts indiuisible.

Matter here is generally taken, and not for the matter of any determinate or certaine kind: vnto which matter do appertaine all things that be finite, perpetual, and immutable, that is to say, all vniuersals.

The causes efficient are partly those things that are more knowne, as first, to know what the thing is by definition consisting of the generall kind, and of the differences thereto belonging: secondly, what is the effect or end of the thing, as in those things which doe not depend vpon our will: and thirdly, what be

bee the causes of that end or effect, the consideration of which end belongeth to those things which doe depend vpon our will, and partly the cause efficient is the right applying or ordering of the more knowne things, which order containeth two parts: for first we must proceed alwaies from the most general kinds to the next generall kinds, as hauing to begin with the definition of the thing which you seeke to know, when need requireth, you must proceed from the most generall kind of all, that is to say, from the highest general kinde, and so descend downward, vntill you come to the thing that is to be defined: but if you haue to begin from the vttermost end of the thing, then next of all consider that, from whence the end doth immediately spring, and what doth follow next to that, and so proceed from one to another, till you come to the first cause of all. Finally, if you haue to begin from the first causes, then you must orderly proceed from that which is first vnto the second, and so to the third, and so forth vntill you come to the vttermost effect or last end.

Now as touching the second part of applying or ordering the more knowne things, you must haue consideration of euery whole thing, and of all his parts: wherefore if you haue to define any thing, Art, or Science, wherof you treat, you must define the whole, and then euery part therof, vntill you come to the lowest part thereof, and yet euery one in his proper place. And if you cannot comprehend in one definition all those things that are to be referred to one head, then vse diuision in diuiding the whole into his parts, and define euery such part in order. But if all the parts which the thing containeth, haue not one selfe end, but diuers, then diuide it by such differences as euery part may haue his proper end.

Moreouer, if the forme, matter, or cause efficient haue diuers respects and considerations, then (according to that diuersitie) make diuers diuisions, and first declare what is common to all the parts in general, & what is proper to euery one in particular.

Finally, if some one whole thing lyeth hidden, then it is to be found out by looking into some of the particular parts thereof. And these are all the chiefe points contained in the *Latine* Treatise which my friend *Acontius* wrote de *Methodo*. And though

that *Petrus Ramus* maketh but one kind of method, that is to say, to proceed from the first principles or elements: yet I am sure he wil not denie, but that to goe forward and backward, be two diuers things, though not contrarie, as doth well appeare by the compositiue and resolutiue method before defined.

*I doe not yet perfectly understand by all this, with what method a simple question is to be handled: therefore I pray you shew the true way and order thereof.*

The method or way in handling a simple question, dependeth vpon these nine Interrogatiues, that is to say, 1. First, what significations the name or word hath, whereof the question is made, and how it is to be taken. 2. Secondly, whether there be any such thing, or not. 3. Thirdly, what it is. 4. Fourthly, what be the parts or speciall kinds thereof. 5. Fifthly, what be the causes. 6. Sixtly, what be the effects. 7. Seuenthly, what things be incident or appurtenant vnto it. 8. Eightly, what things are like vnto it. 9. And ninthly, what things be contrarie to it. All which questions *Aristotle* reduceth into these foure, that is to say, Whether it be? What it is? What manner of thing it is? and, Why it is?

*Give example of a simple question handled according to the nine questions before recited.*

As for example: If wee haue to treat of vertue, first, wee must shew the diuers significations of Vertue; for Vertue signifieth sometime power and abilitie, as when we say, Vertue attractiue, Vertue digestiue, or Vertue expulsiue: but here Vertue is to be taken for a morall habit, bringing forth good and commendable actions. Secondly, whether Vertue be, or not, it plainly appeareth by the diuers doings of men, whereof some be good, some be bad. Thirdly, what Vertue is, we know by the definition thereof, in saying, that Vertue is a morall habit, inclining mans will to do that which is alwaies good, and agreeable to true iudgement. Fourthly, the kinds of vertue be diuers, as Prudence, Iustice, Temperance, Fortitude, Modestie, and such like. Fifthly, the causes of Vertue be also diuers; for the cause efficient thereof is good, and mans will obedient to true reason, and to true iudgement: the matter or subiect of Vertue is the mind or heart of man: the  
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finall cause is blessednesse. Sixtly, the effect of vertue is tranquillitie of the minde, and many prosperous successes, and also publicke vtilitie and peace. Seuenthly, things incident to vertue are these, the honour, prayse, and commendation of good men. Eightly, things of affinitie or like to vertue, be all good inclinations, dispositions, or good naturall affections, as to bee louing, kind, and mercifull. Ninthly, things contrary to vertue, bee all manner of vices, as Pride, Couetousnesse, Hypocrisie, Dissimulation, &c.

*What method is to be observed in handling a compound question?*

A compound question is to be handled by arguing and reasoning on both sides, whereof wee shall treat hereafter. In the meane time we haue to speake of a Proposition, without the which no argument can bee made: for all arguments doe consist of propositions.

*Here endeth the second Booke of Logicke.*


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# THE ARTE OF LOGICKE.

*The third Booke.*

## CHAP. I.

### *Of a Proposition.*

*What is a Proposition?*

It is a perfect speech, whereby something is manifestly declared to bee true or false.

*Whereof is such speech specially compounded?*

Of Nounes and Verbes, which Nounes would bee of the Nominative case, and the Verbes of the Indicative Moode, as

when I say, Man is a sensible body; for the Logicians doe seldom allow any such speeches as are cyther of the Optative, Imperative, Interrogative, or Vocative Moode, as, I would to God I had a good Horse: this speech is not accounted to bee so true or certaine, as to say, I haue a good Horse.

*Of how many parts doth a Proposition consist?*

Of three, that is to say, the Subject, Predicat, and Copulat.

*What is the Copulat?*

It is the Verbe Substantiue, called in Latine, *Sum, es, fui*, that is, to be, which doth couple or ioyne the Predicat with his Subject,

iect, as when we say, Man is a sensible body : here in this proposition, the word *man* is the subiect, and the word *sensible body* is the predicat, and the Verbe *is*, is the copulat : which copulat is not alwayes incident to euery proposition, and specially when the predicat is some other Verbe, and not the Verbe substantiue; as, *Plato* disputeth, *Socrates* walketh; which is as much to say, as *Plato* is disputing, *Socrates* is walking.

*How many wayes is a proposition diuided ?*

Three manner of wayes, that is, according to substance, quality, and quantity. According to substance thus: Of propositions, some are said to be categoricall, that is, simple, and some hypoteticall, that is, compound, of which compound propositions we mind not to speake, before we haue treated of all things belonging to a categoricall and simple proposition, which is twofold, that is to say, absolute and modall.

*What is an absolute categoricall proposition ?*

It is a speech which affirmeth or denyeth something absolutely, without any respect; as when we say, God is true, or, Euery man is a lyer : and this is otherwise called of the Logicians, *Propositio categorica de inesse*.

*How is a simple proposition diuided according to qualitie ?*

Into an affirmatiue and negatiue proposition.

*When is it said to be affirmatiue, and when negatiue ?*

It is said to be affirmatiue, when the predicat is affirmed of the subiect; as when I say, that *Iohn* is learned : and that is negatiue, when the predicat is denyed of the subiect; as, *Iohn* is not learned. And note, that in such kind of speech, the negatiue is alwayes ioyned to the Verbe.

*How many waies is a simple proposition diuided according to quantitie ?*

Four manner of wayes, that is to say, into an vniuersall, particular, indefinite, and singular proposition.

*When is it said to be vniuersall ?*

When some vniuersall signe is added to the subiect.

*Which words are said to be vniuersall signes ?*

These : all, euery, whatsoeuer, whosoever, none, no body, not one, none at all, euery where, no where, and such like ; as Euery man is a Lyer, No man is true.

*VVhen*

*When is it said to be a particular proposition?*

When some particular signe is added to the subiect.

*Which call you particular signes?*

These: some, any, many, few, and such like; as, Some man is wise, Few are wise.

*When is it said to be indefinite?*

When the subiect is a common word, hauing neither vniuersall nor particular signe added vnto it; as when we say, Men in these dayes be giuen to great follies.

*When is it said to be singular?*

When the subiect is some *Individuum*, as when wee say, that Cicero is eloquent.

*What, and how many questions doe rise of these three diuisions?*

These three: that is, of what kind? of what qualitie? of what quantitie? in Latine thus, *qua? qualis? & quanta?* for if it bee asked what kind of proposition it is, then you must answer, that it is eyther categoricall, or hypotheticall, that is, simple or compound: and if it be demanded of what qualitie it be, then you must answer, that it is either affirmatiue, or negatiue: if it bee asked of what quantitie, then you must answer, that it is eyther vniuersall, particular, indefinite, or singular.

## CHAP. II.

*Of the three properties belonging to a simple proposition.*



*Which are those?*

These: Opposition, Equiuallencie, and Conuerſion.

*What is Opposition?*

It is the repugnancie of two simple propositions, hauing one selfe subiect, and one selfe predicat.

*How many kinds of opposite propositions be there?*

Four: Contrarie, Subcontrarie, Contradictorie, and Subalternat.

*Which are said to be contrary?*

An vniuersall affirmatiue, and an vniuersall negatiue; as, Every man is iust. No man is iust.

*Which are said to be Subcontrarie?*

A particular affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue; as, Some man is iust, Some man is not iust.


*Which are said to be Contradictorie?*

Either an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue, or else an vniuersall negatiue, and a particular affirmatiue; as, Every man is iust, and, Some man is not iust: or, No man is iust, Some man is iust.

*Which are said to be Subalternate?*

Either an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular affirmatiue, or else an vniuersall negatiue, and a particular negatiue: as, Every man is iust, and, Some man is iust: No man is iust, and, Some man is not iust.

All which kind of opposites you may the better remember, by considering with what order they are placed in this Figure following.



CHAP. III.

*Of the Lawes and conditions belonging to these foure kinds of opposites before recited: and of the diuers matter of a Proposition.*



Or the better vnderstanding of the lawes belonging to the opposites, it shall be necessarie to speake somewhat of the matter of a proposition, whereupon the said lawes doe partly depend.

*How manifold is that matter?*

Threefold, that is to say, naturall, casuall, and remote or vnnaturall.

*When is a proposition said to consist of matter naturall?*

When the predicat agreeth with his subiect essentially, or at the least necessarily: as when the generall kind is spoken of his speciall kinde, and the speciall kinde of his Indiuiduums, or the difference of his speciall kinde, or the proprietie of his subiect: as, Euery man is a sensible body, *Iohn* is a man, Euery man is reasonable, Euery man is apt to speake.

*When is a proposition said to consist of matter contingent?*

When the predicat agreeth with his subiect accidentally, so as it may either be, or not be; as, *Iohn* is learned.

*When is a proposition said to consist of matter remote or vnnaturall?*

When the predicat agreeth no manner of way with the subiect; as, A man is a horse, A man is a stone, &c.

*What are the lawes of contrary propositions?*

Contrarie propositions can be true no way both together; as Euery man is a sensible body, No man is a sensible body: but they may be both false; and specially consisting of matter contingent; as when I say, Euery man is iust, No man is iust, which are both false.

*What are the lawes of subcontrarie propositions?*

Subcontrarie propositions, consisting of matter naturall, cannot bee both false at once; as, Some man is a sensible body, Some man is not a sensible body: but consisting of matter contingent; both may bee sometime true; as, Some man is iust, Some man is not iust.

*What be the lawes of contradictorie propositions?*

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Those can neither be true nor false both at once : for if one be true, the other must needs be false, whether the matter be naturall, or contingent ; as, Every man is iust ; Some man is not iust ; No man is iust ; Some man is iust.

*What be the Lawes of subalternate propositions ?*

If the vniuersall be true, the particular must needs be true ; as, Every man is iust ; *Ergo*, Some man is iust ; but not contrarily. Againe, if the particular be false, the vniuersall also must needs be false ; as, Some man is a stone, Every man is a stone.

*What good is to be reaped by the knowledge of these opposites ?*

It teacheth to know what speeches be repugnant one to another, and thereby to discern truth from falshood.

### CHAP. IIII.

*Of the equivalencie of simple propositions.*



*What is equivalencie ?*

It is the reconciling or agreeing of two propositions, hauing one selfe subiect, and one selfe predicate, in such sort, that though they bee diuers in words, yet they are made to bee all one in signification.

*How is such reconciliation made ?*

By the helpe of signes, either vniuersall or particular, that are of like value, and equall one to another, and thereby make the speeches equall.

*Giue example.*

As thus : Who knoweth not this to be true ? Every man knoweth this to bee true : There is none but that knoweth this to bee true. All these are of like value, and doe signifie one selfe thing. Againe, Some men are wise, Few men are wise, All men are not wise, Not many are wise, are also equivalent speeches. The Schoolemen doe giue diuers rules touching the equivalencie of speeches ; but such as, in mine opinion, are neither necessarie, nor profitable, for that they cause many times barbarous, vnusuall, and intricate speeches. And therefore I thinke good here to passe them ouer with silence, wishing all men to iudge the equivalencie of speeches, rather by the care, and by custome of speaking,

king, and by vsuall manner of taking the same in euery severall tongue or language, then by any rules, which perhaps will serue in one tongue, but not in another.

CHAP. V.

*Of conuerſion of ſimple propoſitions.*



*What is conuerſion?*

It is the changing or turning of the ſubject and predicate, the one into the others place.

*How manifold is ſuch conuerſion?*

It is threefold, that is, ſimple, by accident, and by contrapoſition.

*What is ſimple conuerſion?*

It is that whereby the termes are onely changed the one into the others place, the ſelfe ſame quantitie and qualitie being ſtill reſerued.

*What propoſitions are conuerted by this manner of conuerſion?*

An vniuerſall negative, and particular affirmative.

*Giue examples of both.*

Of the firſt thus: No vertue is diſcommendable, *Ergo*, no diſcommendable thing is vertue. Of the ſecond thus: Some man is a Philoſopher, and ſome Philoſopher is a man. And by this way ſometime vniuerſall affirmatiues may be alſo conuerted, as thoſe whoſe termes are conuertible, as the ſpeciall kind and his difference or propertie; as, Every man is reaſonable, and euery reaſonable thing is man: or, Every man is apt to ſpeake, and euery thing that is apt to ſpeake, is man.

*What is conuerſion by accident?*

It is that whereby the termes are changed, and alſo the quantity of the propoſitions, but not the qualitie.

*What propoſitions are conuerted this way?*

An vniuerſall affirmative into a particular affirmative, and an vniuerſall negative into a particular negative.

*Giue examples.*

Euery Patience is Fortitude: *Ergo*, ſome Fortitude is Patience. Again: No Vertue is Vice: *Ergo*, ſome Vice is not Vertue.

*What is conuerſion by contrapoſition?*

It is that whereby neither quantitie nor qualitie is changed,

but only termes finite into termes infinite, that is to say, termes limited into termes unlimited.

*Which call you termes infinite?*

All Nounes having a negatiue set before them, as, not man, not beast.

*What propositions are conuerted this manner of way?*

An yniuersall affirmatiue into an yniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular negatiue into a particular negatiue.

*Giue examples.*

Of the first thus: Euery man is a sensible body, and euery thing that is not a sensible body, it not man. Of the second thus: Some vertue is not Iustice: *Ergo*, some thing that is not Iustice, is not vertue. These speeches in English haue some fauour; but to be spoken in Latine, after the Schoole manner, are very barbarous, or rather monstrous, as *Valerius* termeth them, as to say, *Quadam non Iustitia non est non virtus.*

## CHAP. VI.

### Of a Modall Proposition.



*What is a modall proposition?*

It is that which affirmeth or denyeth something, not absolutely, but in a certaine respect, sort, or mood, which mood is commonly the predicat in this kinde of proposition, and all the rest of the subiect called of the Logicians, *Disium.*

*What is a mood?*

Mood is a word determining and limiting the signification of some other word whereunto it is ioyned, as a wise man, a white horse; for here this word *wise* being added to *man*, doth limit and restraints the generall signification of the word *man*, which otherwise of it selfe comprehendeth both wise and foolish. And the like is to be said of any other generall word, whereunto any such addition is put: but of moods making modall propositions, there are but these foure, that is, Possible, Contingent, Impossible, and Necessary.

*How manifold is a modall proposition?*

Twofold, that is, Coniunct and Disiunct.

*When is it said to be Coniunct?*

When

When the mood is placed either in the beginning or ending of a proposition; as, It is impossible that *Iohn* is sicke: or thus; That *Iohn* is sicke it is possible.

*When is it said to be Disiunct?*

When the mood is placed so, as it diuideth the one part of the subiect from the other; as, for *Iohn* it is possible to be sicke: and the Disiunct is said many times to bee true, when the Coniunct is false, being both made of selfe termes: as for example, the Logicians affirme this to be true, A white man it is possible to bee blacke: but this other, A white man to bee blacke it is possible, they affirme to be false.

*What maketh them so to doe, sub by construction the same speeches in sense doe seeme to be all one?*

Because the mood is the Disiunct, which by parting and separating the Subiect, maketh the Proposition to seeme spoken in diuers respects; as man to be white in one respect, and blacke in another, and so the speech to be true.

# CHAP. VII.

*Of the proposition, equivalencie, and conuerſion of modall propositions.*



As I told you before, that of modall propositions, some were called coniuñct, and some disiunct: and as for the modals disiunct, they differ but little from absolute propositions before declared:

And therefore we haue here chiefly to deale with opposition, equivalencie, and conuerſion belonging to modall coniuñct, the matter whereof being not altogether ſo neceſſary as ſome men affirme, I minde to make no long ſpeech thereof. But for the better vnderſtanding of oppoſition, equivalencie, & conuerſion thereof, it is needful firſt to declare the quantitie and qualitie of a modall propoſition: of both which things, though *Ariſtote* maketh no mention, but only a little of qualitie; yet the latter Writers doe neceſſarily ſuppoſe modall propoſitions to be indued with quantitie and qualitie: for they ſay that the mood neceſſarie is much like to a ſigne vniuerſall affirmatiue; the mood impoſſible, to a ſigne vniuerſall negatiue; the moods poſſible and contingent, which are both of one value, are like to ſignes particular affirmatiue. Now as touching the qualitie, which is to be ei-

but only termes finite into termes infinite, that is to say, termes limited into termes unlimited.

*Which call you termes infinite?*

All Nounes hauing a negative set before them, as, not man, not beast.

*What propositions are conuerted this manner of way?*

An vniuersall affirmatiue into an vniuersall affirmatiue, and a particular negative into a particular negative.

*Giue exemplar.*

Of the first thus: Euery man is a sensible body, and euery thing that is not a sensible body, it not man. Of the second thus: Some vertue is not Iustice: Ergo, some thing is not Iustice.

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
ther affirmative, or negative, like as the negative in absolute propositions is wont to be added to the verbe, even so in modal propositions it is added to the mood, as by the examples set downe in the figure of opposition hereafter following, yet may easily perceiue.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of the opposition of Modals.*

*How many wayes are modall propositions said to be opposite?*

They are said to be opposite foure manner of wayes, euen as absolute propositions are, that is so say, contrarily, subcontrarily, contradictorie, and subalternately, as you see in this figure following, wherein the mood is set before in the place of the subiect, the better to shew the quantitie & qualitie of euery proposition.



*Of the equivalencie and conuerſion of modall propoſitions.*

**T**He Schoolemen doe affirme, that modall propoſitions are eaſily made equiualent, by reaſon that they may be vttered foure manner of wayes, that is to ſay, two manner of wayes affirmatiuely, and two manner of wayes negatiuely. The firſt way affirmatiuely, is, when no negatiue is added either to the ſubiect, or to the mood; as, for a man to be iuſt, it is poſſible, contingent, impoſſible, or neceſſarie. The ſecond way affirmatiuely, is, when the negatiue is added to the Verbe of the ſubiect, the mood remayning ſtill affirmatiue; as, for a man not to be iuſt, it is poſſible, contingent, &c. The firſt way negatiuely, is, when the negatiue is only added to the mood; as, a man to be iuſt, it is not poſſible, contingent, &c. The ſecond way negatiuely, is, when the negatiue is both added to the verbe of the ſubiect, and alſo to the mood; as, a man not to bee iuſt, it is not poſſible, contingent, &c. which is all one and equiualent to this affirmatiue propoſition, ſaying, that for a man to be iuſt, it is poſſible, contingent, &c. for two negatiues, as well in the Latine tongue, as in ours, doe alwayes make an affirmatiue. Again, as touching the conuerſion of modall propoſitions, they ſay, that the diſiunct being like to an absolute or ſimple propoſition, may be conuerted both ſimply and *per accidens*; but the coniunct ſuſſereth no conuerſion: and though the Schoolemen doe ſet down diuers and manifold rules, and haue invented theſe foure words of Art, that is, *PVRPVREA, ILIACE, AMARIMVS, E-DENTVLI*, attributing as well to the vowels, as to the conſonants thereof, certayne ſignifications, for the better vnderſtanding and bearing in memorie the equivalencies and conuerſions of the ſaid modall propoſitions: yet becauſe in mine opinion they are more meet to breed prepoſterous, intricate and barbarous ſpeeches, then to ſerue to any other good purpoſe, I thinke it better to paſſe them over with ſilence, then to trouble your memorie therewith: wherefore leauing them as things ſuperfluous, I minde now to treat of an hypotheticall or compound propoſition, and of al the neceſſary accidents thereunto belonging.

## CHAP. X.

*Of a compound or hypobeticall proposition.*

*What is a compound proposition?*



It is that which consisteth of two or more simple propositions, coupled together with some coniunction.

*How manifold is it?*

Threefold, Conditionall, Copulatiue, and Disiunctiue.

*When is it said to be conditionall?*

When the coniunction If is set before any simple proposition, as thus: If it be a man, it is a sensible body.

*When is it said to be copulatiue?*

When two simple propositions are ioyned together with a coniunction copulatiue; as, God is true, and man is a lier.

*When is it said to be disiunctiue?*

When two simple propositions are ioyned together with a coniunction disiunctiue; as thus, Either it is day, or night.

*Of how many parts doth a compound proposition consist?*

Of two, that is, of the antecedent, and of the consequent.

*Which call you the antecedent?*

That which followeth next after the coniunction, as thus: If it be iustice, it is a vertue: here this speech, If it be iustice, is the antecedent, and the rest of the speech, that is to say, It is a vertue, is the consequent: and so it should be, though the words were contrarily placed, as thus: It is a vertue, if it be iustice.

*What things are to be considered in hypobeticall propositions?*

These: First, whether they haue any quantitie, or qualitie: then, whether any opposition, equiualence, or conuersion doe belong to them, or not: thirdly, how to know the truth or falsehood of euery such proposition, be it conditionall, copulatiue, or disiunctiue. And first, as touching quantitie, they haue none at all: for quantitie is to be measured by signes vniuersall, or particular, which are only incident to the subjects of categorical propositions: but qualitie they haue, in that they affirme or deny some thing, by reason whereof there may bee contradiction in

hypo-

hypotheticall propositions, but it cannot bee properly said, that they be either contrarie; subcontrarie, or subalternat, for that they are without quantitie; for want whereof they neither doe aptly admit opposition, equiuallence, or conuersion, but only contradiction.

*How is that contradiction to be understood?*

By reason of affirmation, or negation; which, as in simple propositions is to bee taken on the behalfe of the verbe copulative, and not of the subiect or predicate: so in compound propositions, it is to bee taken on the behalfe of the coniunction, hauing a negatiue set before it, and yet not of euery coniunction, but onely of that coniunction conditionall, If: whereof I cannot aptly giue you any example in our native tongue, because it is contrarie to our naturall and vsuall speech, to put a negatiue before the coniunction, If; and therefore I leaue to speake thereof any further: and to say the truth, it maketh but a strange kinde of speech in the Latine tongue, and I beleue is seldome vsed in any disputation: as to say thus, *Non si animal est, homo est*: or, *Non si lux est, dies est*: both which are said to be negatiue speeches, according to the rule before giuen, because the negatiue is set before the coniunctioun *si*, and by vertue thereof (as the Schoolemen say) maketh the whole proposition to be negatiue.

C H A P. XI.

*Of the truth and falshood of Hypotheticall propositions, and first, of the Conditionall.*



*What is to be considered, to know the truth or falshood of Conditionall Propositions?*

First, whether they be affirmatiue or negatiue: for in the affirmatiues it sufficeth, that the one part doth necessarily follow of the other, as thus: If it be a man, it is a sensible body: and it maketh no matter, though the parts seuerally taken, be both false, so as the Consequent be good: as, If a tree be a man, a tree is a sensible bodie: for though both these parts be false, yet the

M

Consequent



Consequent conditionally is true : for a conditionall Proposition hath no regard to the truth of the parts , but onely that the Consequent may necessarily follow of the Antecedent.

*How is the truth of the negative Proposition to be knowne ?*

By the Consequent : for if the Consequent bee not rightly inferred of the antecedent, then the negative is true, as thus : it followeth not that because a Lyon is a sensible body , that therefore a Lyon is a man.

*Of the truth and falshood of Propositions copulative.*

**W***hen is a copulative Proposition said to be true or false ?*

It is said to bee true , when both the parts bee true, as when I say, God is true , and man is a lyar : againe it is said to be false, when either one part or both parts be false : as when I say, Man is a sensible bodie, and God is not a Spirit. Here because the first part is true, and the second part false , the whole Proposition is said to bee false. It is said also to bee false, when both parts are false , as thus ; Man is true , and God is a lyar. Heere both parts be false.

*What kinde of Propositions are wont to bee referred to this copulative ?*

Those which they call Temporall, Locall, by similitude and causall : as of time thus , When a penitent sinner prayeth , then God heareth him. Of place thus , Where two or three are gathered together in the Name of the Lord, hee is in the midst of them. By similitude thus , As a man dealeth with his neighbour , so will God deale with him. Of the cause thus , Because the Sunne shineth , it is day. And therefore certaine Aduerbes as these, When , Where, Vntill, so long as, as, so as, for, therefore, because and such like, haue the signification sometime of the Coniunction (And) and sometime of the Coniunction (If).

*Of the truth and falshood of disjunctiues.*

**W***hat belongeth properly to disjunctiue Propositions ?*

To consist of repugnant parts, according to the signi-


signification of Coniunctions disiunctiue, such as these bee, *vel* or either, or else, and such like: as either it is day, or it is night, whereof the one destroyeth the other: for if the one bee, the other cannot bee: and therefore they cannot bee both true: but they may be both false, if there be any meane betwixt the two cōtraries: as when we say, This woman is either white or blacke, both these are false, if she be browne, which is a meane colour betwixt white and blacke. But the later Writers affirme the disiunctiue to bee true, if any one or both of the parts bee true, as thus, Either a man is a sensible bodie, or else a tree is a Substance: and to bee false when both parts bee false, as Either a man is true, or God is a Lyar.

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*The end of the third Booke of Logicke.*

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# THE ARTE OF LOGICKE.

## *The fourth Booke.*

### CHAP. I.

#### *Of Places.*

**T**Hough immediately after the Treatise of a Proposition, the old men are wont to deal with the order of reasoning, called Argumentation, and with the formes thereof: yet sith by order of Nature it is meete to finde out matter, before wee goe about to forme, frame, or order the same, and that the matter of proving any Question is to be fetched from certayne common Places, I thought it best to treat first of those Places, and then to shew the order of reasoning.

#### *What is a Place?*

A Place is a marke or token, shewing from whence any Argument, apt to proue the Question propounded, is to bee taken.

#### *What difference is betwixt Argument and Argumentation?*

Argument is the bare prooffe or meane terme which is inuented by him that disputeth, to proue the truth of the Question: but Argumentation is the whole reasoning it selfe, of what

forme so euer it be, comprehending both the Question, and al-  
so the prooffe thereof: whereof wee shall speake hereafter in his  
proper place, and giue you examples of both.

*How manifold is Place?*

Two-fold, the one of persons, the other of things: the or-  
der and distribution of both which, you may plainly see in the  
Table following.

*To what end serueth this manifold diuision?*

That the disputers may the more perfectly know the pow-  
er and proper nature of euery Argument, according to the  
great or little force of the Place, from whence such Arguments  
are fetched.

*How is Place diuided according to the Schoolemen?*

Into two kindes, the one called Maxim, and the other diffe-  
rence of Maxim.

*What is Maxim?*

It is a generall rule approued and receiued of all Logicians,  
in such sort as no man will deny the same, as of contrarie  
things there must needs bee contrarie consequents. Againe,  
Whatsoeuer agreeth with the thing defined, agreeth also with  
the Definition of the same: and such like.

*What is the difference of Maxims?*

It is the proper name of euery Place whereby one Maxim is  
knowne from another, and to what place euery Maxim belong-  
eth, as from the contrary, from the Definition, from the thing  
defined: for by these names and such like, wee know to what  
Place euery Maxim belongeth.

*To what end serueth this diuision?*

The Maxims serue as shoote-ankers, and as places of refuge,  
when the aduersarie shall deny our Conclusion: againe, the  
differences being few in number, doe cause the multitude of  
Maxims to be the more easily kept in memorie.



The Table of Places.

|   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| Of Persons, as  | Name, Roocke, birth, nation, sex, or kinde, age, education, habit of the body, affections of the mind, flare, calling, or condition of life, diet, study, or exercise, acts done, death, wonders chancing beioze death, or after death, monuments left of things done, or written, and kinde of Funerals shewing how well or euill the person was beloued. | The Definition, and the things defined,<br>The Description, & the thing described,<br>The Interpretation, and the thing interpreted.<br>The Matter, and the thing made.<br>The Forme, and the thing formed.<br>The generall kind, & his speciall kind.<br>The Difference, and his propertie.<br>The whole, and his parts Integrall.<br>Principall, and not principall. |
|   |  |  |
| Of Places, some be<br>and some be of things, which be, either | Inward<br>Places be<br>either  | Of the substance it selfe, which<br>be these.  |
|   | Or, of things accompanying substance, as these   | Generation, and the thing ingendred.<br>Corruption, and the thing corrupted.<br>Vse, Abuse.<br>Subjects.<br>Adiacents, and actions.<br>Apposition.<br>Common Accidents.<br>Signes and circumstances, as time, place, and meane, &c.  |
| Artificiall Places<br>are either                              | Outward<br>Places be<br>these  | The Cause Efficient, and his effect,<br>The End, and the thing ended.<br>The foure Opposites, as   |
|   | Things diuers in kinde, called in Latine, <i>Disparata</i> .<br>Comparison, as more or lesse.<br>Like or Vnlike.<br>Example and comparison.<br>Also to Comparison may be added these places.<br>Proportion.<br>Changed proportion.<br>Disproportion.<br>Changed Disproportion.<br>Translation or Figuratiue speech.  | Relatives.<br>Contraries.<br>Priuatues.<br>Contradictories.<br>From the Comparatiue to the Superlatiue.<br>From the Positiue to the Comparatiue.<br>From two Positiues to two Comparatiues.<br>From two Positiues to two Superlatiues, and contrariwise.   |
| or Inartificiall places,<br>which be these five               | Or meane<br>Places be<br>these 3.  | Coniungates.<br>Cases.<br>Diuision.  |
|   | Fore- iudgements.<br>Rumors.<br>Torments.<br>Writings.<br>Oath.<br>Witnesses.  | All which six places are comprehended vnder the place of Authoritie, as you may see in the Table of Authoritie hereafter following, in which Table are set downe the said inartificiall places, together with the definitions and vses thereof.  |

## CHAP. II.

## Of the Places of persons.



*Give examples of all the Places of persons.*

Though the Places of persons may bee very well applyed to the place of common Accidents hereafter following, because they eyther goe before, accompanie, or follow the subiects whereunto they doe belong: yet because there is a difference betwixt persons and things, and that the Places before mentioned in the Table of persons, doe more properly belong to Persons, then to things, I thought it best to giue you examples of euery Place belonging to the person, before I come to treat of the Places of things, and first of the name, then of the stocke and family, and so forth.

*Of the name.*

Of this Place you may reason eyther in praise or dispraise more probably then truly; as to say thus: his name is *Good-man*: *Ergo*, he ought to bee a good man, for that name importeth good. I did once see an euill woman executed at Tyborne, whose name was *Sweepstake*, which name was answerable to her propertie, which was to sweepe all her louers purses so cleane as shee could. *Cicero* did not let to scoffe in like manner with *Verres* the Roman extortioner, against whom he made so many inueyghing Orations, saying many times, that he had not his name for nought: for *Verres* was as much to say as a sweeping thiefe, deriued of the verbe *verro*, which in English is to sweepe.

*Of the stocke or birth.*

Of this Place you may reason thus: Hee had strong parents: *Ergo*, he is strong. He came of an euill race: *Ergo*, it is no maruell though he be euill disposed.

*Of the nation.*

He is of the Island of *Crete* or *Candie*: *Ergo* hee is a liar. Hee is a *Flemming*: *Ergo*, a drunkard. He is an *Englishman*: *Ergo*, a glutton. He is an *Italian*: *Ergo*, a dissembler.

*Of the sex or kind.*

It is the promise of a woman, *Ergo* not to bee performed or trusted.

*Of the age.*

He is but an Infant, *Ergo* not malicious. He is yong of age, and therefore to be pardoned.

*Of education.*

He was euill brought vp, and therefore can not be good.

*Of the habit of the body.*

He is bigge set, *Ergo* he is strong. He is redheaded, *Ergo* euill conditioned.

*Of the affections of the minde.*

He is giuen to excesse and ryot, *Ergo* he is not temperate or modest: to this place may be referred all manner of vertues and vices.

*Of the state, calling, or condition of life.*

He is a bondman: *Ergo* he can neither sue nor be sued.

*Of dyet.*

He loueth to fare delicately, and to lie soft: *Ergo* hee is lasciuious.

*Of studie or exercise.*

He is very studious and applyeth his Booke: *Ergo* no voluptuous man.

*Of things done.*

*Pompey* hath had many prosperous and noble Victories; *Ergo* he is most meet to be sent as Generall of the warre against *Mithridates*.

*Of death.*

The death of *Scipio* was much lamented of the Romans, *Ergo* hee was dearely beloued of the Romans. Such a one suffered death most constantly for Christs sake. *Ergo* hee was a good Christian.

*Of things chancing after death.*

Honourable Monuments were set vp by the people of *Rome* in the honor of *Iulius Caesar* after his death, *Ergo* he was honored and beloued of all the people of *Rome* in his life time. There were great earthquakes, and dead bodies did arise immediately

after the death of Christ, *Ergo* hee was the Sonne of God, and was vniuſſly condemned.

## CHAP. III.

*Of the Places of things, and firſt of artificiall Places.*



*What be artificiall Places?*

Artificiall Places are thoſe wherein are containd ſuch Arguments as of their owne force and nature are able to proue or diſproue: which are diuided (as I ſaid before) into inward, outward and meane Places.

*What are inward Places?*

Inward Places are thoſe which yeeld Arguments either appertaining to the nature and ſubſtance of the matter in queſtion, or elſe to ſuch things as doe accompany the ſubſtance and nature of the thing.

*Which be the Places of Subſtance?*

Theſe, Definition and the thing defined, together with the reſt rehearſed before in the Table.

*Of Definition and the thing defined.*



*What is Definition?*

It is that which briefly, plainly and properly declarerh the nature of any thing, by ſhewing the ſubſtantiall parts thereof.

*How may a man reaſon from this place?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, aſwell from the Subiect as the Predicate of the Queſtion. Affirmatiuely thus, Every reaſonable bodie is apt to learne Letters, *Ergo* man is apt to learne Letters. Negatiuely thus, No vnreaſonable bodie is apt to learne Letters, *Ergo* no brute beaſt is apt to learne Letters.

*What be the Maxims or generall rules of this Place?*

The Maxims be theſe, Whatſoeuer agreeth with the definition, agreeth with the thing defined: and contrariwiſe whatſoeuer

soeuer agreeth not with the definition, agreeth not with the thing defined.

*What is the thing defined?*

That, whose nature and propertie is declared in the definition.

*How may a man reason from this place?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely, as *Peter* is a man: *Ergo* he is a reasonable body. Negatiuely, as an Ape is no man: *Ergo* an Ape is no reasonable body.

*What be the Maxims of this Place?*

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the thing defined, agreeth also with the definition thereof: and whatsoeuer agreeth not with the thing defined, agreeth not with the definition of the same.

*Of Description, and the thing described.*

**W***hat is Description?*

It is a speech declaring what a thing is, by shewing the properties and accidents whereby it differeth from other things.

*How may a man reason from this place?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Every laudable habit adorneth his possessor: *Ergo* vertue adorneth his possessor: negatiuely thus, no laudable habit shameth his owner or possessor: *Ergo* no vertue shameth his owner or possessor.

*What is the thing described?*

It is that, whose properties eyther naturall or accidentall are declared in the description.

*How are arguments to be fetched from this Place?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, This beast is foure-footed, hauing long eares and whole feet: *ergo* it is an Asse: negatiuely thus; This foure-footed beast hath no long eares, nor whole feet: *Ergo* it is no Asse.

*When are arguments to be confuted, being fetched from these places?*

When the definition or description is not true or proper to the thing defined or described.



*Of Interpretation and the thing interpreted.*

**VV** *What is Interpretation?*

It is the declaring of a name lesse knowne by another that is more knowne, as thus; Iesus is as much to say as a Sauour, a Philosopher is a louer of Wisdome.

*What is the thing interpreted?*

That which is declared by the Interpretation; as this word Iesus to be a Sauour, or this word Philosopher to be a louer of wisdome.

*How may a man reason from this place?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, if the termes be conuertible. Affirmatiuely thus: Hee is a louer of Wisdome: *Ergo* a Philosopher. Negatiuely thus: He is no louer of Wisdome: *Ergo* no Philosopher.

*What be the maxims of these two places?*

The Maxims of these Places are like: for whatsoeuer agreeth with the one, agreeth with the other, and contrariwise.

*Of the Place of Matter, and of the thing made.*

**VV** *What is Matter?*

That whereof any thing is made, as Siluer is the matter of a Siluer Cup, and the Cup is the thing made, called of the Logicians *materialium*.

*How is Matter diuided?*

Into Matter permanent, and Matter transient.

*What is Matter permanent?*

It is that which remaineth in the thing made, retayning still both nature and name, as stone and timber is the matter of an House.

*What is Matter transient?*

It is that which being changed, doth not returne againe into his first nature: as flower and water being made bread, will neuer be flower and water againe.

*How are arguments to be fetched from Matter permanent?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Here is timber, lime and stone: *Ergo* here may be an House: negatiuely

ly thus, Here is neither timber, lime nor stone : *Ergo*, here is no house.

*How are arguments to be fetched from Matter transient ?*

Affirmatiuely, but not negatiuely, as, here is Water and Meale : *Ergo*, here may be bread : but you cannot say, here is no meale : *Ergo*, here is no bread : for the matter permanent being taken away, the effect thereof is also taken away : but this Maxime taketh no place in Matter transient, vnlesse the Argument be made by the preterperfect Tense or time past, as thus : Here was no Meale : *Ergo*, here is no bread.

*What be the Maxims of this Place ?*

The matter being set downe, the effect also may be according to the difference of the matter.

*How may we reason from the thing made to the Matter ?*

In matter permanent you may reason from the present Tense to the present Tense, thus : Here are Iron weapons : *Ergo*, here is Iron. But in matter transient wee must reason from the present time to the time past, thus ; here is bread : *Ergo*, here hath beene meale.

*What be the Maxims of this place ?*

The thing made of matter permanent being set downe, the matter also must needs be : and the thing made of matter transient being set downe, the matter thereof must needs haue beene.

*How may you else reason from these two places ?*

By adding these two adiectiues (good or euill) as thus : The house is good : *Ergo*, the timber and stone was good : for the goodnesse or defect of the matter permanent, sheweth the present goodnesse or defect of the thing made : and any good or euill thing made of Matter transient, proueth the Matter to haue beene good or euill.

*Of the Places of Forme and Shape.*

**W**Hat is Forme ?

Forme is that which giueth shape and being to the thing formed, whereof also the thing taketh his name, as the soule of man is the forme, and man is the thing formed.

*How is Forme divided ?*

Forme substantiall, which is  
 the first being or shape of a  
 ny thing, and that is either } Mortall, as the soule  
 of a bruit beast.  
 Or immortall, as the  
 soule of man.  
 And into Forme accidentall, which is a meere acci-  
 dent, called of the Logicians *Abstratum*, as whitenesse or  
 blacknesse.

*How are arguments to be fetched from the Forme and the thing  
 formed ?*

Two wayes, affirmatiuely from the substantiall forme, thus :  
 Here is the soule of a beast : *Ergo*, here is a beast : from the acci-  
 dentall forme thus : Here is whitenesse : *Ergo*, here is some  
 white thing : from the substantiall thing formed, thus : The beast  
 is here : *Ergo*, his soule is here : of the accidentall thing formed,  
 thus : Here is some white thing : *Ergo*, here is whitenesse : Ne-  
 gatiuely from the substantiall forme, thus : Here is no soule of a  
 beast : *Ergo*, here is no beast : of the accidentall forme, thus :  
 Here is no whitenesse : *Ergo*, here is no white thing : of the sub-  
 stantiall thing formed, thus : The beast is not here : *Ergo*, his  
 soule is not here : of the accidentall thing formed, thus : Here is  
 no white thing : *Ergo*, here is no whitenesse.

*Rehearse the Maxims whereupon these arguments are grounded.*

The Maxims be these, where Forme is either present or wan-  
 ting, the thing formed also must needs be either present or wan-  
 ting, and contrariwise. Yet this Maxim sayleth in the forme of  
 man, for the soule intellectuall may be, and yet no man, vnlesse  
 you reason from the inbeing of the Forme in the Subiect, as, In  
 the body is a reasonable soule : *Ergo*, it is a man : for euery Sub-  
 iect hath his name and being in his shape or forme, as hath been  
 said before.

*Of the generall kind.*

**W**hat is generall kind ?

It is that which comprehendeth many things differ-  
 ring

ring in speciall kinde, as hath beene said before.

*How are Arguments to bee fetched from the generall kinde to the speciall kind?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely: affirmatiuely thus, Euery vertue is to be desired: *Ergo* Iustice is to be desired. Negatiuely thus, No vice is to be prayfed: *Ergo* drunkenesse is not to be prayfed.

*Rehearse the Maxims belonging to the generall kind?*

To what kinde soeuer agreeth the generall kinde being vniuersally taken (that is to say) pronounced with some vniuersall signe, as All, Euery or None, to the same the speciall kind doth also agree: and whatsoeuer agreeth not with the generall kind vniuersally taken, agreeth not with the speciall kind: for if no vniuersall signe be added to the generall kind, you cannot reason affirmatiuely, but onely negatiuely, thus: It is no sensible body: *Ergo* it is no man: but you cannot reason so affirmatiuely, as to say thus, It is a sensible body: *Ergo* it is a man: because the vniuersall signe All, or Euery, is wanting.

*How many Places doth this Place of generall kind comprehend?*

Four, (that is to say) All or euery in quantitie, All or euery in respect, All or euery in place, All or euery in time.

*What is All or euery in quantitie?*

It is when an vniuersall signe is added to the generall kinde, as euery plant liueth, therefore euery tree liueth.

*When is it all or euery in respect?*

When any generall kind is vnderstood in some respect, and that the generall signification thereof is restrayned by some word added vnto it, or by some secret meaning limiting the same, as a white beast, a good man: for this word white restrayneth the generall signification of beast, and this word good, the generall signification of man.

*Give examples of this place.*

God gaue his holy Spirit to all faithfull men: *Ergo* to his Apostles.

*What is all or euery in place?*

It is when the generall kinde is an Aduerbe of place, signifying euery where or no where, as Iustice is no where truly

truely executed : *Ergo*, neither in France nor in England.

*What is all or euery in time ?*

It is when the generall kind is an Aduerbe of time , signifying euer or neuer, as God is alwayes with vs : *Ergo*, now at this present.

*What maxims doe belong to these places ?*

The same that doe belong to the generall kind vniuersally taken before mentioned, by vertue whereof you may reason both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as I said before.

#### *Of the speciall kind.*

**H**ow are arguments to be fetched from the speciall kinde to the generall kind ?

Affirmatiuely, but negatiuely thus ; It is a man : *Ergo*, it is a sensible body. But now you cannot say, it is no man : *Ergo*, it is no sensible body : for it may be a horse , or some other sensible thing.

*What be the maxims belonging to the speciall kind ?*

Where the speciall kind is, there the generall kind must also needs be : againe , all the speciall kinds being taken away , the generall kind is also taken away.

#### *Of the place of Difference.*

**T**his place is comprehended vnder the place of definition, for difference is a good part of the definition, and yet for order sake I haue thought good to place it next to the generall kind and speciall kind before taught.

*How may a man reason from this place ?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as an Oyster hath feeling : *Ergo*, it is a sensible body, a horse hath no reason : *Ergo*, hee is no man.

*What be the maxims in this place ?*

Whatsoever agreeth with the speciall difference , agreeth with the thing that hath that difference, and whatsoever disagreeeth with the speciall difference, disagreeeth with the thing that hath that difference, for they be convertible.



*Of the place of Propertie.*

**H**ow may a man reason from this place?

This place is contained vnder the place of Description before shewed. And from hence you may reason both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as thus; He is apt to speake : *Ergo* hee is a man; He is not apt to speake : *Ergo* he is no man.

*What be the maxims of this place?*

Whatsoever agreeth with the propertie, agreeth also with the thing that hath that propertie. And whatsoever disagreeeth with the property, disagreeeth also with the thing whereto such propertie belongeth, for they be conuertible.

*Of the place of whole Integrall.*

**W**hat is the whole Integrall?

That which consisteth of parts hauing quantitie.

*How may we reason from the whole to euery particular part?*

Affirmatiuely, but not negatiuely, thus ; It is a house : *Ergo* it hath foundation, walls and rooffe : but you cannot reason so negatiuely from the whole to euery particular part, as to say thus ; Here is an House : *Ergo* here is no foundation or walls.

*What be the maxims of this place?*

If the whole be, euery principall part must needs bee : but if the whole be wanting, some principall part must needs be wanting, though not all : for the house might bee wanting, and yet the wals and foundation may still remaine.

*Of the place of Integrall parts.*

**W**hat is an Integrall part, and how is it diuided?

It is that which certaine other parts make vp the whole, and such Integrall part is either principall, or not principall.

*Define these two parts.*

The principall is that without the which the whole cannot be, as the head or belly of a liuing body, or as the foundation, walls,

walls, or couering of an house. The part not principall is that without the which the whole may stand, as a house without doores or windowes : or the body may liue without hands or feet.

*How may we reason from the principall part to the whole?*

Negatiuely thus; Heere is no foundation or walls : *Ergo*, here is no house: but you cannot reason so of the part not principall, but onely in hauing respect to the perfection of the whole, as thus; Heere is neither doores nor windowes : *Ergo*, the house is not perfect.

*What be the maxims of this place?*

If any principall part be wanting, the whole cannot bee. If any part not principall be wanting, the whole is vnperfect.

*Of the places of things accompanying Substance.*

**VV** *What is the place of things accompanying Substance.*

It is that which comprehendeth such arguments as are not fetched from the substance of the thing it selfe, but from that which accompanieth the substance thereof.

*Which be those places?*

These: Generation, the thing ingendred : Corruption, the thing corrupted : Vse, Subiect, Adiacents, Actions, Opposition, common Accidents, and Circumstances and such like.

*Of the place of Generation, and of the thing engendred.*

**VV** *What is Generation?*

It is the first being or springing of any thing.

*How are Arguments to bee fetched from Generation to the thing engendred?*

Affirmatiuely thus : It was good that Christ was borne: *Ergo*, Christ was good; It was euill for Rome that Catiline was borne: *Ergo*, Catiline was euill to Rome.

*What be the maxims of this place?*

Those things whose generation is good, must needs be good, and those things whose generation is euill, must needs be euill.

*How*

*How may we reason from the thing engendred to the Generation?*

Affirmatiuely thus: *Catiline* was euill to *Rome*: *Ergo*, the birth of *Catiline* was euill to *Rome*.

*What be the maxims of this place?*

If the thing engendred be either good or euill, the generation thereof must needs be also either good or euill.

*Of Corruption, and the thing Corrupted.*

**V** *What is Corruption?*

Corruption is contrary to Generation, and is the destruction of the thing engendred, and the thing destroyed is said to be corrupted.

*How may we reason from Corruption, to the thing Corrupted?*

Thus: To execute Theeues and Murtherers, is profitable to the Common-wealth: *Ergo*, Theeues and Murtherers are hurtfull to the Common-wealth. The death of *Virgil* was a great losse to learning: *Ergo*, *Vir.* was a great furtherance to learning.

*How may we reason from the thing Corrupted, to the Corruption?*

Affirmatiuely thus: *Virgil* was a great furtherance to learning: *Ergo*, the death of *Virgil* was a great losse to learning.

*What be the maxims of these two places?*

Those things whereof the end and destruction is laudable, must needs of themselves be pernicious and hurtfull. And contrariwise, those things whose end and destruction is hurtfull, must needs of themselves bee good and profitable. Againe, of good things, the losse is euill, and of euill things, the losse is good: but in reasoning from these places, you must take heed that as well the Corruption, as the thing corrupted, bee absolutely good, or euill of it selfe, and not by Accident: for it were no good argument to reason thus; The death of Christ was good: *Ergo*, Christ was euill: for his death was good by accident for our saluation, and not for any crime that was in him. Moreouer, you must beware that you vse not one selfe predicate both in your antecedent, and in your consequent: for if good be the predicate in the antecedent, euill must be the predicate in the consequent, and if euill be the predicate in the antecedent, good must

must be the predicate in the consequent: for this kind of reasoning consisteth of contraries.

*Of Vse.*

**W***hat is Vse?*

Vse is the apt applying of euery thing to his proper end, as the vse of Wine to comfort the stomake, and to reioyce the heart of man.

*How may we reason from this place?*

Affirmatiuely thus: the vse of Wine is good: *Ergo*, Wine is good: the vse of art Magike is euill: *Ergo*, the art it selfe is euill.

*What be the maxims of this place?*

That thing is good or euill, whereof the vse is good or euill.

*What is to be obserued in this kind of reasoning?*

Two things: first, that the thing whereof wee speake, haue some good or euill vse of it selfe absolutely, and not by accident: secondly, that we take not the abuse in stead of the right vse, as to say, Wine will make men drunke: *Ergo*, Wine is not good.

*Whereto serue most chiefly these three places last mentioned (that is to say) the place of Generation, of Corruption, and of Vse?*

They chiefly serue to proue the naturall goodnesse or euilnesse of any thing.

*Of the Subiect.*

**H***ow is this word Subiect here taken?*

For that whereunto accidents and actions doe belong: and hauing to speake here of common accidents, I thought it good to speake first of the Subiects, because all manner of Accidents must needs cleaue to one Subiect or other.

*How may we reason from this place?*

Affirmatiuely, and Negatiuely: Affirmatiuely thus: It is fire: *Ergo*, it is hot and apt to burne. He is a man: *Ergo*, apt to laugh or to weepe. Negatiuely thus, Dead men haue no being at all: *Ergo*, dead men are not miserable. He hath no gall: *Ergo*, hee cannot

cannot be angry. There be no Pigmeans : *Ergo*, they fight not with Cranes.

*Which be the maxims of this place?*

If the Subiect be, the naturall accidents and actions belonging to the Subiect must also needes bee : and the Subiect being taken away, all the accidents and actions thereof must also bee taken away.

*How may such arguments as are fetched out of this place bee confuted?*

When the Accidents doe not of necessity belong to the Subiect, as thus, He is a man : *Ergo*, he is a good Poet, for this accident belongeth not of necessitie to every man.

*Of Adjacents and Actions.*

**F**Or so much as Adjacents, otherwise called perpetuall Accidents, and also naturall and proper Actions belonging to any Subiect, be eyther contayned under the place of Propertie, of Difference, or else of common Accidents, and haue like kind of reasoning, I thought good therefore to referre you to those places, whereof some are taught before, and some doe follow hereafter.

*Of Apposition.*

**W**Hat is Apposition?

Apposition is when a thing sheweth what his owne quality or operation is, by being put or added to another thing, as, white Chalke being put to a wall, will make the wall white, and thereby Chalke sheweth it selfe to bee white : so likewise Inke being put to paper, or such like thing, will make it blacke.

*How may a man reason from this place?*

Affirmatiuely thus : Chalke being put to a wall, will make it white : *Ergo*, Chalke is white. Fire being put vnder a Cauldron of water, will make the water hot : *Ergo*, fire is hot. By this place also a man may prooue conuersation or companie with others to be good or euill in this sort. This young man



keeping company with that olde man is made vertuous : *Ergo*, the olde man is vertuous. Hee is become a Thiefe by keeping company with such a person : *Ergo*, that person is a Thiefe. And therefore the Scripture saith, *cum bonis bonus eris, & cum peruersis peruerteris* (that is to say) with the good thou shalt be good, and with the froward thou shalt learne frowardnesse.

*What be the maxims of this place ?*

If one thing being put to another, endureth the same with any qualitie, that thing must needs haue the same qualitie it selfe. I doe place this place next to action, because it seemeth to me that it appertaineth to action.

*Of common Accidents.*

**V***What call yee common Accidents ?*

I call those common Accidents, such things as are either alwaies, or for the most part so knit together, as the one goeth before or after the other, or els accompany each one the other : whereof some are necessary, and some probable.

*How may we reason from the Necessary ?*

Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, and first affirmatiuely, by the latter part thus. This Appletree hath flowres : *Ergo*, it hath budded. It hath fruit : *Ergo*, it hath both budded and flowred. This woman is brought to bed of a childe : *Ergo*, she hath conceived. Negatiuely by the former part thus. This woman neuer conceived : *Ergo*, she can bring forth no childe. This man neuer studied : *Ergo*, he is not learned.

*What be the maxims of this place ?*

If the latter be, the former must needs goe before, and if the former were not, the latter cannot bee.

*Of Probable Accidents, Coniectures, Presumptions, Signes, and Circumstances.*

**H***ow may we reason from Probable Accidents ?*

From Probable Accidents you may reason Affirmatiuely thus : The feast of *Bacchus* is this day celebrated : *Ergo*, there

there will be many drunken this day. The generall Sessions are holden this day : *Ergo*, there will bee some hanged.

*What be the maxims of this place?*

If the latter be, it is likely that the former went before, and if the former bee, it is like enough the latter may follow; but you must beware in reasoning from this place, that you fetch not your argument from such Accidents as chance but seldome, or bee indifferent, for such bee neither necessary nor probable, but sophisticall and fallible, as to reason thus. Shee is a faire woman : *Ergo*, shee is vnchaste.

*Whereto serueth the place of common Accidents?*

In the Iudiciall kind it helpeth greatly to prooue the fact. In the Demonstratiue kind to prayse or dispraise. In the Deliberatiue kind to perswade or dissuade, and to gather together all Coniectures meete for the purpose, and therefore this place is much vsed of naturall Philosophers to prooue things by naturall signes, or by Physiognomie : also of Astrologers to proue Dearth, Mortality, and such like, by Wonders, and Monsters, as by blazing Stars, and such like impressions. Also it is much vsed of Chiromancers, Southsayers, and such as vse to iudge by Coniectures, and therefore this place extendeth very farre, and serueth to many vses. Hitherto also are referred the places of circumstances, and chiefly of time and place, from whence good arguments may be fetched.

Of Time.

**H**ow are arguments fetched from time?

Negatiuely thus : *Pythag.* was not borne in *Numa Pompilius* time : *Ergo*, *Numa* was not *Pythagoras* Scholler. The Ceremoniall Lawes of *Moses* were made for a certaine time : *Ergo*, after that time they doe not bind.

*What be the maxims of this place?*

Nothing cannot be without time, for if time be taken away, the thing also must needs faile.

of

**H**ow are arguments fetched from place?

Negatiuely thus: Cicero was not at Rome, when Iulius Caesar was slaine: Ergo, Cicero slew him not.

*What is the maxime of this place?*

No certaine body or thing is without a place, neither is one body at one time in diuers places: and thus much touching inward places.

*Of outward Places, and first of Causes.*

**W**hich be outward Places?

Outward places bee those which appertaine to the thing, and yet doe not cleaue thereunto: of which places the first is of Causes and Effects.

*What is a Cause?*

A Cause is that by vertue whereof another thing followeth.

*How many chiefe kinds of Causes be there?*

Foure, (that is to say) the Cause Efficient, the end, matter, and shape, of the two last whereof we haue spoken before, because they be inward places, and doe belong to the Substance of the thing, and therefore wee haue to deale onely here, with the cause Efficient and end.

*Of the Cause Efficient.*

**W**hat is that cause Efficient, and how is it deuided?

Cause Efficient is that from whence proceedeth the first beginning of any thing that is made or done, and is the maker thereof. As for example, the Carpenter is the Cause Efficient of the house which he maketh, and so is euery Artificer of his owne worke. Causes Efficient are deuided into two kinds (that is to say) Cause Absolute, and Cause Adiuuant. Cause Absolute worketh by his owne force and vertue, as the fire that burneth. Cause Adiuuant worketh not by himselfe, but is a helper, and such cause is sometime principall, as ver-

ue is a Principall Cause of blessed life, and sometime not Principall, as the gifts of the body and of fortune be helpers to the happy life: but not Principall Causes thereof. Againe of Causes, some are of Necessitie, without which the thing cannot be made, as the Instrument or matter, and some are said not to be of Necessitie, as when we say, The speaking of truth causeth hatred, and yet not of Necessitie. Also of Causes Efficient, some be Vniuersall, and some Particular, as the Eclipse or euill Coniunction of certaine Planets is the Vniuersall cause of Pestilence: but the corruption of humours in mans bodie is the particular cause thereof. Againe, of causes some be called of the Latins *Propinqua* (that is to say) nigh vnto the Effect, as the Father and Mother be the highest Causes of Generation of Children. And some bee called *Remota*, (that is to say) removed causes, which be further of, as the Grandfirs, and Grandames of the said children. Moreouer of Causes Efficient some work by a certaine naturall Necessity, as those that lack choice and iudgement, as fire that burneth, and the Sunne that shineth, and all other naturall things that doe worke by their own force and vertue. Some againe doe worke by Counsell, Reason, and Freewill, as Men, Angels, and most chiefly God himselfe.

*How may we reason from the Efficient Cause to the Effect?*

From the necessarie Efficient Cause you may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely. Affirmatiuely thus: The Sunne is lately gone downe: *Ergo*, it is twilight. Negatiuely thus: The Sunne was not vp when *Troy* was destroyed: *Ergo*, *Troy* was not destroyed in the day time: but from the Efficient not Necessary, you can reason but onely Affirmatiuely thus: Hee is slaine: *Ergo*, he is dead: but you cannot say; he is not slaine: *Ergo*, hee is not dead.

*What be the Maxims of this place?*

The Necessary Cause Efficient not letted, the Effect must needs follow: as if he hath drunken Poyson, he must needs dye. But if such Cause faileth, the effect also must needs faile: as the Sunne is not vp: *Ergo*, it is not day. Hee neuer studied: *Ergo*, he is not learned, to which place may bee referred the places of occasion, Instrument, Meane, and Generation.

*How may we reason from the Effect, to the Cause Efficient?*

From the Necessary Effect, both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely thus, it is day : *Ergo*, the Sunne is vp it is not day : *Ergo*, the Sunne is not vp. From the Effect not Necessary you may only reason Negatiuely, thus : He is not dead; *Ergo*, He is not slaine, but you cannot reason so Affirmatiuely, as to say, Hee is dead : *Ergo*, He is slaine.

*What be the Maximes of this place?*

The Effect being put, the necessary Cause must needes bee, and the Effect being taken away, the necessary Cause is also taken away.

*When doe Arguments fetched from this place faile?*

When the Cause is not necessary or proper.

*Of the End.*

**W***hat is the End, and how is it diuided?*

The End is that for whose sake any thing is done, and of ends some be chiefe and last, and some not chiefe, but helping : The chiefe is that which is desired for it selfe sake, and such is the best state of euery thing in his kinde, as blessed life to Man : courage and fiercenesse to a Horse of seruice : heate and drynesse to Fire : coldnesse and moystnesse to Water, &c. The helping end is that which is desired not for it selfe sake, but for that it helpeth to attaine the chiefe end, and of such helping ends one may be better then another, as when we desire money to buy a house, and the house to dwell in, &c.

*How may we reason from this place?*

Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, Affirmatiuely thus, Vertue is good, because blessed Life is good : Negatiuely thus, If Adulterie be not good to allure another mans wife, To breake Wedlocke is not good.

*What be the Maximes of this place?*

That thing where of the end is good or euill, is also of it selfe good or euill.

*Tell the vse of the places of Causes, and whereto they serue?*

The vse thereof is diuers and manifold : for sith that in the Deliberatiue kind two principall questions are to be discussed;

first,



first, whether the thing be profitable; and secondly, whether it may be possible and conueniently done or not. Arguments to proue the first, are to be fetched out of the End and Effect. And to proue the second out of the Cause Efficient. Also in the kind Demonstratiue to prayse or disprayse. Arguments are to bee fetched out of the End and Effect. Thirdly, in the Iudiciall kind, wherein doubt riseth of the fact, and will of the doer. Arguments are to bee fetched from the End, to proue or disproue the same. Finally, these places, together with the other two Causes, Matter and Forme before taught, doe serue to make those kinds of Definitions which we call Causall.

*Of Opposites.*

**W**Hat be Opposites?

Things contrary one to another.

*How many kinds of Opposites be there?*

Four (that is to say) Relatiues, Contraries, Priuatiues, and Contradictories.

*And first of Relatiues.*

**W**Hen are things said to be Opposites by Relation?

When according to their owne significations they haue mutuall Relation one to another, as the Father and the Sonne.

*How may we reason from this place?*

You may reason from the Affirmation of the one to the denyall of the other, thus: *Augustus was Octanius* his sonne: *Ergo*, He was not his Father.

*What be the Maximes of this place?*

Such Relatiues bee alwayes together by nature, if the one be, the other must needs bee, and if the one bee taken away, the other is also taken away.

*What is to be obserued in fetching Arguments from this place?*

You must beware that you haue one selfe respect, and not diuers, for to reason thus is no good Consequent, This man is

a Father: *Ergo*, He is no Sonne: or thus, This man is his Superior: *Ergo*, Not his Inferior, for in diuers respects he may be both a Father and a Sonne; a Superior and Inferior; a Superior in one respect, and Inferior in another.

*Of Contraries.*

**VV** *What be Contraries, and how are they diuided?*

They be two Extremes Repugnant one to another, whereof some are called Mediate (that is to say) hauing a meane, and some Immediate hauing no meane at all.

*How may we reason from these two kinds?*

From the first kinde you may conclude negatiuely, thus, Hee is prodigall: *Ergo*, Hee is not couetous: from the second kind you may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, thus, This man is whole: *Ergo*, Hee is not sicke; This man is not whole: *Ergo*, He is sicke.

*What be the Maximes of this place?*

The Maxime of the Affirmatiue to the Negatiue is the generall Maxime to all Opposites, thus: Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one Opposite, must needs disagree with the other Opposite: but the Maxime of the Immediate is thus: If one of the Contraries Immediate be not, the other must needs bee, as the former examples doe plainly shew.

*Of Priuatiues.*

**VV** *What be Priuatiues?*

Priuatiues are two Contraries, belonging to one selfe Subject, apt to receiue the same, in the which Subject, when the one is wanting (at such time as Nature doth appoint) the other must needs bee.

*How may we reason from this place?*

Two wayes: first, from Affirmation of the one to the denyall of the other, which is common to all Opposites, as thus, He is blind: *Ergo*, He seeth not. Secondly, you may reason from the denyall of the one to the affirmation of the other, thus: He cannot speake: *Ergo*, He is dumbe. But this kinde of Argument is not strong, vnlesse the thing required bee applyed to his

his proper Subiect, and in such time as nature hath appointed, for it were no good argument to say thus: a sucking childe cannot speake: *Ergo*, he is dumbe; or thus, a whelp of two dayes old cannot see: *Ergo*, he is blinde: for nature commonly suffereth not the childe to speake before it bee two yeeres old, nor the whelp to see before it be nine dayes old.

*What be the Maximes of this place?*

If the one bee not in the Subiect apt to receiue the same at such time as nature hath appointed, the other must needs be.

*Of Contradictories.*

**VV** *What be Contradictories?*

They bee Contraries having no meane, whereof the one denieth the other.

*How may we reason from this place?*

Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely thus: he is wife: *Ergo*, he is no foole: he is a foole: *Ergo*, he is not wife.

*What is the Maxime of this place?*

If the one be, the other cannot bee: for two Contradictories cannot be together at one selfe time, in one selfe Subiect, and in one selfe respect.

*Of things differing in kind, called of the Latines Disparata.*

**VV** *What be they?*

They are those things that doe differ in nature and kind, as a Man, a Horse, a Stone, a Tree, whereof euery one differeth from another in kind and nature.

*How may we reason from this place?*

From the Affirmation of the one, to the Deniall of the other, as thus: *Peter* is a Man, *Ergo*, he is no Horse.

*What be the Maximes of this place?*

Whatsoever agreeth with the one, agreeth not with the other.

*What is to be observed in reasoning from all these kindes of Opposites?*

That the Repugnancy consist in the Predicat, and not in the

Subiect:

Subiect : for it were no good Consequent to say thus : what soeuer seeth is a sensible bodie : *Ergo*, that which is blinde is no sensible body : for heere the Contrariety consisteth in the Subiect, and not in the Predicate.

*Of Comparison.*

**H**ow may we reason from the place of Comparison?

Three manner of wayes, that is, either from the More to the Lesse, or from the Lesse to the More, or from Like to Like.

*Of the More.*

**T**hese two words, *More* or *Lesse*, how are they to be taken?

We vnderstand here by *More*, that which hath more probability, and by the *Lesse*, that which hath lesse probability.

*How may we reason from the More to the Lesse?*

Onely Negatiuely, and that three manner of wayes : first, from the Subiect, as thus : *Cicero* was not able to defend this cause, much lesse any other common Orator : secondly, from the Predicate thus : If this man be not able to beare one hundred weight, much lesse two hundred weight : thirdly, from the Subiect, and Predicate both together thus : A strong man is not able to beare a hundred weight : *Ergo*, much lesse a weak child is able to beare two hundred weight.

*What is the Maxime of this place?*

If it preuaileth not in the *More*, it cannot preuaile in the *Lesse*.

*Of the Lesse.*

**H**ow may we reason from the Lesse to the More?

Affirmatiuely, three manner of wayes, as before from the Subiect thus : A little childe was able to beare tenne pound weight : *Ergo*, much more a strong man : From the Predicate thus : If Martyrs were readie to lose their liues for Christs sake, much more their temporall goods : From the Subiect, and the Predicate both together thus : Christ suffered most

griuous

grievous torments for our sakes : *Ergo*, wee ought to suffer a little paine for his sake.

*What is the Maxime of this place?*

If the Lesse preuaile, the More must needes auail.

*What is to be obserued in reasoning from these two places?*

You must beware that you take not the More for the Lesse, nor the Lesse for the More, for many times that which seemeth to be the More in number or quantitie, is the Lesse in purpose, and contrariwise, as for example: to beare a hundred weight, is more in quantitie, then to beare halfe a hundred weight, and yet in purpose it is lesse, for it is lesse probable, and lesse likely to beare a hundred weight, then to beare halfe a hundred weight.

*Of Like and Unlike.*

**H**ow may we reason from Like to Like?

When the thing which we bring to proue, is like or equall to the thing that is to be proued: from which place wee may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, thus: *Peter* is mortall: *Ergo*, *Paul* is mortall. The day Labourer is worthy of his hyre: *Ergo*, the Preacher or Teacher: A man ought to be drowned in the Sea for killing his Father: *Ergo*, he ought to be executed with the like death for killing his Mother.

*What is the Maxime of this place?*

Of things like, like iudgement is to be made: but note that this kinde of reasoning of Like, is more apt to teach and to print in the hearers minde a liuely representation of the thing, then to vrge him by any necessitie of due prooffe to beleue the same, because it is vnpossible, that the two things which are to bee compared can bee like in all points, and therefore this is the weakest kind of argument that is, and yet necessarie to such end as is before declared, and specially for Lawyers, to proue one ruled case, or for iudgement by another Like. To this place also is referred the place of Example.

*Of Example.*

*How may we reason from this place?*

Affirma-



Affirmatiuely thus : *Peter* slew *Ananias* for lying : *Ergo*, without all doubt God will punish those that vse to lye : the *Maxime* whereof is all one, with that of like before set downe.

*Of Unlike.*

**H**ow may we reason from this place?  
Negatiuely thus : God is not as man is, for man is a lyer : *Ergo*, God is true and no lyer.

*What is the Maxime of this place?*

Of things Vnlike, vnlike iudgement is to be made.

*Of the degrees of Comparison.*

**T**O the place of Comparison, we thinke it were not amisse to referre all those places which Aristotle reciteth, and are taken out of the three degrees of Comparison, which children learne in their Accidents, (that is to say) the Positiue, the Comparatiue, and the Superlatiue.

*From the Comparatiue to the Positiues.*

**H**ow may we reason from the Comparatiue to the Positiue?  
Affirmatiuely thus : *Virgil* was a more learned Poet, then *Horace* : *Ergo*, *Virgil* was a learned Poet : Honey is sweeter then Milke : *Ergo*, Honey is sweet.

*What is the Maxime of this place?*

If the Comparatiue degree be truly and properly applyed to any thing : the Positiue must needes be also rightly applyed to the same. I say, heere properly to auoid Ambiguitie, for it were no good Consequent to say thus : the Sea of *Cassia* is more sweet then any other Sea : *Ergo*, it is sweet and not salt : for this word sweet hath not in this speech his proper signification, but is rather taken, for that which is lesse bitter or salt.

*From the Positiue to the Comparatiue.*

**H**ow may we reason from the Positiue to the Comparatiue?  
Onely Negatiuely thus : *Zoilus* was no learned Poet : *Ergo*, he was not better learned then *Homer*.

*What is the Maxime of this place?*

If the Positiue be denied, the Comparatiue also must needs be denied.

*From two Positiues to two Comparatiues and two Superlatiues.*

**H**OW may we reason from two Positiues, to two Comparatiues, and to two Superlatiues at once, and contrarily?

In this manner; that which is good, deserueth iustly to bee beloued: *Ergo*, that which is better, ought more iustly to bee beloued, and that which is best, ought most iustly to be beloued. And much after this manner you may reason from a double Comparatiue, to a double Positiue thus: that which is more honest; is more laudable: *Ergo*, that which is honest is laudable.

*What is to be observed in reasoning from these degrees of Comparison?*

You must take heed that the Predicate bee spoken of the Subject naturally and necessarily, and not by Accident, for it were no good Consequent to reason thus: he that is learned, is honest, therefore he that is more learned, is more honest: for a man may haue much learning, and yet small honesty.

*Of Proportion.*

**W**HEN are we said to reason from the place of Proportion?

When two like Propositions being compared together, we conclude in this or such like manner: looke what proportion is betwixt 6. and 4. the same proportion is betwixt 12. and 8. but betwixt 6. and 4. is *Proportio Sesquialtera*: *Ergo*, betwixt 12. and 8. the like proportion is: for when one number or measure doth comprehend another once, and one halfe thereof, that is called *proportio sesquialtera*, as 12. and 8. and if it contayne it once, and one third part thereof, then it is called *proportio sesquitercia*, as 8. and 6. for 8. containeth 6. once and two ouer, which is the third part of 6.

*What is the Maxime of this place?*

Of things hauing like proportion, like iudgement is to bee made.

Q

Where-

*Whereto serveth this place?*

This place is necessary for Iudges and Magistrates that have to consider of equitie in cases of Iustice, and in rewarding Vertue, or in punishing Vice, in which the Geometricall proportion would be alwayes vsed. Some doe giue such examples of this place, as in my opinion doe rather belong to the place of Like then to this place, for the arguments of this place ought properly to be fetched out of the Predicament of quantitie, and not out of qualitie, or out of any other Predicament.

*Of Changed Proportion.*

**W**hat is changed Proportion?

Changed Proportion is when the Foundations, and Termes of two like Proportions are answerable in proportion aswell amongst themselves, as one to another.


*What means you by these two words, Foundation and Termes?*

The Foundation is that from whence the Comparison first proceedeth, as the Father, and the Terme, Bound or end is that whereunto the said Comparison is applyed, and endeth in the same, as the Sonne, and therefore the Sonne is called the Terme, Bound or end: whereof we haue spoken before in the Predicament of Relation.

*Giue Examples of reasoning from this place.*

Looke as 8. is to 4. so is 12. to 6. (that is to say) in double proportion one to the other: *Ergo*, as 12. is to 8. so is 6. to 4. for each other containeth the other once and a halfe, which is called *proportio sesquialtera*. The manifest Demonstration whereof you may see in this Figure heere following.

**Funda-**



*Why is this Proportion said to be changed or transposed?*

Because the order of numbers that are compared, is altered in the conclusion: for in the Antecedent the first is compared to the second, and the third to the fourth: but in the Conclusion the third is compared to the first, & the fourth to the second.

*Of Disproportion.*

**H**ow may we reason from this place?

Negatiuely thus: 12. is not to 6. as 8. to 6. but 12. to 6. is double in proportion: Ergo, 8. to 6. is not double in proportion.

*What is the Maxim of this place?*

Of things hauing vnlike proportion, vnlike iudgement is to be made.

*From Disproportion changed or transposed.*

**H**ow may we reason from this place?

Negatiuely thus: 12. is not to 6. as 4. to 3. for betwixt the two first is a double proportion, and betwixt the two last Sesquitertia: Ergo, 12. is not to 4. as 6. to 3. for the one is a tripla, and the other double.

*What be the Maximes of this place?*

If the first be not to the second, as the third to the fourth, then the first shall not be to the third, as the second is to the fourth.

*To whom are these places most familiar?*

To those that are exercised in the Mathematicall Sciences.

*Of Translation.*

**VV** *What is Translation?*

Translation, otherwise called a Metaphor, is a figure of speech, whereby the proper signification of a word is changed into another vnproper, for some likenesse that is betwixt the thing signified, and being generally taken, it is rather a Trope, or Figure of Rhetorick, more meete to adorne speech, then to prone any thing thereby: notwithstanding being taken heere as a place of Logick, you may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, in this sort: A roaring Lion that seeketh to deuoure, is to be feared: *Ergo*, the Deuill is to be feared: Loue is blinde: *Ergo*, they that be in loue, are not able rightly to iudge.

*What be the Maximes of this place.*

Whatsoever agreeth with the Metaphoricall name, agreeth also with the proper name, and contrariwise.

*Of Meane places.*

**VV** *What be meane Places?*

Meane Places are those from whence such Arguments are to be fetched, as doe partly agree with the nature of the things to be proued, and doe partly differ from the same.

*How are the Meane Places diuided?*

Into Coniugates, Cases, and Diuision.

*And first of Coniugates and Cases.*

**VV** *What be Coniugates or Cases?*

Coniugates or Cases, be like words deriued all of one selfe word, differing onely in termination or end, as wise, dome, wise, and wisely: notwithstanding some vse Coniugates and Cases as seuerall places.

*Why*



*Why, wherein doe they differ?*

Their Difference is very small, sauing that in Arguments fetched from Coniugates, the Abstract is mentioned, but not in those that are fetched from Cases.

*How may we reason from these two places?*

Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely, from the Coniugates thus: A iust man is to be praised, *Ergo* iustice is to bee prayesd: a vicious man is not to be prayesd, *Ergo*, viciousnesse is not to be prayesd. From cases thus: He doth all things wisely, *Ergo* he is wise: He doth nothing wisely, *Ergo* he is not wise: for in these two last examples the abstract which is wisdom, is not once mentioned: what abstract is, looke before in the Chapter of predication *Lib. 1. cap. 5.* but you must beware in reasoning from this place, that your phrase of speech be naturall and proper, and not vnproper: for it were no good argument to say thus: white is sweet: *Ergo* whitenesse is sweetness.

*What is the Maxime of these two places?*

Whatsoever agreeth with one of the Coniugates or Cases, must needs also agree with the other.

*Of Diuision.*

**W** *What is Diuision?*

What Diuision is, and how many kinds there be, and what is to be obserued in euery kind hath beene declared before, *Lib. 2. cap. 4.* when we shewed the order of defining and diuiding.

*How may we reason from Diuision?*

Two manner of wayes: first, from the denying of one part or more of the diuision, to affirme another part therof, as thus: Euery sensible body is whole or sicke, but *Peter* is a sensible body and not sicke: *Ergo*, hee is whole: or thus. Of sensible bodies there bee some whole, some sicke. *Peter* is a sensible body and not sicke: *Ergo*, he is whole. In these two kinds of examples the diuision consisteth onely of two parts, wherein it sufficeth to deny the one for affirming the other. But if the diuision consist of many parts, then you must denie all the parts sauing that which you would affirme, as in this example following:

lowing : *Plato* disputeth, is a proposition, but it is neither vniuersall, particular, nor indefinite : *Ergo*, it is a singular proposition : in which kind of reasoning if you leaue out or omit any part that is to be denied, then the conclusion is naught, for it is no good consequent to say thus : this proposition *Plato* disputeth, is neither vniuersall nor particular : *Ergo*, it is indefinite. Notwithstanding, if you ioyne the part omitted in your Antecedent with a coniunction diuine, the Argument may bee made good ; as to say thus : this proposition *Plato* disputeth, is neither vniuersall nor particular : *Ergo*, it is either indefinite or singular.

*What is the Maxim of this first way of reasoning ?*

The Maxim is thus : whatsoeuer agreeth with the thing diuided, must needs agree with some one of the parts thereof.

*What is the second way of reasoning from Diuision ?*

The second way is to proceed from the affirming of one of the parts to the denying of the other, if it consist but of two, or to the denying of all the rest, if it consist of many. Of two parts let this be your example : Of sensible bodies some bee whole, some sicke, but this sensible bodie is whole : *Ergo*, he is not sicke. Of many parts thus : of propositions one is vniuersall, another particular ; one indefinite, another singular : but this proposition *Plato* disputeth, is singular : *Ergo*, it is neither vniuersall, particular, nor indefinite.

*What is the Maxim of this way of reasoning ?*

Whatsoeuer agreeth with one of the parts, must needs disagree with all the rest, for euery good diuision would be made of parts meere repugnant, or at the least diuers in kinde one from another : for it is a principall condition requisite to diuision, whereupon the second way of reasoning is grounded euen as the first way is grounded vpon another good condition belonging also to diuision, which is that the thing diuided may not containe more or lesse then his proper parts.

*Of inartificiall places.*

**H**Auing sufficiently spoken of places, inward, outward, hand meane, which as I said before are places artificiall, it is

is meet now that we speake of the places inartificiall, which according to *Quintilian* be the fixe: Foreiudgements, Rumours, Torture, Writings or Evidences, Oath, and Witnesses: All which are bricfly and plainly set forth in the Table of Authoritie here following, because they are all contained vnder the place of Authoritie.

*Of Authoritie.*

**H**ow is *Authoritie* here to be taken?

Authoritie is here to be taken for any testimonie worthy of credit.

*How may we reason from this place?*

Affirmatiuely thus: the learned Philosophers say that there bee foure elements, whereof all other things are mixt and compounded: *Ergo*, it is true. Christ saith that whosoever is baptized, and beleueth in him, shall be saued: *Ergo*, it is true.

*What be the Maxims of this place?*

Whatsoever is allowed by the most part of the wise and learned, is to bee beleued as a thing probable, neither ought we rashly to discent from their opinion and iudgement. Againe, euery man is to be beleued in his owne Art: but for so much as Authoritie is two-fold (that is to say) Diuine and Humane, and that all Arguments fetched from this place bee not of like value, for some be true and infallible, some probable, and some Sophisticall: this Table therefore here following shall plainly set forth euery kind by it selfe, whereby you shall easily discern the one from the other.

THE

## The Table of Authoritie here following.

|  |   |
|--|---|
|  | <p>Of the written which we call holy Scriptures, sound Arguments are made, so long as the words are truly expounded according to the meaning of the Holy Ghost. But they be weake and captious if the authoritie be corrupted either by addition, subtraction, or alteration of any word, syllable, or letter, or by wresting the sense otherwise then the Holy Ghost meant it.</p>   |
| <p>Divine which is twofold:</p> <p>or unwritten tradition:</p> <p>Authoritie is twofold,</p> | <p>As for tradition or unwritten verity of what value it is and what credit it hath, I leave to the judgement of the learned Divines, amongst whom is no small strife and contention in these dayes for the same. The Painims were wont to referre to Divine Authoritie the Oracles and Answeres of their false Gods, Priests, Prophets, and Soothsayers, which true Christians ought utterly to reject, and to abhorre: notwithstanding Lactancius letteth not to prove the Birth, Death and Passon of Christ against the Painims by Sybils Prophecies, because he knew they would give more credit to them then to the Holy Scriptures.</p> |
| <p>or Humane which is three-fold:</p> <p>Things written by mouth.</p>                        | <p>As</p> <p>Histories, Laws, Statutes, Decrees, Judgements, ruled Cases, Maxims, Proverbs, generall Rules, Patents, Warrants, Licenses, Commissions from the Prince, Charters, Deedes, Releases, Court-Rolles, Extents, Accounts, Obligations, Indentures, Wills and Testaments, and such like.</p> <p>If it be by mouth, it is either free and voluntary, as voluntary Confession, or Testimony, Rumor, Opinion, and the speech of the Wise.</p> <p>Or else forced by Oath or Torture.</p>  |
|  | <p>And the third kind of Humane Authoritie, is that which is allowed by use and custome of the people.</p>  |

As for such Arguments as are fetched from humane Authoritie, the Lawes doe teach at large, which bee sound, and which bee weake: notwithstanding, for so much as *Quintilian* affirmeth, that the inartificiall places, are the six places aboue-mentioned, I haue thought good to set downe according to *Valerius*, the definition of euery place, and briefly to shew how euery such place may be confirmed or impugned.

*And first of Fore-iudgements or Ruled Cases.*

**W**hat call you Fore-iudgements or Ruled Cases?

They be Iudgements or sentences heretofore pronounced, whereby Iudges take example to giue like iudgement in like Cases.

*How may a man confirme or impugne Fore-iudgements?*

You shall confirme them by aggrauating the authoritie of those that first pronounced them, and by the likenesse of the Cases: but you shall impugne or confute them by extenuating or diminishing the authoritie of the first pronouncers, and by the vnlikenesse of the Cases.

*Of Rumor and Fame.*


**W**hat difference is betwixt Rumor and Fame?

Rumor is a particular assertion or affirmation proceeding of some suspicion, without any certaine Authour. But Fame is a common affirmation, having some certaine Authour: either of which whosoever will impugne, must call it an vncertaine brute or clamour, taking his beginning first of malice, and his increase through credulitie and lightnesse of beliefe, and that the same may chance to the most innocent man that is, through the Fraud of his Enemies, publishing abroad false surmises against him. Contrarily, he that will defend Fame or Rumor, must say that it riseth not of nought, nor is spread abroad without some iust cause, and that it is accounted as a publike Testimonie, according to the old Prouerbe, which saith; *vox populi, vox Dei*, the voice of the people, is the voice of God.

**R**umors are often spread by the voice of the people.



## The Table of Authoritie here following.



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**R**umors are often spread by the voice of the people.

*Of Torture.*

**VV** *Hat is Torture?* Torture is a painfull kinde of punishment, inuented for the inquisition of truth, and violently to wrest or wring the same out of such as would not otherwise confesse it.

*How is this place to be confirmed or impugned?*

It is to be confirmed by aggravating the necessarie yse of torture for the finding out of the truth; but whoso will impugne it, must say, that such Torture causeth many times more lyes then true tales to be told: for those that bee strong and able to endure paine, and of a resolute minde, will neuer yeeld for any torment to say otherwise then they list themselves. Againe, if they be weake and not able to suffer paine, it maketh them to say whatsoeuer you will haue them, be it neuer so false.

*Of Writings and Euidences.*

**W** *Hat is meant by Writings?* Deeds, Indentures, Releasees, Obligations, and such like other Euidences before rehearsed.

*How is this place to be impugned?*

You may impugne Euidences or writings, if ye can prooue them to be vnperfect any manner of way, as to be forged, to be made by some collusion or fraude, or to bee extorted by force from some that was put in feare, and such like.

*Of Oathes.*

**VV** *Hat is an Oath?* It is a religious affirming or denying some thing, by calling God to witness, which is the strongest bond that may be, to bind mans faith and conscience.

*How is this place to be confirmed or impugned?*

He that will prooue by this place, must aggravate the integritie, honestie and holinesse of the parties that are sworne, saying, that the Oath of an honest, holy, and religious man is of great importance: And he that will impugne it, must doe cleane contrarie, saying, That they are naughtie men that are sworne,  
and

and common Iurors, which by reason of wicked custome of swearing, will easily be forsworne: or he must say that the partie sweareth for feare, loue, hatred, for hope of gaine, reward, and such like.

*Of Witnesses.*

**VV** *Hat be Witnesses?*

Witnesses be proofes of things done or not done, whose office isto speake what they haue heard or knowne: the confirmation or confutation of which prooffe dependeth vpon the goodnesse or euilnesse of the persons.

*To what end serueth the knowledge of places?*

He that will write or speake of any matter probably, wisely, or copiously: or will vnderstand the effect, tenor, arguments, and proofes, of other mens speeches, and writings, hath as much need to be practised in these places, as a Huntsman is in knowing the haunts of his Game which hee hunteth, for without that, he shall wander long time in vaine, and hardly finde that which he seeketh: neither is it enough to know the places, vnlesse you can aptly apply them and vse them when occasion shall serue, in disputations made either by mouth or pen, which requireth a continuall exercise of such as will be perfect therein. And therefore to the intent you might the better learne how to exercise your selfe in the fore-said places, I haue thought good here to giue you at the least one example set downe by *Hunneus* in his Logicke: the Theame of which example is, thus: Man ought to imbrace vertue: which Theame hee doth not onely handle after the Logicall manner with short speech, but also after the Rhetoricall manner with copious speech, vsing therein this threefold order: For first, he bringeth in such proofes as are to be gathered in respect of the subiect of the Theame. Secondly, those that are to be gathered in respect of the Predicate of the same: and thirdly, those that are to be had in respect of both.

*The Theame or Proposition.*

*From the definition of the subiect.*

**M** An ought to embrace vertue.

R 2

*What*

*What Arguments are to bee gathered on the behalfe of the subiect of this Proposition?*

These that follow, and first, from the definition thus: Sixth of all sensible creatures man is the most noble and most worthy creature, for that he is endued with reason and counsell, and was created like to the Image of God: it is most meete therefore that such a creature should be like his Creator, in life adorned with such vertue and goodnesse as is answerable to true iudgement, which the Logicians would briefly expresse in this manner: it becommeth euery sensible body endued with reason, to loue vertue: *Ergo*, euery man ought to loue vertue.

*From the Etymologie.*

**I**T becommeth euery creature that is made of the slime of the earth, to bee void of all arrogancie and pride, to bee lowly, humble, and obedient to his Creator, and to imbrace vertue in obseruing the Law of God deuouly and religiously, wherefore man called in Latine *homo*, of this word *humo*, (that is to say) earth, or rather slime of the earth, taking his originall from so base and vile a thing, ought to be humble and void of all pride and arrogancie, and to loue vertue above all things, being alwayes obedient to God his Creator, and readie to doe his most holy Precepts and Commandements.

*Logically thus:*

Euery sensible creature that is created of the slime of earth, ought to bee obedient to his Creator, and to imbrace vertue, therefore man ought to be obedient to his Creator, and to imbrace vertue.

*From the Matter.*

**M**AN is made of the selfe-same Matter of which all other vniuing dumbe and vsensible creatures are made, (that is to say) of the foure Elements, whereby he is subiect to alteration and corruption: wherefore man ought not to bee proud or arrogant, but modest, humble, lowly, and obedient, shewing in all the actions of his life, that he is not vnmindfull of his base



base estate and condition, nor ignorant from whence hee came, and what he is, euen no better then earth and dust.

*Logically, thus:*

Man is made of a base matter, as all other things are, therefore Man ought not to be proud, but to loue the vertue of humilitie and obedience.

*From the forme or shape of Man.*

**I**T hath beene alwayes most firmly, and with one whole consent agreed and beleueed, euen from the beginning of the World, that the true shape of Man is a reasonable Soule, immortall, and capable of euerlasting blessednesse, which Soule God of his goodnesse did breathe into man, to the intent that he should continually serue, honour, and obey him, during this mortall life, and after death enioy eternall life: what great madnesse were it then to thinke, that Man hauing obtrayned at Gods hands so noble a shape, ought not to embrace all noble vertues, and to gouerne all his actions in such godly and vertuous manner, as he may at length attayne to the euerlasting ioy, whereunto he was first created and formed?

*Logically, thus:*

Man consisteth of a Soule, capable of eternall felicitie: *Erge*, Man ought to loue vertue, whereby hee may attayne to that felicitie.

*From the generall kinde.*

**S**Itch it is giuen by nature to euery sensible Bodie, to seeke his owne safetie, and to be best affected (that is) to haue his full, perfection according to his kinde: the loue of vertue therefore, whereby Man is made not only perfect in this life, but also attayneth thereby euerlasting ioy in the life to come, must needs be to him most naturall.

*Logically, thus:*

Euery sensible body willingly desireth that which is agreeable to his nature and kinde; therefore, Man must needs loue vertue, as a thing most fit for his kinde.

*From the speciall Kinde.*

**B**Oth Men and Women, Rich and Poore, Yong and Old, of what state or calling soeuer they bee, if they intend to leade a good and godly life, haue need of vertue: wherefore, all Men that will liue well, ought to embrace vertue.

*Logically, thus:*

Both Rich and Poore, Yong and Old, ought to loue vertue: *Ergo*, Every Man ought to loue vertue.

*From the common Accidents.*

**E**VERY Man, after that hee hath ended this short course of life, must appeare at the last day before the terrible iudgement seate of God, there to render account of all his deeds and words, both good and bad, whereas euery man that hath done well, shall receiue for his good deeds a most glorious reward, euen life euerlasting: but the wicked for his euill deeds shall be condemned to hell fire, that neuer shall be quenched, a iust reward for his deserts: wherefore, all men ought in this life to flie vice, and to embrace vertue, from whence all good actions doe spring.

*Logically, thus:*

Euery man shall render account at the last day, of all his deeds both good and bad, and shall receiue a iust reward according to the same: *Ergo*, Every man whilest hee liueth in this world, ought to flie vice, and to embrace vertue.

*From the cause Efficient.*

**S**ITH Man was created by God, the Creator of all things, and Author of all goodnesse, excellencie, and vertue, and was formed according to the very Image and likenesse of God: it behoueth man therefore to imitate his Creator, and by leading a godly and vertuous life, to shew that hee is somewhat like him, though not able in all things to attayne to the perfection of so perfect a patterne.

*Logically, thus:*

God, the cause efficient, is good; therefore, Man being the effect, ought to be good.

*From*

*From the End.*

**T**He Prophets and Apostles, inspired with the Holy Ghost, Author of all Truth, by many their writings doe testifie, that the greatnesse and excellencie of that blessednesse, whereunto Man is created, is such as no man is able to expresse with tongue, nor in his heart or minde to conceiue the same: wherefore sith Man is created to such exceeding great blessednesse, it behoueth him to imbrace vertue, which is the very meane and way to bring him to that blessednesse.

*Logically, thus:*

Sith most glorious blessednes is the end of Man, Man therefore ought to embrace vertue, that he may attaine to that end.

*What arguments are to be gathered on the behalfe of the Predicate, and from what places?*

These that follow, and such like, and first from the definition, thus:

*From the Definition of the Predicate.*

**S**ith Vertue is a morall habite, whereby Mans will and all his actions are alwayes directed to God, and gouerned according to true iudgement, and thereby are made most acceptable both to God and Man: Man therefore ought to embrace Vertue, from whence such noble fruits doe spring.

*Logically, thus:*

Man ought to loue that habite from whence all honest actions doe spring: therefore man ought to loue Vertue.

*From the Description.*

**M**An ought with all endeuour to follow that thing whereby he may attayne not a vaine and transitorie glorie, but a true and euerlasting glorie, and thereby to be made acceptable both to God and Man: Wherefore Man ought to embrace Vertue, from whence such glorie springeth.

*Logically, thus:*

That thing is worthy to be beloued of Man, which getteth him euerlasting glorie: Therefore Vertue is worthy to bee beloued.

*From*

*From the Etymologie.*

**S**ith Vertue, if you diligently consider and weigh the signification of the word, is none other thing but a Noble affection of the minde, of great excellencie, and most meete for Man: it is not to be doubted, but that those (which leaving so precious a thing, doe set their whole delight in seeking after worldly riches and bodily pleasure) are much deceiued, and doe greatly offend.

*Logically, thus:*

Such excellencie as is most meet for Man, becommeth Man best: therefore Vertue becommeth him best.

*From the generall Kinde.*

**S**ith it is well knowne, that Man ought with all diligence to seeke after those habits, whereby humane nature is best adorned, and made most perfect: And that Vertue, amongst such habits, is the chiefe: because, that thereby the minde of Man is taught to know what Truth is, and his Will thereby is alwayes inclined to honest and laudable actions: Man therefore ought with al his power and endeavour to embrace Vertue.

*Logically, thus:*

Man ought chiefly to loue those habits, whereby his nature is made perfect: Therefore Man ought to loue Vertue.

*From the speciall Kinde.*

**I**T is most meete, yea most necessarie for all men to loue Fortitude and Temperance: for, by Temperance, Mans will is bridled, and kept from all euill lusts and affections; and by Fortitude, he is made free from feare of death: and as without Temperance, mans life cannot be honest; so without Fortitude, his death cannot be commendable: wherefore it plainly appeareth, how necessarie a thing it is for a man to embrace Vertue, as that which chiefly maketh his life honest and laudable, and his death glorious and honorable.

*Logically, thus:*

A man ought to loue Fortitude and Temperance: *Ergo*, He ought to loue Vertue.

*From*

*From the corruption of the Subject.*

**T**HE destruction of Vertue is the cause of most grieuous euils, for the light of Vertue being extinct, the minde is immediately wrapped in such darknesse, as it cannot see nor discern what is honest, what is profitable, or what is hurtfull: by meanes whereof man falleth into most filthy vices, which doe so infect and corrupt the life of man as it becommeth most detestable both to God and Man: whereby it plainly appeareth how noble a thing Vertue is, and with what loue and diligence it ought to be embraced of all men.

*Logically thus.*

The destruction of Vertue is euill: therefore Vertue is good and worthy to be beloued.

*From the vse of the Subject.*

**T**HE vse of Vertue maketh mans life commendable, holy, glorious, and acceptable both to God and Man: then which nothing can be in this World more to be desired of man: wherefore it manifestly appeareth, that Vertue is so noble a thing, as all men ought to bestow all their studie, labour and care in obtayning the same.

*Logically thus.*

The vse of Vertue is good: Therefore Vertue is good.

*From common Accidents.*

**S**ITH all men doe greatly desire to haue their consciences quietted, and their minds free from all euill iusts, affects, and passions, which with continuall strife doe molest the same: and thereby doe cause Man to lead a miserable life: Man therefore ought to refuse no paine nor labour, so as hee may attayne to Vertue, which is alwayes accompanied with that tranquillitie of minde and conscience that is so much desired.

*Logically thus.*

The tranquillitie of the minde and conscience is to bee desired: *Ergo*, Vertue which is alwayes accompanied with that tranquillitie is to be desired.



*From the cause Efficient.*

**S**ith true Vertue is not to be gotten by any mans labour, exercise, or industrie, without the great grace of God, who is chiefe Authour and Giuer of all good gifts: it well appeareth that Vertue is a most excellent thing, and most worthy to bee had in admiration, and therefore with seruent loue and diligence to be embraced of all men.

*Logically thus:*

God the chiefe Author of all good, is the cause Efficient of Vertue: therefore Vertue proceeding of so worthy a cause, must needs be an excellent thing, and worthy of all men to be embraced.

*From the Effect.*

**T**Rue honour and glory hath beene alwaies had amongst all men in great admiration: because it seemeth not only by mans iudgement, but also by the diuine iudgement of God, to be alwayes attributed to Vertue: wherefore sith Vertue doth yeeld such noble fruits and effects, Vertue must needs bee a noble thing it selfe, and worthy of all men to be embraced.

*Logically thus:*

The Effect of Vertue, which is true honour and glory, is good, and to be desired.

*From the End.*

**S**ith euermlasting blessednesse is of such excellency, as neither tongue is able to expresse the ioyes thereof, nor minde to conceiue the same, and therefore ought to be desired aboue all things, as the iust reward of all goodnesse, and finall end of all euill, and that Vertue is the onely meane to bring man to that blessed End: who then will once thinke that Vertue is not to be esteemed aboue all things, and worthy of all men to bee embraced?

*Logically thus:*

The end of Vertue, which is euermlasting felicitie, is to be desired: Ergo, Vertue is to be desired.

*Huberto*

Hitherto you have shewed how the aforesaid Thema is to be proved with Arguments fetched aswell from the Subiect as the Predicate: now shew what arguments are to be fetched from both ioined together.

These that follow and such like, and first by Comparison, from the Lesse to the More.

*From the Lesse to the More.*

**I**F men will not let to bestow any paine, labour or cost to preferue their bodies from death, sicknesse, or any other hurt: how much more then ought they to endeavour themselves to obtayne Vertue, which will preferue their soules from all corrupt affections and euill vices, and thereby deliuer them from death euerlasting?

*Logically thus:*

Man ought to be carefull of his bodily health: *Ergo*, Much more of his soules health, which is chiefly preferued by Vertue.

*From Similitude or Likenesse.*

**A**S the beauty of the bodie is pleasant to mans eyes: euen so the beautie of the minde or soule is as acceptable to God: and therefore as man will bee diligent and carefull in decking and adorning his body to please the eyes of men: euen so hee ought to be most carefull to decke his soule and mind, with such Vertues, as doe make the same in Gods sight most acceptable.

*Logically thus:*

As the decking of the body is pleasant to mens eyes so the decking of the Soule is pleasing to God.

*From Authoritie.*

**D**avid the Prophet in the thirty foure Psalme saith thus: Turne from euill, and do that which is good. The Prophet *Michas* also agreeth hereunto in saying thus: Deale iustly with all men, loue mercy, and walke diligently in the way of God. By which words these two godly Prophets doe teach no

other thing, then that man forsaking all kinde of Vice, should with all diligence embrace Vertue.

*Logically thus:*

God teacheth by his Prophet *David*, and also by *Micheas*, that Man should flye Vice, and loue Vertue: *Ergo*, Man ought to loue Vertue. By daily exercising your selfe in such exam-

ples as this is, you shall in short time learne the

right vse of the places, and be able there-

by readily to apply them to

euery good pur-

pose.

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*Here endeth the fourth Booke of Logicke.*

**THE**



# THE FIFT BOOKE OF LOGICKE.

## CHAP. I.

*Of Argumentation, and of the foure kinds thereof in generall,  
and also of the first Principles of a Syllogisme.*

**H**aving hitherto sufficiently spoken of words both simple and compound, whereof all questions doe consist, also of definition and division, of Method, of Propositions and of the places: It resteth now that I declare unto you the formes and kindes of reasoning called Argumentation, which be the meanes whereby in all compound questions the truth may bee discerned from falshood, wherein consisteth the chiefest fruit of Logicke: and therefore you shall understand that there bee foure principall kindes or formes of Argumentation, (that is) a Syllogisme, an Induction, an Enthymeme, and Example, I say here principall, because there bee diuers other formes, which though they bee not so necessary, yet I will briefly treat of them hereafter: But for so much as the Syllogisme is the chiefest, whereunto all others are referred as things vnperfect, vnto a thing perfect, I will first speake of a Syllogisme, and of all the parts thereof: but yet before I define or diuide a Syllogisme, I thinke it very necessary to declare unto you the first Principles aswell Materiall, as Regular, of a simple Syllogisme consisting of simple Propositions.

*Which call you Material Principles?*

Materiall Principles are three simple Propositions, and three termes, (that is to say) the Subiect, the Predicate, and the meane terme hereafter defined, whereof the Subiect and the Predicate are said to bee the outermost limits or bounds of any simple Proposition.

*Why are they called termes or limits?*

Because they limit a Proposition, euen as Dole-stones or Meares doe limit a piece of ground in the field, and bee the vttermost parts or bounds whereunto any Proposition is to bee resolued, as for example in this Proposition, euery man is a sensible body: these two words, man, and sensible body, are the termes, limits, or bounds, whereof as the said Proposition is compounded, so into the same it is to bee resolued, as into his vttermost parts that haue any signification: for letters and sillables of themselves be without signification, and therefore can limit no speech, so that the termes of Propositions must be eyther Nounes, or Verbes, which bee only voices significative, as haue beene said before.

*Which be the Principles regulatiue?*

The Principles regulatiue of a Syllogisme be these two phrases of speech, to be spoken of all, and to be spoken of none.

*What is to be spoken of all?*

That is, when the predicate being truly spoken of the Subiect, must needs be also spoken of all that is comprehended vnder the said subiect: as when I say euery man is a sensible body: here this word sensible body, is not only spoken of man in generall, but also of *Peter* and *Iohn*, and of euery other man in particular, comprehended vnder the foresaid Subiect, man,

*What is to be spoken of none?*

It is when the Predicate being denied to bee spoken of the Subiect, is denied also to bee spoken of any thing contayned in the Subiect: as when I say no man is a stone, here like as this word stone is denied to bee spoken of man, so it is also denied to be spoken of *Peter* and *Iohn*, and of euery other singular man: out of which Definitions are gathered two necessary rules.

*Which*



*Which be they?*

The rule is, whatsoeuer is truly affirmed of his naturall and proper Subject, is also affirmed of all those things which are containd vnder the said Subject: the second rule is thus, whatsoeuer is denyed to be spoken of any Subject, is also denyed to bee spoken of euery thing containd vnder the said Subject.

*Whereto serue these rules?*

The first rule confirmeth all Syllogismes affirmatiue, and the second confirmeth all Syllogismes negatiue.

## CHAP. II.

*Of a Syllogisme, what it is, how it is diuided, and of what parts it consisteth.*

*What is a Syllogisme?*



A Syllogisme is a kinde of argment containing three Propositions, whereof the two first, commonly called the premisses, being disposed according to mood, and figure, and granted the third Proposition, otherwise called the conclusion, differing from the other two, followeth of necessity, by vertue of the premisses; how these three Propositions are called, and what moode and figure is, shall be declared hereafter; In the meane time marke well the two other points touching this Definition: first, that the Conclusion must not be all one, but differing from the premisses: secondly, that the said Conclusion bee necessarily inferred of the premisses, as in this example: euery sensible body is a substance: euery man is a sensible body: *Ergo*, euery man is a substance: for if the Conclusion were thus: *Ergo*, euery sensible bodie is a substance, or euery man is a sensible body, the argument should not bee good, because the Conclusion should bee all one with one of the premisses: the reason why the Conclusion must needes bee inferred of the premisses, and so consequently follow the same, shall bee declared vnto you hereafter.

*How is a Syllogisme diuided according to the Schoolemen?*

First,

First, they diuide it according to the diuersity of the Propositions whereof it consisteth, into two kinds, *viz.* Categorical, and Hypothetical, (that is to say) simple and compound, calling that simple, which is made of simple Propositions, and that compound, which is made of compound Propositions: what simple and compound Propositions are, hath beene before defined. Againe, they diuide the simple Syllogisme three manner of wayes, first, according to the diuersity of the termes into a common and into a singular Syllogisme, for if the termes whereof the Syllogisme consisteth, bee common, or generall, and specially the meane terme, or prooffe, then that Syllogisme is called a common Syllogisme: but if the meane terme or prooffe be *Individuum*, then that Syllogisme is said to be a singular Syllogisme, called of them, *Syllogismus expositivus*, whereof wee shall speake hereafter: Secondly, they diuide a simple Syllogisme, according to the diuersity of the figure, into a perfect, and vnperfect Syllogisme.

*When is it said to be perfect?*

When it needeth not to be altered any manner of way, otherwise then it is, that the consequent may manifestly appeare.

*When is it said to be vnperfect?*

When the Consequent doth not manifestly appeare, vnlesse the Syllogisme be altered either by conuersion, or transposing of the premisses, whereof wee shall speake hereafter: Thirdly, they diuide a simple Syllogisme, according to the matter of the Propositions whereof it is made, into three kinds, that is, into a Syllogisme Demonstratiue, Dialecticall, and Sophisticall: of which three kinds wee shall speake hereafter, and in their proper places; so as in all, the Schoolemen make foure feuerall diuisions of a Syllogisme, the first according to the diuersity of the Propositions, the second according to the diuersity of the Termes, the third according to the diuersity of the figure, and the fourth according to the diuersity of the matter of the Propositions whereof wee haue spoken before, and shewed how manifold such matter is: but in the meane time wee will shew you of what parts a simple common Syllogisme consisteth.

*Of how many parts doth a simple Syllogisme consist?  
Of two; that is, Matter, and Forme,*

CHAP. III.

*Of the Matter and Forme of a simple common Syllogisme.*



*What things are said to bee the Matter of a Syllogisme?*

The Matter whereof a Syllogisme is made, are three termes, and three Propositions, which wee called before Materiall principles, and the Forme consisteth of figure and Mood, whereof we shall speake in the next Chapter.

*Define what these three Termes be.*

The one is called the Maior terme, or Maior extremitie, which is the Predicate of the question that is to be prooued: the other is called the Minor terme, or Minor extremitie, which is the subiect of the question: and these two Termes are knit together in the Conclusion, and made to agree by helpe of a third Terme, called the Meane terme or prooffe.

*What is the Meane terme?*

It is the prooffe of the question which is twice repeated before the Conclusion, and not once mentioned in the same.

*How is such prooffe to be found out?*

Four manner of wayes, (that is to say) by experience, by quicknesse of wit, by erudition, and by searching the common places.

*Giue examples of all these four wayes.*

1. By experience, as when wee affirme that intemperance is to be fled, because wee know by experience, that it consumeth both body and goods in vaine pleasures. 2. By wit, as to proue that the couetousnesse of wicked men is infinite: because wit and reason teacheth vs, that if couetous men did either care for the Law of God, or for reason, they would not exceed so farre the bounds thereof. 3. By erudition, as to prooue that riches are not to be desired ouer-greedily, but to serue necessitie: be-

T

cause

cause it appeareth by the Doctrine of Saint Paul, that such as greedily seeke to be rich, doe fall into temptation, and into the snares of the Denill. 4. By searching the common places: as when the prooffe of any question is fetched from any of the common places before taught, as from the generall kind, from the speciall kind, from the difference, or propertie, and such like, whercof you haue had examples before.

*Which bee the three Propositions whercof a Syllogisme doth consist?*

These three: The Maior, the Minor, and the Conclusion,  
*Which call you the Maior?*

That which consisteth of the Predicate of the question, otherwise called the Maior terme, and of the Meane, or Prooffe, being both ioyned together in one selfe Proposition; which Proposition is the whole strength of the Syllogisme, for it is the cause and prooffe of the Conclusion.

*Which call you the Minor?*

That which consisteth of the Subiect of the question called the Minor terme, and of the Meane or prooffe ioyned together, which two Propositions are called by one generall name, Premisses, because they goe before the Conclusion.

*What is the Conclusion?*

It is that which consisteth of the Predicate, and of the Subiect, and is the question it selfe concluded.

*Give example.*

For example, let this bee your question: whether man bee a substance or not, here you haue two extremes or termes, wherof substance being the Predicate, is the Maior terme, and man being here the subiect, is the Minor terme: now to prooue that this word Substance, is properly and naturally spoken of man, as of his Subiect, and that you may truly knit these two extremes, or termes together, you must seeke out some cause or prooffe, otherwise called the Meane terme, which being once found out, the Syllogisme is soone made: let the Meane terme therefore be this word, Sensible body, for every sensible bodie is a substance, which prooffe is fetched from the generall kinde, then forme your Syllogisme thus: every sensible



sible body is a substance : but man is a sensible body : *Ergo*, man is a substance. Here you see that the Meane terme or prooffe is twice repeated before the Conclusion: (that is to say) in the Maior Proposition, together with the Predicate of the question, called the Major terme ; and also in the Minor Proposition together with the subiect of the question called the Minor terme, and not once mentioned in the Conclusion. Thus much touching the Matter whereof a Syllogisme consisteth : now of the Forme thereof.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the Forme of a Syllogisme.



As was said before, that the Forme of a Syllogisme comprehended Figure, and Moode, now therefore tell what Figure and Moode is, and how many of them there bee.

Figure is no other thing, but the diuers placing or disposing of the meane terme in the premisses : which figure is three-fold ; that is, First, Second, and Third : for if the meane terme bee the Subiect in the Maior Proposition, and Predicate in the Minor, as in the example aboue, then it maketh a Syllogisme of the first figure, and if it chance to bee Predicate in both Propositions, then it maketh a Syllogisme of the second figure, as thus : no stone is a sensible body : but man is a sensible body : *Ergo*, no man is a stone : for here the meane terme, Sensible body, is Predicate in both Propositions : but if the meane bee subiect in both Propositions, then it maketh a Syllogisme of the third figure, as thus : euery man is a substance : euery man is a sensible body : *Ergo*, some sensible body is a substance : for here the meane terme, that is, Man, is subiect in both the first Propositions, and to these three figures doe belong certaine Moodes.

*What is a Moode ?*

A Mood, called in Latine *modus*, amongst the Logicians, is none other but the true ordering aswell of the premisses, as of the conclusion in a Syllogisme, according to due quantitie,



and quality : what the quantity and quality of a Proposition is, hath beene taught before, *Lib. 3. Cap. 1.*

*How many Moods doe belong to the first figure?*

To the first figure doe belong nine Moods, thus named:

*Barbara: Celarent: Darii: Ferio: Baralipson:*

*Celantes: Dabitis: Fapesmo: Frisefomorum.*

Whereof the first foure, because they conclude directly, are called perfect Moods, making perfect Syllogismes: and the other five, because they conclude vnderirectly, are called vnderperfect Moods, making vnderperfect Syllogismes.

*What is to conclude directly or indirectly?*

That Mood is said to conclude directly, when the Maior terme is made the Predicate, and the Minor terme the subiect in the conclusion. But if in the conclusion the Minor terme bee the Predicate, and the Maior terme the subiect, then that Mood is said to conclude directly: as for example: Every sensible body is a substance: Man is a sensible body: *Ergo*, man is a substance. This Syllogisme concludeth directly, because the Maior terme, substance, is the Predicate in the conclusion: but if the conclusion were thus: *Ergo*, some substance is a man, then it should conclude indirectly: because this word man which was the subject of the question in this conclusion, is made the Predicate.

*How many Moods doe belong to the second figure?*

These foure: *Casare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco.*

*How many Moods doe belong to the third Figure?*

These sixe: *Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datifi, Bocardo, and Ferison*: which words being otherwise called Termes of Art, and euery one consisting of three sillables, were purposely inuented by the Schoolemen, to signifie the quantitie and quality of euery Proposition containd in a Syllogisme, and are briefly set downe in these foure Verses following.

*Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipson:*

*Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisefomorum:*

*Casare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti:*

*Felapton, Disamis, Datifi, Bocardo, Ferison.*

*It seemeth to me that these names doe not evenly consist each one of three Syllables: for in the two first Verses there bee two Moods or names, whereof the one called Baralippton, containeth foure Syllables, and the other called isefomorum, containeth five Syllables.*

You say true, but these Syllables are no part of these two Moods, but serue only to fill vp the Verse: for this Syllable *ton*, is no part of the Mood *Baralip*: nor the two Syllables *morum*, are any part of the Mood *Priseo*.

*What is to be considered in these words of Art or Moods?*

Two things, (that is to say) the Vowels and the Consonants containd in euery Mood, and what they signifie.

*Which are those Vowels, and what doe they signifie?*

The Vowels bee these foure, *a. e. i. o.* whereof *a.* signifieth an vniuersall Affirmatiue, *e.* an vniuersall Negatiue, *i.* a particular Affirmatiue, *o.* a particular Negatiue: of all which you shall haue examples in the sixth Chapter of this Booke here following.

*Which be the Consonants, and what doe they signifie?*

Wee shall haue cause to speake of them hereafter in a fitter place.

*In the meane time then, giue examples of the Moods belonging to all the Figures.*

Before we giue examples, it shall not be amisse to set downe certaine rules requisite to all the three Figures, as well in generall, as in particular.

## CHAP. V.

*Of certaine Rules, as well Generall, as Speciall, belonging to the three Figures.*



*How many Generall Rules be there, which are common to all the three Figures?*

Four: two of quantitie, and two of quality.

*Which is the first of those that belong to quantitie.*

In euery Syllogisme it behooueth eyther one or both of the premisses to be vniuersall.

*Why so?*

Because that of two meere particular Propositions, nothing by order of Logick can consequently follow: As for example, This Syllogisme is not good: Some sensible body is a Man, but some Horse is a sensible body: *Ergo*, a Horse is a Man. The like reason is also to be vnderstood, when the premisses are indefinite Propositions, yea or singular Propositions, if the meane terme be not likewise singular, for then it maketh a Syllogisme expository, whereof we shall speake hereafter.

*Which is the second Rule that belongeth to quantitie?*

If any of the premisses be particular, then the conclusion also must be particular.

*Why so?*

Because the conclusion being implied of the premisses, ought alwayes to follow the weaker part of the same premisses, but the particular is alwayes accounted weaker then the vniuersall, and the Negatiue weaker then the Affirmatiue.

*What is the first Rule belonging to qualitie?*

In euery Syllogisme it behoueth eyther one or both of the premisses to be affirmatiue.

*Why so?*

Because that of two pure Negatiue Propositions nothing can be orderly concluded, as in this example: No man is a tree, but no Peare-tree is a man: *Ergo*, No Peare-tree is a tree; which Syllogisme cannot be good, for the premisses are both true, and the conclusion is false.

*Which is the second Rule belonging to qualitie?*

If any of the premisses be Negatiue, then the conclusion must also be Negatiue.

*Why so?*

Because (as it hath beene said before) the conclusion must follow the weaker part.

*Which be the speciall Rules belonging to the three Figures?*

In the first foure Moods of the first Figure directly concluding the Minor, may not be a Negatiue, nor the Maior particular, but vniuersall.

In the second Figure, the Maior must not be particular, and

and one of the premisses must bee a Negative.

In the third Figure, the Minor must not bee a Negative, nor the conclusion vniuersall: but as for the quantitie and qualitie of euery Proposition in euery kinde of Syllogisme, of what Figure soeuer it bee, it shall plainly appeare by the Vowels, or rather Syllables of the Moods, otherwise called words of Art, annexed to the examples hereafter following.

*First, giue examples of Syllogismes of the first Figure, and of his foure perfect Moods directly concluding.*

CHAP. VI.

*Examples of the foure perfect Moods belonging to the first Figure.*



**T**H is first Mood of the first Figure, is when three termes being giuen, a Syllogisme is made of two vniuersall Affirmatiues directly concluding an vniuersall Affirmatiue, as this Syllogisme heere following: the termes whereof bee these, Sensible body, Substance, and Man placed in this sort.

Bar. Every sensible body is a substance.  
 ba. But every man is a sensible body:  
 ra. Ergo, Every man is a substance.

The name of this Mood is called *Barbara*, diuided into three Syllables, placed in the margent right against the Syllogisme, to shew the quantity and quality of euery Proposition, according to the significations of the Vowels containd in euery Syllable: and so are all other names of the Moods hereafter following.

The second Mood is, when three termes being giuen, a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Negative Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding an vniuersall Negative: As for example, let the termes bee these: Sensible Body, a Man, a Stone, and the Syllogisme thus:

Ce-

- Ce- No sensible body is a stone,  
 la- But every man is a sensible body:  
 rent. Ergo, No man is a stone.

The name of this Mood is *Celarent*.

The third Mood is, when three termes being giuen, a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Affirmative Maior, and of a particular Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Affirmative: As for example, let these be the termes: Sensible Body, Substance, and Man, and the Syllogisme thus:

- Da- Every sensible body is a substance,  
 ri- But some man is a sensible body:  
 j. Ergo, Some man is a substance.

The name of this Mood is *Darij*.

The fourth Mood is, when three termes being giuen, a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Negative Maior, and a particular Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Negative: As for example, let these bee the termes: Sensible Body, Man, and Stone: and the Syllogisme thus:

- Fe- No sensible body is a stone,  
 ri- But some man is a sensible body:  
 o. Ergo, Some man is a stone.

The name of this Mood is *Perio*.

## CHAP. VII.

*Examples of the fine vnperfect Moods of the first Figure.*

*we examples of the fine Moodes of the first Figure directly concluding.*



The first Imperfect Moode of the first Figure indirectly concluding, is when the Maior and Minor, being both vniuersall Affirmatives, doe conclude indirectly a particular Affirmative, as thus:



Da- Every sensible body is a substance,  
 ra- Every man is a sensible body:  
 lip. Ergo, Some substance is a man.

The name of this Mood is *Baralipson*, whereof the last Syl-  
 lable, *son*, is only to fill vp the Verse, as hath beene said before.

The second Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made  
 of an vniuersall Negatiue Maior, and an vniuersall Affirmatiue  
 Minor, indirectly concluding an vniuersall Negatiue, as thus:

Ce- No sensible body is a tree,  
 lan- Every man is a sensible body:  
 tis. Ergo, No tree is a man.

The name of this Mood is *Celantis*.

The third Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made  
 of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of a particular Affir-  
 matiue Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Affirmatiue,  
 as thus:

Da- Every sensible bodie is a substance,  
 bi- Some man is a sensible body:  
 tis. Ergo, Some substance is a man.

The name of this Mood is *Dabitis*.

The fourth Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made  
 of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Ne-  
 gatiue Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Negatiue,  
 as thus:

Fa- Every sensible body is a substance,  
 pel- No tree is a sensible body:  
 mo. Ergo, Some substance is not a tree.

The name of this Mood is *Fapesmo*.

The fifth Imperfect Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of  
 a particular Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Negatiue  
 Minor, indirectly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus:

Fri- Some sensible bodie is a substance,  
 se- But no tree is a sensible body:  
 fo. Ergo, Some substance is not a tree.

The name of this Mood is *Friseformum*, whereof the two last syllables (as hath beene said before) are only put to make vp the Verse.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of the foure Moods belonging to the second Figure.*



*One examples of the foure Moods belonging to the second Figure.*

The first Mood of the second Figure, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Negative Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmative Minor, directly concluding an vniuersall Negative, thus:

Ca- No stone is a sensible body,  
sa- Euery man is a sensible body:  
re. Ergo, No man is a stone.

The name of this Mood is *Cesare*.

The second Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Affirmative Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmative Minor; directly concluding an vniuersall Negative, as thus:

Ca- Euery man is a sensible body,  
mes- But no stone is a sensible body:  
tres. Ergo, No stone is a man.

The name of this Mood is *Camestres*.

The third Mood is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Negative Maior, and of a particular Affirmative Minor, directly concluding a particular Negative, as thus:

Fes- No stone is a sensible body,  
ti- But some man is a sensible body:  
no. Ergo, Some man is not a stone.

The name of this Mood is *Festino*.

The fourth Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of a vniuersall

uerfall Affirmatiue Maior, and of a particular Minor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus :

- Ba- Every man is a sensible body,  
ro- But some stone is not a sensible body:  
co. Ergo, Some stone is not a man.

The name of this Mood is *Baroco*.

CHAP. IX.

Of the six Moods belonging to the third Figure.



True examples of the six Moods, belonging to the third Figure.

The first is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Affirmatiue, as thus :

- Da- Every man is a substance,  
rap- But every man is a sensible body:  
ti. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.

The name of this Mood is *Darapti*.

The second Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Negatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus :

- Fe- No man is a stone,  
lap- But every man is a substance:  
ton. Ergo, Some substance is not a stone.

The name of this Mood is *Felapton*.

The third Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of a particular Affirmatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Affirmatiue, as thus :

- Di- Some man is a substance,  
sa- But every man is a sensible body:  
mis. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.

The name of this Mood is *Disamis*.

The fourth Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Maior, and of a particular Affirmatiue Minor, concluding a particular Affirmatiue, as thus :

- Da. Every man is a substance,  
 ti But some man is a sensible body:  
 fi. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.

The name of this Mood is *Datisi*.

The fifth Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of a particular Negatiue Maior, and of an vniuersall Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus :

- Bo. Some man is not a stone,  
 ca. But every man is a sensible body:  
 do. Ergo, Some sensible body is not a stone.

The name of this Mood is *Boardo*.

The sixth Mood, is when a Syllogisme is made of an vniuersall Negatiue Maior, and of a particular Affirmatiue Minor, directly concluding a particular Negatiue, as thus :

- Fe. No man is a stone,  
 ri But some man is a sensible body:  
 son. Ergo, Some sensible body is not a stone.

The name of this Mood is *Ferison*.

Thus you haue all the three Figures, together with their Moodes plainly set forth with examples.

## CHAP. X.

### Of a Syllogisme expositorie.



NOW because a Syllogisme expository is said to be a Syllogisme of the third figure: I thinke it most meete to giue you an example thereof euen here: for I haue already defined the same before.

Yea, I remember ye said it was expositorie, when the prooffe or meane terme is an Individuum: But if ye giue example, I shall the better understand it.

Let

Let this then be your example, to prooue some men to bee both Orators and Philosophers, by a Syllogisme expository thus: *Cicero* was an Orator: but *Cicero* was a Philosopher: *Ergo*, some men are both Orators and Philosophers: againe, to prooue that some rich men are not wise, thus: *Crassus* was not wise, but *Crassus* was rich: *Ergo*, some rich men are not wise. Thus you see that this kind of Syllogisme serueth to prooue both affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as it were by way of example.

CHAP. XI.

An Obiection concerning the three Figures, and  
Moodes belonging to the same.



What purpose serue so many figures and moodes, with the first figure, and the foure first moodes belonging to the same are onely perfect, yea; and so perfect indeed, as the Mathematicians in seeking out the truth of any problem, will vse none other, because the first figure alone doth suffice to conclude all kinds of problemes whatsoeuer they be, whereby it should seeme, that the two other figures, with their moodes, be superfluous?

They be not altogether superfluous; for as the first figure serueth chiefly and onely to conclude an vniuersall affirmative, so the second figure serueth to conclude an vniuersall negative, and the third figure to conclude both a particular affirmative, and also a particular negative, as you may perceiue very well by the examples before rehearsed; neither bee the fiftene vnperfect moodes so vnperfect, but that they may easily bee reduced vnto the foure perfect, by one of these wayes heere following; (that is to say) either by conversion, or by transposing of the premisses; or else by a Syllogisme leading to impossibilitie, of which three wayes of Reduction we come now to speake: by which things it doth plainly appeare what difference there is betwixt a perfect and vnperfect Syllogisme; for the perfect Syllogisme hath no need of these helpes to make the Conclusion manifest, as hath bene said before.



## CHAP. XII.

*Of Reduction, and of the kinds thereof, and also of the signification of certaine consonants in the words of Art serving to Reduction.*



*What is Reduction?*

Reduction here is none other thing, but a declaration, proving or shewing the goodnesse of an vnperfect Syllogisme, by a Syllogisme of a perfect Mood.

*How manifold is such Reduction?*

Twofold; for it is either offensive, or else by impossibility.

*What is Reduction offensive?*

Reduction offensive is, when a Syllogisme is reduced to his perfection, eyther by conuersion or by transposing the premisses, or else by both at once.

*What meane wee by transposing of the premisses? for as touching conuersion ye haue spoken thereof before, Lib. 3. cap. 6.*

The premisses are said to be transposed, when the Maior is put in the Minors place; or contrariwise the Minor into the Maiors place.

*What is Reduction by impossibility?*

Reduction by impossibilitie, is, when the goodnesse of the Syllogisme is so prooued, as the aduersary denying the same, must needs be brought to some absurditie, as to confesse two Contradictories to be both true at once, or some proposition to be false, which he hath confessed before to be true, or is manifestly true of it selfe. But first we will speake of Reduction offensive, and then of Reduction by impossibility; and because that Reduction offensive is done sometime by conuersion, and sometime by transposition, & sometime by both at once; and againe, that sometime one of the premisses, sometime both, & sometime no more but the conclusion onely is conuerted, and that sometime by simple conuersion, & sometime by conuersion *per accidens*: the Schoolemen for easement of the memory, haue made eight of the Consonants, besides the Vowels in the words of Art before mentioned, to be significative, and to declare

declare how every proposition ought to be reduced.

For first, these foure Consonants, *s.e.d.f.* (with one of the which every vnperfect Mood doth begin) doe shew that such vnperfect Moodes ought to be reduced into those perfect Moodes, which doe begin with the like letter, as,

*Baralipton, Baroco, Bocardo, into Barbara,*  
*Celantes, Cesare, Camestres, into Celarent,*  
*Dabitis, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, into Darij,*  
*Fapesmo, Frisomerum, Felapton, Ferison, Festino into Darij.*

Which be the other foure Consonants, and what do they signifie?

The other foure Consonants put betwixt the Vowels, bee these, *s.p.m.c.* whereof *s.* signifieth simple conuersion, (that is to say) that the Vowell, which next before this Consonant is to be simply conuerted; *p.* signifieth conuersion *per accidens*, *m.* betokeneth transposition of the premisses, *c.* in the latter end or midst of the Mood, betokeneth Reduction by impossibilitie, as in *Baroco* and *Bocardo*.

Give examples, and shew how such Reduction is to be made.

First, as touching reduction by conuersion, *Cesare* is reduced into *Celarent* by simple conuersion of the Maior: as this Syllogisme is *Cesare*.

|       |                                   |  |
|-------|-----------------------------------|--|
| Ce-   | No tree is a sensible body,       | } which is reduced<br>into Celarent, thus: |
| sa-   | But every man is a sensible body: |  |
| re.   | Ergo, No man is a tree.           | }  |
| Ce-   | No sensible body is a tree,       |  |
| la-   | But every man is a sensible body: |  |
| rent. | Ergo, No man is a tree.           |  |

And *Camestres* is reduced into *Celarent*, by simple conuerting the Conclusion, and also by transposing the premisses, as this Syllogisme in *Camestres*.

|       |                                 |  |
|-------|---------------------------------|--|
| Ca-   | Every man is a sensible body,   | } which is reduced in-<br>to Celarent, thus: |
| me-   | But no tree is a sensible body: |  |
| tres. | Ergo, No tree is a man.         |  |

Ce-

Ce- No sensible body is a tree,  
 la- But every man is a sensible body:  
 rent. Ergo, No man is a tree.

*Festino* is reduced into *Ferio*, by simply converting the Major, as in this Syllogisme in *Festino*.

Fel- No stone is a sensible body,  
 ti- But some man is a sensible body:  
 no. Ergo, Some man is not a stone. } which is reduced into *Ferio* thus.

Fe- No sensible body is a stone,  
 ri- But some man is a sensible body:  
 o. Ergo, Some man is not a stone.

*Darapti* is reduced from *Darij*, by converting the minor *per accidens*, as this Syllogisme in *Darapti*.

Da- Every man is a substance,  
 rap- But every man is a sensible body:  
 ti. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance. } which is reduced into *Darij* thus.

Da- Every man is a substance,  
 ri- But some sensible body is a man:  
 j. Ergo, Some sensible body is a substance.

*Ferison* is reduced into *Ferio*, by simple conversion of the minor, as this Syllogisme in *Ferison*.

Fe- No man is a stone,  
 ri- But some man is a sensible body:  
 son. Ergo, Some sensible body is not a stone. } which is reduced into *Ferio* thus.

Fe- No man is a stone,  
 ri- But some sensible body is a man:  
 son. Ergo, Some sensible body is not a stone.

And so forth in all the rest, according as the significative Consonants doe direct you.

Of Reduction by impossibilis.



How is Reduction by impossibility made?

By ioyning the Contradictorie of the conclusion to one of the premisses, and to dispose the same according to some one of the perfect Moodes of the first figure, in such sort as you may thereby make your Conclusion contradictory to the premiss which you left out, and was granted by your aduersary, whereby your aduersary is brought into an absurditie, to confesse two contradictories, to be true both at once.

Give examples.

As for example, if your Aduersary would deny this Syllogisme in *Baroco*, every man is a sensible body: but some tree is not a sensible body: *Ergo*, some tree is not a man: then you may reduce it to the first Moode of the first figure, which is *Barbara*, by making the contradictory of your Conclusion to be the Minor of your Syllogisme in this sort, Every man is a sensible body: but every tree is a man: *Ergo*, every tree is a sensible body: which argument hee cannot denie, because hee hath granted the Minor to be true: for if this Proposition, some tree is not a man, bee false, then this proposition, every tree is a man, must needs bee true, for two Contradictories cannot bee both true at once, and two true premisses must needs inferre a true Conclusion; and note that according to the diversitie of the figures, the Contradictory of the Conclusion is diversly disposed (that is to say) made eyther Maior or Minor accordingly; for in all the Moodes of the second figure it must bee made the Minor, the former Maior being still reserved; and in the third figure it must bee the Maior, the former Minor being still reserved.

To which of the perfect Moodes is every imperfect Moode to bee reduced by impossibilis?

To know this, it shall bee needfull to learne, first, the vse of certaine words compounded of diuers syllables, and invented by the Schoolemene for this purpose.

Which be those words?

The words bee these containd in this Verse following, *no-  
sciebatis : odiebam : letare Romanis* : whereof the first *no-  
sciebatis* containing five fillables, representeth the five vnperfect Moods  
of the first figure : *odiebam* hauing foure fillables, betokeneth  
the foure vnperfect Moods of the second figure : *letare Roma-  
nis*, containing six fillables, signifieth the six vnperfect Moods  
of the third figure : in all which words the foure Vowels, *a. e. i. o.*  
doe still retaine their old significations before taught, seruing  
here chiefly to shew the quantitie and qualitie of euery Con-  
clusion, for euery vnperfect Moode must bee reduced to that  
perfect Moode of the first figure, which hath such Conclusion  
as that vowell of the fillable representing that vnperfect Moode  
doth signifie : as for example in this word *no-sciebatis*, here you  
see, that in the fillable *no-sc* representing the first vnperfect  
Moode called before *Baralipton*, the vowell *e* signifying an vni-  
uersall negatiue, doth shew that this Moode is to bee reduced  
into *Celarent*, whose cōclusion is an vniuersall negatiue, so as by  
the order of the fillables in the word *no-sciebatis*, together with  
the signification of the vowels contained in the said fillables,  
you may plainly perceiue that *Baralipton*, is to bee reduced into  
*Celarent* : *Calantes* into *Darij* ; *Dabitis* into *Celarent* ; *Fapsmo*  
into *Barbara*, *Friselen* into *Darij*. The like obseruation and  
consideration is to be had in the other words, representing the  
rest of the imperfect Moods of the second and third figure : for  
*odiebam* appointeth *Cesare* to be reduced into *Ferio*, *Camestres* to  
*Darij*, *Festino* to *Celarent*, *Baroco* to *Barbara* : againe, *letare Ro-  
manis* appointeth *Darapti* to *Celarent*, *Pelapton* to *Barbara*, *Dis-  
amis* to *Celarent*, *Datifi* to *Ferio*, *Beccardo* to *Barbara*, and *Feris-  
on* to *Darij*, whereof I giue you no examples, because I would  
haue you to exercise your selfe in examining the former exam-  
ples of the three figures, and to see how you can reduce each vn-  
perfect Moode, to his perfect Moode by impossibilitie, accord-  
ing to these short Rules here set downe.

The Schoolemen, after they haue taught the vse of the  
Moods, and of reduction, doe immediately treat of a Syllo-  
gisme, made in oblique cases, and also of the fixe habilities,  
and



and three defects of a Syllogisme : all which I willingly passe over with silence, as things more curious then profitable, for truly I know not whereto the Syllogisme made in oblique Cases, doth serue more then for varietie sake.

C H A P. XIIIIL.

*Of Syllogismes made in oblique Cases, and of the sixe Habilit-  
ties, and three defects of a Syllogisme.*



*What means you by oblique Cases?*

You learned in your Accidents, that euerie Noun hath sixe Cases, (that is to say) the Nominatiue, the Genitiue, the Dative, the Accusatiue, the Vocatiue, and the Ablatiue, whereof the Nominatiue is onely right, and all the rest are called oblique : as this is a Syllogisme made in oblique Cases : every drawing beast belongeth to man, or is the beast of man : but an Oxe is a drawing beast : *Ergo*, an Oxe belongeth to man, or is the beast of man : and as for the sixe habilities called *sex potestates Syllogismi*, they are but meanes to prooue the goodnesse of one Syllogisme by another, or to shew which is more vniuersall, or comprehendeth more then another, or to conclude a truth of false premisses, which God wot is a silly kind of conclusion, the best parts of which habilities are more easily learned by the rules and examples before giuen, then by those that they set downe in their Treatises touching the same. Likewise the three defects, are none other but Elenches or Fallaxes, whereof there bee thirteene kinds set downe by *Aristotle* himselfe, whereof we shal speake hereafter, in their place, so as they might say that there are thirteene defects as well as three, and therefore leauing to trouble you with these things, I mind here to treat of a compound Syllogisme.

Of a compound Syllogisme, and of the diuers kinds thereof.

**W**hat is a compound Syllogisme, and how many kinds thereof be there?

A compound Syllogisme is that which is made of compound Propositions, whereof there bee three sorts, so they make three kinds of compound Syllogismes, (that is to say) conditionall, disunctiue, and copulatiue.

Of how many parts doth a compound Syllogisme consist?

Of three, as well as a simple Syllogisme, that is, of the Maior, contayning two simple Propositions, and of the Minor, repeating the one part of the Maior, and of the Conclusion, concluding the other part of the Maior, as in this example: if this woman hath had a childe, shee hath layne with a man: but shee hath had a childe: Ergo, shee hath layne with a man.

How is the truth of a compound Syllogisme to be found out?

By reducing the same into a simple Syllogisme thus; every woman that hath had a childe, hath layne with a man: but this woman hath had a childe: Ergo, shee hath layne with a man.

Are there no other kinds of compound Syllogismes?

No, if you consider the order of concluding, there bee but three kinds or wayes, (that is to say) conditionall, disunctiue and copulatiue; but if you consider the varietie in vitering such Syllogismes, you may make seuen sorts or wayes, whereof three appertaine to the conditionall, two to the disunctiue, and two to the copulatiue.

Which is the first way?

The first way is of the Antecedent, which being granted; the consequent must needs follow, both affirmatiuely, and negatiuely: Affirmatiuely thus: if he be godly, he is blessed: hee is godly, therefore blessed: negatiuely thus, if he bee not godly, hee shall not bee blessed, but hee is not godly: Ergo, hee is not blessed.

Which is the second way?

The second way is of the Consequent, which failing, the Antecedent must also needs faile, as thus: If he be wise, he is free; but he is not free: *Ergo*, not wise.

*Which is the third way?*

The third way, is when by granting the Antecedent, the Consequent faileth, as thus: If he be not wise, hee is wretched; but he is wise: *Ergo*, not wretched.

*Which is the fourth way?*

The fourth way, is when the former part of the Maior Proposition disiunctiue being put, the latter part is cleane taken away, as thus: He is eyther good or euill; but hee is good: *Ergo*, not euill.

*Which is the fift way?*

The fift way, is when the former part of the Disiunctiue being taken away, the latter part must needs stand, as thus: Hee is eyther good or euill; but he is not good: *Ergo*, he is euill; for all Syllogismes Disiunctiue, are made for the most part of parts repugnant, whereof there can be no more, but one true part.

*Which is the sixth way?*

The sixth way, is by putting a Negatiue before the Coniunction copulatiue, so as it maketh the Antecedent to stand, and taketh away the Consequent, as thus: Hee is not both wise and wretched; but he is wise: *Ergo*, not wretched.

*Which is the seventh way?*

The seventh way, is when the Negatiue is placed in like manner before the Coniunction copulatiue, but yet so as the Antecedent being taken away, the Consequent doth stand, as thus: Hee is not both wise and wretched; but hee is not wise: *Ergo*, wretched.

## CHAP. XVI.

*Of a Consequent, and by what means and rules the goodnesse thereof is to be knowne.*

**B**Vt sith the goodnesse of an Hypotheticall Syllogisme dependeth vpon the goodnesse of the Consequent: it shall not be amisse to treat heere of a Consequent, and first to define what it is, and to shew how it is diuided.

*What is a Consequent?*

A Consequent, is a speech consisting of such parts as doe follow one another, and are ioyned together with some rationall, (that is to say) an inferring or imploying Coniunction, as *Ergo*, then, therefore, and such like.

*How many parts are requisite in a Consequent?*

Three, that is, the Antecedent, the Consequent, and the inferring Signe or Note, for of these three parts every Consequent consisteth.

*How is it diuided?*

Into two, that is, Good and Euill: againe, the good is diuided into two, that is formall and Materiall.

*When is it said to be Formall?*

When the Antecedent being true, the Consequent doth necessarily follow thereof, as when I say: This woman hath had a child, *Ergo*, she hath layne with a man.

*When is it said to be Materiall?*

When the Consequent doth not of necessitie, but casually follow, the Antecedent being true: as *Socrates* walketh abroad: *Ergo*, it is faire weather.

*Whereupon doth the goodnesse of a Consequent chiefly depend?*

It dependeth not so much of the truth of the Antecedent, and of the Consequent, as of the necessary Connexion, or knitting of them together: and if the same be in forme of a Syllogisme, it requireth also the precepts of Mood and Figure before taught to be obserued.

*How*

*How else shall a man know whether a Consequent be good or not?*

By examining the same with the Maximes or generall Rules of the places: whereof some doe yeeld proofes or causes necessary, some probable, and some only coniecturall.

*What rules doe the Schoolemen set downe to know a good Consequent?*

They set downe some more, some lesse, but *Cesarus* only reciteth two, which are these: The first is, if a Consequent doth necessarily follow of his Antecedent, then the contrary of the Antecedent must needs necessarily follow the contrarie of the Consequent: As for example, because this is a good Consequent to say, it is a man: *Ergo*, it is a sensible body: it is a good Consequent to say, it is no sensible body: *Ergo*, it is no man: the reason thereof is, because the contrary of the Consequent and the Antecedent cannot bee both true together, but one of them must needs be false. The second rule is, that whatsoever followeth vpon a good Consequent, must needs also follow vpon the Antecedent thereof: As for example, if it be a good Consequent to say, it is a man: *Ergo*, it is a sensible body: ye may aswell say, if it be a sensible body: *Ergo*, it is a substance: and sith that a sensible body is a substance, you may therefore as well conclude that a man is a substance. To these rules you may adde also the third, which is, that of true things, nothing can follow but truth: but of false things, sometime that which is false, and sometime that which is true, as hath beene said before: and yet such truth followeth not by vertue of the false premises, but because the conclusion or Consequent is a true Proposition of it selfe: As in this example. Every sensible body is a tree, but every Peare-tree is a sensible body: *Ergo*, every Peare-tree is a tree.



## CHAP. XVII.

*Of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue.*

**H**itherto wee haue treated of a Syllogisme, according to the first three of the foure diuisions thereof, before mentioned: for if yee remember well, wee said that according to the first diuision, a Syllogisme is either Categorical or Hypotheticall, according to the second diuision, eyther common or expository, according to the third diuision, either perfect or vnperfect, and according to the fourth diuision, either Demonstratiue, Dialecticall, or Sophisticall, whereof we come now to speake, and first of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue.

*What is a Syllogisme Demonstratiue?*

A Syllogisme Demonstratiue is that which is made of necessary, immediate, true, certaine, and infallible Propositions, being first and so knowne, as they neede none other prooffe.

*What means you by necessary and immediate Propositions?*

Necessary Propositions be those which cannot be otherwise, as those which doe consist of the generall kinde, of the speciall kinde, of the difference, or of the propertie, as hath beene said before: and therefore *Aristotle* maketh a difference betwixt a Demonstratiue and a Dialecticall Proposition: for a Demonstratiue Proposition consisting of matter naturall, is necessarily true, and cannot be otherwise, but a Dialecticall Proposition, consisting of matter contingent, or casuall, is onely probable, and may be otherwise.

*What be immediate Propositions?*

Immediate Propositions be those which are first, and haue none before them; whereby they can bee prooued: as every sensible body endued with reason, is apt to learne. *Aristotle* also setteth downe three properties or conditions belonging to the Subiect and Predicate of a Demonstratiue Proposition.

*Which be those Properties?*

These,

These to be spoken of all, by it selfe, and vniuersally.

*What is to be spoken of all?*

It is when the Predicate is knowne to bee altogether and alwaies in the Subiect, either as a part of the substance thereof, as when it is a generall kinde, the speciall kinde, the difference, or the propertie, as some inseparable accident alwaies incident to the said subiect, as when I say: Every man is a sensible body: or every man is endued with reason: or every man is apt to speake: or every Swanne is white: or every fire is hot.

*What is to be spoken by it selfe?*

That is, when the Predicate is eyther the definition of the Subiect, as a man is a sensible bodie endued with reason: or else some part of the Definition, as a man is a sensible bodie, or man is endued with reason.

*What is to be spoken vniuersally?*

It is when the Predicate is in the Subiect, and in every such Subiect by it selfe; and first, as when I say, a man is a sensible body endued with reason: heere this Predicate sensible body endued with reason, is not onely spoken of man, but of every man in generall by it selfe: and first; for if yee should say, *Peter* or *Socrates* is a sensible body endued with reason: heere the Predicate is not spoken of any of these, as first, but in the second place, because they are comprehended vnder the word man. For generall kindes are said to be before speciall kindes, and speciall kindes before Individuums, as hath bin said before.

*How doth Aristotle define Demonstration?*

In this sort: Demonstration is a Syllogisme made of such Propositions as are true: first immediate, & manifestly knowne, and be the causes of the conclusion: first and immediate here is all one, signifying such Propositions as need not to be proved or made more euident by any other former Propositions. Again, the premises must bee more knowne then the conclusion, for otherwise it should neither be Demonstration, nor yet good Syllogisme. Finally, the Premises must render the very cause of the conclusion: and therefore *Aristotle* in another place saith, that Demonstration is a Syllogisme causing knowledge and science.

*What is Science?*

It is a firme and assured knowledge of any thing.

*What is to know?*

We are said to know a thing, when wee know the true causes thereof, and that it cannot be otherwise: for to make a perfect Demonstration, wee must not only shew that there is such a thing as we goe about to prooue, but also wee must shew the cause why it is so: for (as *Aristotle* saith) every discipline and doctrine, intellectuall dependeth vpon a former knowledge, which is two-fold, whereof the one is to know that the principles (that is to say) the premises of the Demonstration bee true, and the other is to know the true signification of the Subject and Predicate of the question: for vlesse a man know what the name of the Subject signifieth, whereof the question riseth, and also the proper qualities of the same, how shall hee bee able to iudge, whether the prooue which is brought in to proue the question withall be to the purpose or not? Againe, vlesse hee know the premises to bee true, the Demonstration shall breed no certaine knowledge in him.

*Give example of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue.*

Let this be your example: every sensible body endued with reason, is apt to learne: but every man is a sensible body endued with reason: *Exge*, every man is apt to learne. Heere you see that in this Syllogisme the premises being true and first, doe render the cause of the conclusion: and thereby doe imply a most true Consequent: for whoso would goe about to demonstrate any of the premises by some other former, or more knowne Propositions, should lose his labour, sith there is none before them more certaine, nor more knowne to proue this conclusion withall then they: for to vnderstand the truth of these premises, it sufficeth onely to know the signification of the termes, and to haue some experience of the thing called Man; and therefore this kind of Demonstration is called of the Schoole-men, *Syllogismus Scientificus*, because it yeeldeth the perfect knowledge and Science of the thing in question.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Of the certaintie of mans knowledge.**Hereof dependeth the certaintie of Mans knowledge?*

Of three things, that is, of vniuersall experience, of principles, and of naturall knowledge that a man hath in iudging of Consequents: for these bee three infallible rules of certitude or truth in all kindes of Doctrine.

*What is vniuersall experience?*

Vniuersall experience is the common iudgement of men, in such things as are to be perceiued and knowne by the outward senses: as Fire to bee hot, the Heauens to turne round about, Wine and Pepper to bee hott in operation, Women to bring forth Children, and not Men: which things all men (vnlesse they bee madde, and out of their wits) must needs confesse to be true.

*What be Principles?*

Principles bee certaine generall conceptions and naturall knowledges grafted in mans minde of God, to the intent that by the helpe thereof, he might inuent such Arts as are necessary in this life for mans behoofe; for by the naturall knowledge of the mind we vnderstand Number, Order, Proportion, and all other necessary Arts and Sciences.

*How doth Aristotle define Principles?*

In this manner: Principles be true Propositions, hauing credit of themselues, and need no other prooffe.

*How many Diuisions doe the Schoole-men make Principles?*

Diuers.

*Rebears these Diuisions.*

The first is, of Principles, some be called Speculatiue, and some Praetiu: The speculatiue bee those naturall knowledges or Propositions, whereof Naturall Philosophie or the Mathematicall Sciences be grounded, as these: The whole is more then his part: Those things which are equall to a third, are



equall among themselves: of one simple body, there is but one naturall moouing, and such like. The Principles Practise, bee those naturall knowledges, whereby mens manners are gouerned: for by this naturall light we know the difference betwixt good and euill: As for example: these be Principles Practise: God is to be honoured and obeyed: Iustice is to be embraced: ciuill societie is to bee maintained, and the disturbers thereof to bee punished: these and such like Propositions are naturally receiued of all men as infallible verities. Again, of Principles, some bee called Generall, and some Proper. The Generall, bee those that may be applyed to many Sciences, as these the whole is more then any of his parts, if equall be taken from equall, equall doe remaine and such like. The proper Principles bee those, that are properly belonging to some one certaine Science, as a Line to bee a length without breath, is a principle of Geometrie: Again, this proposition, every thing is, or is not, is a principle of Logick: and to bee short, every Science hath his proper principles: of which some bee called Dignities or Maximes, and some Positions.

*Wherefore are they called Dignities or Maximes?*

For that they are worthy to bee credited for their selfe sake, for so soone as we heare them in such speech as we vnderstand, we naturally know them to be true without any further prooffe as these, Take equall from equall, and equall will remaine: the whole is more then any of his parts, &c.

*What be Position.*

Positions be those principles, which although they need no other prooffe, yet they be not so easily vnderstood of all men at the first vtering, as Maximes bee: for in these, besides the knowledge of the termes, it is needfull to haue also some experience, as in these Principles. Euery thing that is compounded of matter and forme is moucable: whatsoever is heauie, tendeth naturally downward, and whatsoever is light, tendeth vppwards. Again, of Positions, some are called Definitions, and some Suppositions, and of Suppositions, some are called Petitions, called in Latine *Postulata*, and some Suppositions assumed.

*Defins*



*Define these kinds?*

- 1 Definition sheweth what the thing is.
- 2 Supposition is that which supposeth a thing to be, or not to be, as the Geometricians doe suppose that there is *Punctum*, (that is to say) a prick, or a thing indivisible, having neither length, breadth, nor depth.
- 3 Petition is a Proposition asked and granted to be true: as this is a petition in Geometry, that a man may draw a right Line from one point to another.
- 4 Supposition assumed is, when a manifest supposition is assumed to prove another thing withall, as to prove that Demonstration consisteth of true Propositions, the Disputer will assume this assertion, which saith, that of false things there is no certaine knowledge: and truth is not knowne but of true things.

*What is the third thing whereof the certaintie of mans knowledge dependeth?*

It is the knowledge that man hath in iudging of Consequents, which is not altogether artificiall, but partly naturall, for God thought it not sufficient for mans behoofe to know simple Propositions, as Principles or common Conceptions gotten by experience, vnlesse hee could also compare them together, and ioyne things like, and agreeable together, and sever things vnlike, and disagreeing one from another, and by such comparison and composition to finde out things before not knowne: and to the intent wee should not erre or wander out of the right way, God hath shewed vs an order, and prescribed certaine bounds and limits of necessitie to be obserued in such composition, which bounds are Syllogismes rightly made: forso doe the Consequents plainly appeare: And because that proportions are knowne by nature, it shall not be amisse to giue you an example in numbers: for three knowne numbers being placed in true order of a Syllogisme, a fourth number vnknowne, of necessitie doth follow, as in this question: If one pound of waxe be worth a groat, what is tenne pound of waxe worth? Marry tenne groates, which is prooued by a Syllogisme in this manner: Every pound of

waxe is worth a groat, but here is ten pound of waxe: *Ergo*, they are worth ten groats: and like as in these kinds of Syllogismes Arithmetically, the proportion which is to bee iudged by mans naturall knowledge, doth shew the Consequent to bee infallible, euen so the Consequents in other Syllogismes are shewed to be infallible, by such demonstrations as are not farre fetched, or doubtfull, but are manifest, plaine and euident.

## CHAP. XIX.

*Of the two kinds of Demonstration.*

*How doe the Schoolemen diuide Demonstration?*

Into two; that is, perfect and vnperfect: and they call the perfect, *demonstratio proper quid*: and the vnperfect, *demonstratio quia est*.

It is perfect, when it proceedeth from the proper cause to the effect, called of the Schoolemen, *a priore*: for in that demonstration the Antecedent containeth the proper and true cause of the consequent; as when we say, the Sunne is vp: *Ergo*, it is day.

*What is to be obserued in a perfect Demonstration?*

That the Predicate of the Conclusion, which is also Predicate in the Maior, bee first, properly, alwayes, and that really and accidentally, incident to the subiect of the Maior, and to every thing contained vnder the same; which subiect must bee some generall kind, and the very meane or prooue of your conclusion: As for example, if you would prooue a Cocke to be a feathered fowle, it were not a sufficient demonstration to say, that euery flying beast is a feathered fowle; for some beastes flye, that haue no feathers, as Backs, that flie in the night season. But if you say, that euery Bird is a feathered fowle, and euery Cocke is a Bird: *Ergo*, euery Cocke is a feathered fowle: you shall make a perfect demonstration, because the Subiect, and Predicate of the Maior, haue such conditions as are before required; for this Maior sheweth the thing to be, and also wherefore it is, which is done so often as the Predicate is the true definition

inition of the Subject: as when I say, Every man is a sensible body endued with reason, or else some chiefe part of the definition, as when I say, Every man is endued with reason, as hath beene said before: for every good demonstration is either made of a true definition, or taken from the general kind, special kind, or else from the speciall difference, or propertie, yea, and sometime they may bee taken out of the whole and of the parts, of the proper causes and effects, of perpetuall adjacents, otherwise called common accidents, of proper acts, of contrarieties, and of diuine authoritie, whereof you haue had examples before in the Treatise of places, and seates of arguments.

*When is it said to be an vnperfect Demonstration?*

When the premisses are true, implying a true Consequent, but yet are not first, neither doe they shew the originall cause of the Conclusion; as in this example: Every sensible body is nourishable; but every man is a sensible body: *Ergo*, euery man is nourishable: here though the premisses be true Propositions, yet they be not first, neither doe they shew the originall cause of the Conclusion: for the Maior of this Syllogisme may bee prooued by a former and more knowne Proposition; for that which is more generall, is more knowne then that which is lesse generall, as thus: Every living body is nourishable; but euery sensible body is a living body: *Ergo*, euery sensible body is nourishable. Again, it is said to be vnperfect, when we proceed from the effect to the cause; as when we say, it is day: *Ergo*, the Sunne is vp. But that demonstration which proceedeth from the cause to the effect, is the more worthier, because wee vse therein discourse of reason and vnderstanding: and in the other we only iudge by the outward senses, whereof spring two principall kinds of Method, (that is to say) compendious or short orders or wayes of teaching in all manner of Sciences, whereof the one is called composition, proceeding forward from the first to the last, and the other is called resolution, proceeding backward from the last to the first, as hath beene said before in the Chapter of Methode, *Lib. 2. cap. 5.*

Of Science, Opinion, Ignorance, Wit, and of the  
four Scienciall questions.



What other things are wont to bee treated of by the  
Schoolemen in Demonstration?

Divers things; as what difference is betwixt  
Science and Opinion: also they treat of the di-  
uers kinds of Ignorance, of prompt Wit: and  
of the four Scienciall questions.

What difference is betwixt Science and Opinion?

Science, as hath been said before, is that which consisteth of  
necessary, certaine, and infallible Propositions, and of such  
things as cannot bee otherwise. Opinion is the knowledge of  
things casuall, which may bee sometime false, and sometime  
true.

How many kinds of Ignorance doe the Schoolemen make?

Two: that is to say, absolute, which of the Schoolemen is  
called *Ignorantia negationis*, and ignorance by false conception,  
which they call *Ignorantia affectionis*. The first is, when we vt-  
terly deny to haue any knowledge of a thing at all: The other  
is, when we thinke to know that which we know not, being de-  
ceined by some false perswasion, whereunto wee are affected,  
whereof it is called *Ignorantia affectionis*.

How doth Aristotle define prompt wit, called of the Latines *Solertia*?

Hee defineth it to be a promptnesse or readinesse, in quickly  
finding out the prooffe or cause of any thing, that is in question,  
without any studie.

Which be the four Scienciall questions?

These: whether the thing be, what it is, how it is, and where-  
fore it is: whereof the first enquireth of the subiect, whether  
it be: the second of the Predicate, as what it is: the third, how  
it is, (that is to say) how the Predicate is spoken of the subiect:  
and the fourth asketh the cause why it is spoken of the subiect?  
And thus much of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue: now of a Syl-  
logisme Dialecticall, or probable.



CHAP. XXI.

Of a *Syllogisme Dialecticall.*



*What is a Dialecticall Syllogisme?*

A Dialecticall Syllogisme is that which is made of probable and credible Propositions.

*What things are said to be probable?*

Things probable, according to *Aristotle*, are these that seeme true to all men, or to the most part of men, or to all wise men, or to the most part of wisemen, or else to the most approved wise men : whereby it appeareth that things probable may be said five manner of wayes.

*Shew how.*

First, those things are probable, which vnto all men aswell learned as vnlearned being in their right wits, doe seeme to be true, as these: Euery mother loueth her childe : we loue them that loue vs : we must doe good to them that doe good to vs. Secondly, those things that seeme true to most men, as these: It is better for a communalty to be ruled by one Prince, then by many : It is not good to serue many masters at once. Thirdly, those things that seeme true to all wise men, as these : what thing soeuer is honest, the same is also profitable : Vertue is better then riches. Fourthly, those that seeme true to the most part of the wise and learned, as thus : the soule of man is immortall : the Sunne is greater then the earth. Fifthly, those things that seeme true to the most approved wise men, as these: The world had a beginning : it is better for a Prince to be loued, then feared of his Subiects. And generally vnder things probable are contained all true Propositions that be casuall, and not implying any necessitie. I say here, true Propositions, to exclude false Propositions, whereof Sophisticall Syllogismes are made, and not those which we call probable or Logickall Syllogismes ; and yet such Propositions be not so true in deede, as those that be required in a Syllogisme demonstratiue, but onely doe seeme true, ingendring a certaine opinion in mans minde, doubting notwithstanding the contrary : for



it breedeth not a perfect knowledge as Science doth, whereby the minde is of all doubts thoroughly resolved. And note here, that the Schoolemen doe make the matter (whereof a Dialecticall Syllogisme doth consist) to be twofold, that is, *Materia remota*, in English; farre off: and *Materia propinqua*, (that is to say) nigh, or neere at hand.

*What doth Materia remota containe?*

These foure Dialecticall Predicates, (that is) Definition, called of the Schoolemen *Terminus*, property, generall kinde, and Accident: All which Predicates are before defined, and are called Predicates, because they are common words spoken of others. But truely I see no cause why these foure Predicates should be attributed to a Dialecticall Syllogisme, more then to a Sillogisme demonstratiue: for sure I am, that as good demonstrations may be made of these as of any other Predicates.

*What is contained vnder Materia propinqua?*

These: a Dialecticall Proposition, Probleme, and Position.

*What difference is betwixt these three words, Dialecticall Proposition, Probleme, and Position?*

A Dialecticall Proposition is a probable question vttered with a simple Interrogatory; as whether the mother loueth her childe? which is no question in deede, but to him that asketh.

A Probleme is a doubtfull question vttered with a double Interrogatory, as whether the least fixed starre in the firmament be greater then the Moone or not? or whether that the Sunne be bigger then the earth or not? Position is a wonderful opinion maintained by some excellent Clerke, as to say, that all things are but one essence or being, as *Melissus* affirmed, or that all things doe continually flowe and change, as *Heraclitus* held, or that the earth moueth, and not the heavens, as *Copernicus* supposed, onely to finde out thereby the true motions of the Planets, and not for that he thought so in deede.

CHAR.

CHAP. XXII.

Of a sophisticall Syllogisme.



What is a Sophisticall or false Syllogisme?

A false Syllogisme is that which is either made of false Propositions, or else of such as seeme probable, and be not in deede, or else of probable premisses not rightly concluding: and of such Syllogismes there be three sortes, the one failing in matter, the other in forme, the third in both.

*When is it said to faile in matter?*

It faileth in matter, when the Syllogisme having true forme, is made of such Propositions as seeme probable, and bee not probable in deede, as thus: no opposites are both true at once, but subcontraries are opposites: *Ergo*, they are not true. Here though this Maior seemeth probable, because many opposites, as contraries, and contradictories, be neuer both true at once, yet it is not probable in deede: for those opposites which be called subcontrarie and subalternate, may bee both true at once as hath beene before,

*When is it said to faile in forme?*

It faileth in forme, when it is made of probable premisses, not rightly concluding: because they be not orderly disposed according to Moode and Figure, as thus: Some opposites are both true at once, but contradictories are opposites: *Ergo*, Contradictories are both true at once. Here the premisses be probable, but the Syllogisme halteth in forme, because that of mere particulars no good conclusion can follow.


*When is it said to faile both in matter and forme?*

It faileth both in matter and forme, when the premisses are neither probable, nor yet doe conclude rightly according to the rules of Logicke, as thus: No opposites are both true at once, but subcontraries are opposites: *Ergo*, no subcontraries are both true at once. Here first it faileth in matter, because the Maior, (as hath been said before) is not probable in deed. Againe, it faileth in forme, because that contrary to the rules of a

Syllogisme, an vniuersall conclusion is implied, one of the premisses being particular, which should not be.

*Is there no other kindes of false Syllogismes?*

Yes, there is another kinde of false Syllogisme, called of *Aristotle*, *Syllogismus falsigraphus*, which proceedeth of the proper principles of some discipline misconstrued, or not rightly vnderstood, as thus: All lines drawne from one selfe-point to another selfe-point, be equall: a right line and a crooked line be drawne from one selfe-point to another selfe-point: *Ergo*, a right line and a crooked line be equall, as you see in the figure *a. b.* in the Margent: Here the Maior being a principle in *Geometric*, is not rightly vnderstood; for the right meaning of the principle is, that the lines should be also drawn in one selfe space, and then they must needes be equall, (that is to say) all of one length: but as touching false Syllogismes, wee shall treat of them hereafter more at large in the *Elenches*: in the meane time we minde to speake of the other kindes of arguments before mentioned; and first of *Induction*.



## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of Induction.*



*What is Induction?*

*Induction* is a kinde of argument, wherein we proceede from many particulars, to a vniuersall conclusion, comprehending all the said particulars: and by the particulars here I mean not only singularities, called in Latine *Individua*, but also such things as be lesse common then that vniuersall which is concluded; as when we proceed from many speciall kindes, to some generall kinde comprehending the same, or from things lesse common to more common.

*What is to be obserued in this kinde of reasoning?*

That the particulars be all of like nature; for if there be any one contrary or vnlike to the rest, then the *Induction* is not good.

*How manifold is Induction?*

Twofold:

Twofold: Perfect, and Vnperfect: it is called perfect, when all the singularities are rehearsed: and vnperfect, when but some certaine parts are only recited.

*Give example of Induction.*

Of an Induction, proceeding from meere singularities vnto vniuersall, let this be your example: Malmesie is hot, Gascoin wine is hot, Romney wine is hot, & sic de singulis: Ergo, every wine is hot; French wine is hot, & sic de singulis: Ergo, every wine is hot; which may bee brought into a Syllogisme thus: Every thing that is wine, be it either of Greece, Spaine, Italy, Germany, France, or of any other countrey is hot, but every wine is one of these: Ergo, every wine is hot.

*Give example of an Induction proceeding from the speciall kinds to their generall kinds.*

Of an Induction proceeding from the speciall kinds to the generall kinde, let this be your example: Every Man hath mouing, every Horse hath mouing, every Oxe hath mouing, & sic de singulis: Ergo, every sensible body hath mouing. In which example you see, that to every speciall kinde is added an vniuersall signe to make your Induction good, which would not be so, if you should vse a particular signe, in saying, some Man, some Horse, some Oxe, and so forth.

*Which of the two kinds of reasoning, eyther an Induction or a Syllogisme, is most familiar and easie to man?*

Induction is more familiar to man then a Syllogisme, for the Syllogisme proceedeth from vniuersalities vnto particularities, which vniuersalities be more knowne to nature (that is to say) to the discourse of reason, and lesse knowne to our outward senses. But Induction proceedeth from particularities vnto vniuersalities, which particularities are more knowne vnto vs, (that is to say) to our outward senses, and lesse knowne to nature. Againe, by Induction wee are able to proue the principles of Demonstration, which are not otherwise to bee proued, as this principle: Every whole is more then his part, may be proued by Induction in this sort: This whole is more then his part, and that whole is more then his part, neyther is there to be found any whole, but that is more then his part:

*Ergo,*

*Ergo*, Euery whole is more then his part. Also this principle, Euery sensible body endued with reason, is apt to learne, may be proued thus: This man is apt to learne; and that man is apt to learne, and so of the rest: *Ergo*, Euery sensible body endued with reason, is apt to learne.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*Of an Enthimeme.*

*What is an Enthimeme?*

An Enthimeme is an vnperfect Syllogisme, made for haste or speede, of two Propositions only, (that is) of one of the Premisses, called in this kinde of argument the Antecedent, and of the conclusion, called heere the Consequent: for the other of the Premisses being supposed to be true and well knowne, is left out of purpose, as a thing superfluous, and not needfull to be recited, and sometime the Maior is left out, as thus: Voluptuousnesse is not perpetuall nor proper, it is not therefore the chiefe felicitie: and sometime the Minor is left out, as heere: Euery good thing maketh his possessor the better, therefore voluptuousnesse is not good.

*How shall a man know when the Maior or Minor is left out?*

It is easie to know which of the Premisses is left out by this meanes: for if the Subiect of the Antecedent and of the Consequent be all one, then the Maior is left out, but if they be not all one, but diuers, then the Minor is left out, as you may see in the two last examples, and the part lacking, being reduced together with the rest into a Syllogisme, will quickly shew the truth or falsehood of the Argument.

*From whence are such kindes of Arguments gathered?*

They are gathered for the most part from signes, which if they be necessarie, then the Enthimeme also is necessarie, as thus: The woman giueth milke: *Ergo*, shee hath had a childe, or is with childe; if the signes be probable, then the Enthimeme is also probable, as thus: This man is a night-gadder: *Ergo*, he is a thiefe.



## CHAP. XXV.

*Of an Example.**What is an Example?*

**W**HAT is an Example? An Example is a kinde of Argument, wherein wee proceede from one particular, to proue another particular, by reason of some likenes that is betwixt them, as thus: God did not punish the Niniuites because they repented: *Ergo*, Hee will not punish vs if we repent. God did not let to plague King *David* for adulterie: *Ergo*, He will not let to plague any other King for committing the same offence.

*Wherein differeth this kinde of Argument from the rest?*

This kinde of Argument differeth in forme from all the rest before taught, for a Syllogisme proceedeth from the generall kinde to the speciall kinde, or otherwise. An Enthimeme imitating a Syllogisme, reciteth in his Antecedent the cause of the Conclusion. Again, an Induction out of many particularities gathereth an vniuersalitie, none of which things is to be found in an Example, proceeding onely from one particular to another like particular. Notwithstanding *Aristotle* saith, that it may be reduced partly to an induction, and partly to a Syllogisme: for in taking the first particular, you may by an vnperfect induction imply an vniuersall Proposition. And so from that vniuersall Proposition to proceed by order of Syllogisme, vnto the other particular implied in the conclusion of the Example, as in this Example: *Iudas* died euill: *Ergo*, *Pilate* also died euill: it may be first reduced into an vnperfect Induction thus: *Iudas* dyed euill, because hee was the author of Christs death, and did not repent: *Ergo*, Euery man that was author of Christs death, and did not repent, died euill. Into a Syllogisme thus: Euery man that was author of Christs death, and did not repent, died euill; but *Pilate* was author of Christs death, and did not repent: *Ergo*, *Pilate* died euill.

*Whereto serues this kinde of reasoning by Example?*

Exam-

*Ergo*, Euery whole is more then his part. Also this principle, Euery sensible body endued with reason, is apt to learne, may be proued thus: This man is apt to learne; and that man is apt to learne, and so of the rest: *Ergo*, Euery sensible body endued with reason, is apt to learne.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*Of an Enthimeme.*

*What is an Enthimeme?*

An Enthimeme is an vnperfect Syllogisme, made for haste or speede, of two Propositions only, (that is) of one of the Premisses, called in this kinde of argument the Antecedent, and of the conclusion, called heere the Consequent: for the other of the Premisses being supposed to be true and well knowne, is left out of purpose, as a thing superfluous, and not needfull to be recited, and sometime the Maior is left out, as thus: Voluptuousnesse is not perpetuall nor proper, it is not therefore the chiefe felicitie: and sometime the Minor is left out, as heere: Euery good thing maketh his possessor the better, therefore voluptuousnesse is not good.

*How shall a man know when the Maior or Minor is left out?*

It is easie to know which of the Premisses is left out by this meanes: for if the Subiect of the Antecedent and of the Consequent be all one, then the Maior is left out, but if they bee not all one, but diuers, then the Minor is left out, as you may see in the two last examples, and the part lacking, being reduced together with the rest into a Syllogisme, will quickly shew the truth or falsehood of the Argument.

*From whence are such kindes of Arguments gathered?*

They are gathered for the most part from signes, which if they be necessarie, then the Enthimeme also is necessarie, as thus: The woman giueth milke: *Ergo*, shee hath had a childe, or is with childe; if the signes be probable, then the Enthimeme is also probable, as thus: This man is a night-gadder: *Ergo*, he is a thiefe.

## CHAP. XXV.

*Of an Example.**What is an Example?*

An Example is a kinde of Argument, where-  
in wee proceede from one particular, to proue  
another particular, by reason of some likenes  
that is betwixt them, as thus: God did not pu-  
nish the Niniuites because they repented: *Ergo*, Hee will not  
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did not repent, died euill; but *Pilate* was author of Christs death,  
and did not repent: *Ergo*, *Pilate* died euill.

*Whereto serues this kinde of reasoning by Example?*

Exam-

Examples are very good in all morall matters, to perswade, or dissuade.

*What is to be observed in reasoning by way of Example?*

You must in any wise be sure that the similitude or likenesse of the particulars doe make to the purpose which you intend, and that it be the very cause why the Predicate of the Antecedent properly belongeith to the Subiect, for otherwise the argument is not good; for if you should reason thus; *Judas* died euill: *Ergo*, *Peter* died euill: because they were both sinners: for their likenes in this behalfe is not the cause that *Judas* died euill, but the cause before alledged.

*From whence is this kinde of argument fetched?*

From the places of Comparison, as from the like, from the more, and from the lesse, of all which the generall rule or Maxime is thus: In things like, is like iudgement or reason, as hath beene said before in the Treatise of places. Thus farre of the foure principall kinds of reasoning: now of the rest, and first.

## CHAP. XXVI.

*Of the Arguments called Sorites.*



*What is Sorites?*

Sorites is a kinde of Argument proceeding as it were by certaine degrees vnto the Conclusion, which is gathered of many Propositions necessarily following one another, and are knit together, so as the Predicate of the first Proposition is the Subiect of the second, and the Predicate of the second the Subiect of the third, and so forth euen to the last Proposition, whose Predicate being ioyned to the Subiect of the first Proposition, doth make the Conclusion as thus: The Soule of man doth moue it selfe: whatsoever moueth it selfe, is the beginning of mouing: the beginning of mouing hath no end, whatsoever hath no end, is immortall: *Ergo*, the Soule of man is immortall.

*When*

*When is this kinde of Argument said to be of force?*

When it is made of Affirmatiue Propositions, wherein words of affinitie are necessarily ioyned together, as when kindes generall, differences, or properties, are ioyned with those speciall kindes, of whom they are spoken, or when proper effects are ioyned with their proper causes: for if the Propositions be either Negatiue, or doe not necessarily hang together, then it is no good Argument, as in Negatiues let this be your example: A Man is not a Lion, a Lion is a sensible beast: *Ergo*, Man is not a sensible beast. Now of Propositions not hanging necessarily together, because that proper effects are not ioyned with their proper causes, let this common iest be your example:

*Whoso drinketh well, sleepeeth well,  
Whoso sleepeeth well, sinneth not,  
Whoso sinneth not, shall be blessed:  
Ergo, Whoso drinketh well, shall be blessed.* }

Which is no good Conclusion, for much drinke is not alwayes the cause of sleepe, nor sleeping the cause of not sinning.

The Rhetoricians vse another kinde of Argument, called *Gradatio*, which is much like to *Sorites*, sauing that the Subject of the first Proposition is not rehearsed in the Conclusion, for they vse it rather as an ornament of speech, then as a prooffe: as the vertue of

*Scipio* wau him Fame, Fame got him  
Enemies, and his Enemies  
procured his  
death.



Of diuers other kinds of Arguments, and first, of a Dilemma, and what kinds it comprehendeth.



Here be also other formes of Arguments, whereof some be Fallaxes, and some are good Conclusions, and they be these, Dilemma, Enumeratio, Simplex Conclusio, Subiectio, Oppositio, Violatio.

What is Dilemma?

Dilemma is an Argument made of two members, repugnant one to another, whereof which soeuer thou grantest, thou art by and by taken, as thus: It is not good to marry a wife, for if shee be faire, shee will be common; if foule, then lothsome: notwithstanding, this is but a slipperie kind of argument, vnlesse both the repugnant parts be such, as neither of them can be turned againe vpon the maker of the Argument, for then by conuersion, the *Dilemma* is soone confuted, as for example, you may conuert both parts of the argument last recited, thus: It is good to marry a wife, for if she be faire, shee shall not be lothsome, if foule, then not common: much like to this is that captious Argument, which *Protagoras* the Lawyer made against his Scholer *Euathlus*, who had couenanted to pay his Master a certayne summe of money at the first Sute or Action that hee should winne by pleading at the Law: whereupon his Master did afterwards commence an Action against him, and in reasoning with him of the matter, made him this *Dilemma*: Either (saith he) iudgement shall be giuen against thee, or with thee: if against thee, then thou must pay me by vertue of the iudgement; if iudgement be giuen with thee, then thou must also pay me by couenant; which the Scholer immediately confuted by conuersion in this sort: Either (saith he) iudgement shall be giuen with me, or against me; if with me, then I shall be quit by Law; if against me, then I ought to pay nothing by couenant.

What

*What other intricate kinds of reasoning are said to be comprehended under Dilemma?*

Diuers, whereof some be called Ceratins or horned Arguments, some Crocodolites, some Assitaton, some Pseudomenons.

*Define all these kinds, and giue examples.*

1 The horned Argument is, when by some subtile and craftie manner of questioning, we seeke to haue such an answer, as we may take vantage thereof, as the Pharises did, when they questioned with Christ, touching the payment of Tribute to *Cesar*.

2 The Crocodolite is, when being deceiued by some craftie manner of questioning, we doe admit that which our Adversarie turneth againe vpon vs, to our owne hindrance, as in the fable of the Crocodile, whereof this name Crocodolite proceedeth: for it is said, That the Crocodile hauing taken away a child from his mother, reasoned with her in this sort; I wil deliuer thee thy child againe, if thou wilt say a troth: whether therefore shal I deliuer him or not? The mother answered, Thou shalt not deliuer him, and therefore of right thou oughtest to deliuer him. No, saith he, I will not deliuer him, to the intent it may seeme that thou hast said troth; and though thou haddest said that I should deliuer him, yet I would not deliuer him indeed, for making thee a lyar.

3 Assitaton, is a kinde of cauelling, not consisting of any sure ground, as if a man did say, that hee doth hold his peace, or lyeth, or knoweth nothing; another by and by might cauill thereof in this sort: *Ergo*, He that holdeth his peace, speaketh, He that lyeth, saith truth, He that knoweth nothing, knoweth somerhing.

4 Pseudomenon, is a false or lying kinde of cauelling, as thus: The heauen couereth all things: *Ergo*, it couereth it selfe. *Epimenides*, being a Candior himselfe, said, That the Candioties were lyers; the question is, whether he said true or not; for though hee said true, and that the Candioties were lyers, yet it is false, because a Candior said it: Again, if the Candioties be no lyers, nor *Epimenides* is a lyer, then he is to be beleueed.

*How are the Fallaxes of these captious Arguments to be found out?*

The Fallaxes of all these kinds of captious Argumentare soone found out, if we consider well the Rules before taught, touching the repugnances of Propositions, as whether there be any ambiguitie in the Termes, and whether the selfe-same Termes in the repugnāt parts haue respect to one selfe-thing, time, or place, or not: it is good also to consider the substance, quantitie, and qualitie of the Propositions: for in the last example, this saying, *Candiotēs be lyers*, is a Proposition indefinite, and therefore is not of such force, as to say, all *Candiotēs be lyers*, which is an vniuersall Proposition, for of particular Premisses nothing rightly followeth. In the other examples you shal find that there is some doubtfulnes in the Termes, hauing respect either to diuers things, to diuers times, or diuers places, as to say, *He holdeth his peace*; when he speaketh: Here is doubtfulnesse in the Termes, hauing respect either to diuers things, that is to say, as well to thole things, which he meaneth to keepe in silence, as to those words which hee vttereth by mouth: so in this word, *Suite*, in the example of *Protagoras*, was doubtfulnesse, for that *Protagoras* meant some other *Suite*, and not that which he himselfe commenced.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

### *Of Enumeration.*

*What is Enumeration?*

**W** Enumeration is a kind of Argument, wherein many things being reckoned vp and denied, one thing onely of necessitie remaineth to be affirmed, as thus: *Sith thou hast this Horse, either thou didst buy him, or he came to thee by inheritance, or hee was given thee, or bred at home with thee, or else thou didst take him from thine enemy in time of warre; or if none of these were, then thou must needs steale him: but thou neither boughtest him, nor he sell not vnto thee by inheritance,*

nor was giuen thee, nor bred vp at home with thee, nor yet taken by thee from the enemy: it followeth therefore of necessity that thou hast stolne him.

*When is this kind of Argument to be confuted?*

When your Aduersarie can proue any necessarie part to be left out.

CHAP. XXIX.

*Of a simple Conclusion.*



*What is a simple Conclusion?*

A simple Conclusion is no other thing, but a necessary Enthymeme, in the which the Consequent doth necessarily follow the Antecedent, as thus: Shee hath had a childe: *Ergo*, shee hath layne with a man.

CHAP. XXX.

*Of Subiection.*



*What is Subiection?*

Subiection is a questioning kinde of Argument, in the which we confute each question with a reason immediatly following the same, as thus: How is this fellow become so well moneyed? Had he any great Patrimonie left him? No, for all his Fathers lands were sold. Came there any inheritance to him by discent any otherwise? No, for he was disinherited of al men. Came there any goods vnto him by Executorship, &c? If then hee hath not beene enriched by any of these honest wayes, either he hath a golden Myne at home, or else hee is come to these riches by some vnlawfull meanes. This argument sayleth when any principall part is left out, and therefore differeth not much from Enumeration before recited.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*Of Opposition.**What is Opposition?*

Opposition is a kind of Argument, made of Repugnant parts, wherein we reuert from the Opposite of the first Proposition, vnto the same Proposition againe, as thus: If I were in the Citie at such time as this man was slaine in the Country, then I slue him not; this Proposition is now a simple Conclusion, and may be made an Opposition in this manner: If I had beene in the Country at such time, as you say, this man was slaine, then you might well suspect me to haue slaine him: but sith I was not there at that time, there is no cause therefore why you should suspect me.

## CHAP. XXXII.

*Of Violation.**What is Violation?*

Violation is a kinde of Concluding, more meete to confute then to proue, whereby wee shew the reason of our aduersarie, to make for vs, and not for him, as thus: it is not good to marry a wife, because that of marriage many times commeth the losse of children to our great sorrow, yea, rather it is good therefore to marry a wife, to get other children for our comfort. Thus much touching the diuers kinds of reasoning: now wee will treat of Fallaxes, or false Conclusions, and shew how to confute them.

*Here endeth the fift Booke of Logicke.*





# THE SIXT BOOKE OF LOGICKE.

## CHAP. I. Of Confutation.

**H**ere be some that make two kinds of Confutation, the one belonging to Person, the other to Matter. Confutation of Person is done either by taunting, rayling, rendering checks for checks, or by scorning, and that either by words, or else by countenance, gesture and action: which kinde of Confutation, because it belongeth rather to scoffing, then to true order of reasoning, I will leave to speake thereof, dealing only with that Confutation that belongeth to Matter, which is two-fold, the one generall, the other speciall: it is generall, when wee affirme that the Argument faileth either in forme, in matter, or in both. Againe, the generall Confutation is done three manner of wayes, that is, either by denying the Consequent, by making distinction, or by instance (that is to say) by bringing in a contrarie Example.

*Shew when these three wayes are to be used.*

If the Argument faile in forme, then wee must denie the Consequent.

*Give Examples.*

Discipline

Discipline is necessarie, but the Ceremonies of *Moses* are Discipline, therefore the Ceremonies of *Moses* are necessary: here you must denie the Consequent, because that of meere particulars nothing followeth: and to be short, when any Argument is made contrary to the rules of Figure and Mood before taught, the Consequent is not good, and therefore to be denyed, as here: Euery couetous man doth violate the Lawes of liberalitie; but euery prodigall man doth violate the Lawes of liberalitie; therefore euery prodigall man is a couetous man: This Syllogisme, being of the second Figure, is made in *Barbara*, which Moode belongeth not to that Figure: But if the Argument faile in matter, that is, when either one of the premisses, or both are false, then it may be confuted aswell by denying the false part, be it Maior or Minor, as by vsing distinction: and to find out the falseness of the matter, it is necessary alwayes to haue respect to the Maxims of the places, from whence the prooffe is fetched; for they doe shew which Propositions are true, and which are not; as for example in this Argument: No painted speech becommeth Philosophers: but eloquence is painted speech: *Ergo*, Eloquence becommeth no Philosophers: Here the Maior is to be denyed, because it is a false definition: for the true definition of eloquence is to speake wisely, aptly, adornedly, and to the purpose, and not to vse painted words vainely: Againe, who-so worshippeth God the Creator, worshippeth the true God; the Turks worship God the Creator: *Ergo*, the Turks worship the true God: This Argument is to be denyed, because the Minor is false; for no man can truly worship God the Creator, vnlesse he worship also Iesus Christ his Sonne, which the Turks doe not, and therefore they worship a fayned Idoll, and not the true God.

*When is distinction to be vsed?*

When either the words or matter is doubtfull.

*Give examples of both.*

All Verbs actiue doe signifie action: but God vsed this Verbe Actiue, *Indurabo*, in saying, I will harden *Pharaohs* heart: *Ergo*, God did harden *Pharaohs* heart: here distinction

on

on is to be made; for Verbs active haue diuers significations, according to the diuersities of the Tongues wherein they are vttered: for in the Hebrew Tongue, Verbs active doe signifie permission or sufferance, aswell as action; as these words, I will harden *Pharaohs* heart (is as much to say) as I will suffer *Pharaohs* heart to be hardened; likewise, whereas we say in the Lords Prayer, Leade vs not into temptation, is as much to say, as, Suffer vs not to be led into temptation. Againe, ambiguitie may be in this matter, as thus: No sinnes are heard of God: but all men are sinners; therefore no men are heard of God: here distinction is to be made betwixt penitent sinners, and impenitent: for God will heare the penitent sinner: although he will not heare the impenitent sinner.

*When is Confutation by instance used?*

When the Argument, though it faile neither in forme, nor matter, yet perhaps it is neither so strong, nor so probable, but that a stronger and more probable may be made against it.

*Give example.*

Whoso killeth any Embassadors in their iourneying, doth violate the Lawes of Armes: but the French-men killed our Embassador iourneying to *Spain*: Ergo, the French-men in so doing did violate the Lawes of Armes: Here to the Maior a man may answer by instance, thus: The *Athenians* killed the Embassadors of the *Lacedemonians*, iourneying to the King of *Persia*, because they went to procure his aide, to destroy the Citie of *Athens*: So likewise the *Romans* did intercept the Legates of *Hannibal*, going to the King of the *Macedonians* for the like intent; and yet neither of these people did thinke to breake the Lawes of Armes, by doing that which should preserue their State and Common-weale.

*How are the Fallaxes of these captious Arguments to be found out?*

The Fallaxes of all these kinds of captious Argument are soone found out, if we consider well the Rules before taught, touching the repugnances of Propositions, as whether there be any ambiguitie in the Termes, and whether the selfe-same Termes in the repugnāt parts haue respect to one selfe-thing, time, or place, or not: it is good also to consider the substance, quantitie, and qualitie of the Propositions: for in the last example, this saying, *Candiotēs be lyers*, is a Proposition indefinite, and therefore is not of such force, as to say, all *Candiotēs be lyers*, which is an vniuersall Proposition, for of particular Premisses nothing rightly followeth. In the other examples you shal find that there is some doubtfulnes in the Termes, hauing respect either to diuers things, to diuers times, or diuers places, as to say, *He holdeth his peace*; when he speaketh: Here is doubtfulnesse in the Termes, hauing respect either to diuers things, that is to say, as well to those things, which he meaneth to keepe in silence, as to those words which hee vttereth by mouth: so in this word, *Suite*, in the example of *Protagoras*, was doubtfulnesse, for that *Protagoras* meant some other *Suite*, and not that which he himselfe commenced.

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When either the words or matter is doubtfull.

*Giue examples of both.*

All Verbs actiue doe signifie action: but God vsed this Verbe Actiue, *Indurabo*, in saying, I will harden *Pharaohs* heart: *Ergo*, God did harden *Pharaohs* heart: here distinction

on is to be made; for Verbs actiue haue diuers significations, according to the diuersities of the Tongues wherein they are vttered: for in the Hebrew Tongue, Verbs actiue doe signifie permission or sufferance, aswell as action; as these words, I will harden *Pharaohs* heart (is as much to say) as I will suffer *Pharaohs* heart to be hardened; likewise, whereas we say in the Lords Prayer, Leade vs not into temptation, is as much to say, as, Suffer vs not to be led into temptation. Againe, ambiguitie may be in this matter, as thus: No sinnes are heard of God: but all men are sinners; therefore no men are heard of God: here distinction is to be made betwixt penitent sinners, and impenitent: for God will heare the penitent sinner: although he will not heare the impenitent sinner.

*When is Confutation by instance used?*

When the Argument, though it faile neither in forme, nor matter, yet perhaps it is neither so strong, nor so probable, but that a stronger and more probable may be made against it.

*Give example.*

Whoso killeth any Embassadors in their iourneying, doth violate the Lawes of Armes: but the French-men killed our Embassador iourneying to *Spaine*: Ergo, the French-men in so doing did violate the Lawes of Armes: Here to the Maior a man may answer by instance, thus: The *Athenians* killed the Embassadors of the *Lacedamonians*, iourneying to the King of *Persia*, because they went to procure his aide, to destroy the Citie of *Athens*: So likewise the *Romanes* did intercept the Legates of *Hannibal*, going to the King of the *Macedonians* for the like intent; and yet neither of these people did thinke to breake the Lawes of Armes, by doing that which should preserue their State and Common-weale.

## CHAP. II.

## Of speciall Confutation.



*What is speciall Confutation?*

Speciall Confutation is, when we confute any false argument, by detecting and shewing the Fallax thereof, naming the Fallax by his proper name.

*What order doth ARISTOTLE obserue in treating of speciall Confutation?*

*Aristotle* first treateth in generall of all those things that commonly appertayne to the disputations of learned men, as first he treateth of an Elench, which is asmuch to say as reprehension, then of Syllogismes, and of Disputation, and also of the marks and ends of Sophistrie, and whereto they tend.

*How doth he an Elench or Reprehension?*

Reprehension or Elench (saith he) is a Syllogisme, which gathereth a conclusion contrary to the assertion of the respondent, as if a man would defend *Medea* not to loue her childe, because she killed it, another might reason against him in this manner: euery Mother loueth her child: but *Medea* is a Mother: *Ergo*, *Medea* loueth her child: the Conclusion of this Syllogisme is contrarie to the first Assertion: and note here by the way, that there be two sorts of Elenches, the one true, and the other false: it is said to be true, when it rightly gathereth a contrarie conclusion to the respondents assertion: And false, when it faileth in any part requisite to a true Elench: of which parts we shall speake hereafter, when we come to treat of the Fallax, called Ignorance of the Elench, which is one of the five ends or marks wherunto Sophistrie tendeth, for a true Elench seemeth to belong vnto Dialecticall disputation, rather then to Sophisticall disputation. But now leauing to define a Syllogisme, because it hath bene defined before, and therefore not needfull here againe to be rehearsed, I will proceede to Disputation.





Disputation is a contention about some question taken in hand, either for finding out of truth, or else for exercise sake, and there be foure kinds of disputation, whereof the first is called Doctrinall, because it appertayneth to Science.

The second is called Dialecticall, which belongeth to probable opinion.

The third is called Tentative, which serueth to try another mans knowledge, in any kinde of Science.

The fourth is called Sophisticall, which tendeth onely to deceiue.

*Give examples of all these foure kinds?*

The Doctrinall Disputation vseth no other but Syllogismes Demonstratiue as this is, Whatsoeuer hath reason, is capable of learning; but *Iohn* hath reason: *Ergo*, *Iohn* is capable of learning. Dialecticall Disputation vseth onely probable Syllogismes, as the former example of *Medea*, Euery Mother loueth her child; but *Medea* is a Mother: *Ergo*, *Medea* loueth her child: against this another probable argument may bee made thus: Whosoeuer killeth her child, loueth not her child: but *Medea* killed her child: *Ergo*, shee loued not her child. Tentative disputation vseth such arguments as are made of the first common principles of any science, in which principles who so is ignorant, cannot be skilfull in that Science; as if a man would professe Geometrie, and know not the definitions of a point, or pricke of a line, or superficies, or of such common Maxims, as these are; the whole is more then his part: take equall from equall, and equall remaine, &c. should quickly bewray his owne ignorance.

Sophisticall disputation vseth nothing but deceitfull arguments, or Fallaxes, whereof there be thirteene kinds hereafter set downe: but first I will shew you which be the five Marks and Ends of Sophistrie.

## CHAP. IIII.

Of the five Marks and Ends of  
Sophistrie.



RISTOTLE saith, That the fraudulent disputation of the Sophister, tendeth alwayes to one of these five Ends or Marks; that is, either by force of argument, to bring you into some absurditie, which he calleth Elench; that is to say, a reprehension or reproofe, or else to make you to confesse that which is manifestly false, or to grant some Paradox, which is as much to say as an opinion contrary to all mens opinions: or to allow of incongrue speech contrarie to the rules of Grammar, called in Latine, *Solecismus*, or to admit some vaine repetition, called in Latine, *Nugatio*.

*Give example of all these five Marks.*

Of the first Marke, let this be your example: If in disputing of Vertue, you haue perhaps granted, that the meditation of Vertue doth make a man sad, the Sophister will force you by argument, to denie againe that which you before granted, thus: All things that be contrarie, haue contrarie effects: but it is proper to Vice to make the minde of man sad: *Ergo*, Vertue maketh his minde glad: This kinde of reasoning is more plainly taught before, when wee talked of Reduction by impossibilitie.

Of the second Marke, let this be your example: Euery Dog hath power to barke; but there is a certayne Starre called the Dog: *Ergo*, that Starre hath power to barke. The Fallax of this argument consisteth onely in the word Dogge, which is equiuoke, as shall be declared more at large hereafter, when wee come to speake of that Elench or Fallax.

Of the Paradox, which is the third Marke, let this be your example: The Sophister will make you to grant, that a rich and happy King is wretched, by force of argument, thus: Whosoever is subiect to sin, is wretched: but all rich and happy Kings are subiect to sinne: *Ergo*, all rich and happy Kings  
are

are wretched and miserable : in this is also a Fallax , because that happinesse is spoken here in two respects , for there is worldly happinesse, and heauenly happinesse.

Of the fourth marke called incongruitie of speech , I can hardly giue you any fit example in our natiue tongue, because that our English Adiectiues doe not differ in Case, Gender, and Number, and therefore I pray you content your selfe with this Latine example , for it is an easier matter for an Englishman to speake false Latine , then false English: the Sophister will make you to allow of this false Latine, *Mulier est candidus*, by force of argument, thus : *Omnis homo est candidus*, at *mulier est homo*, ergo, *mulier est candidus*; the English whereof is thus : Euery man is white, but woman is man : Ergo, a woman is white : here this word white in the Latine is of the Masculine gender, contrarie to the Rules of Grammar, but this may be very well referred to the Fallax , called forme of speech, hereafter declared.

Of the fift marke called Nugation, let this be your example : The Sophister will make you to allow of this vaine repetition : *Plato* is learned, a man learned, by force of argument, thus : *Plato* is learned, but *Plato* is a man learned : Ergo, *Plato* is learned ; a man learned : here the premisses and the conclusion are all one thing, and therefore contrarie to the

Rules of Logicke. But leauing these things as superfluous , and in my iudgement seruing to

small purpose , if I may so say without

offence, I minde therefore now

to returne to my matter

first intended.

## CHAP. V.

*How to confute all manner of Elenches, or Fallaxes,  
whatsoever they be.*



Very Fallax consisteth either in words or in things : and of those that consist in wordes, there are in number sixe, and of others consisting in things, there are seven, so as in all there be thirteene, as I said before.

*Which be those sixe that consist in words?*

Equiuocation, Amphibologie, or doubtfull speech, Coniunction, Diuision, Accent, and Figure, or forme of speech.

*Shew what these Fallaxes be, and giue examples?*

**I**  
*Equiuocatio.*

Equiuocation is, when the deceit consisteth in the doubtfulness of some one word, hauing diuers significations, as for example: Euery Dogge is a sensible body, there is a certayne Starre called a Dogge: *Ergo*, That Starre is a sensible body: here the Conclusion is to be denyed, because this word Dog hath diuers significations: another example, the Prophet saith that there is no euill in the Citie, but God doth it; but there be horrible euils in the Citie: *Ergo*, God is the Author of euill: the Conclusion is to be denyed, because in the Maior this word euill signifieth punishment, and in the Minor it signifieth sinne: another example, Whosoever loueth Christ, obserueth his Word, and is beloued of the Father: but no body that breaketh the Law, obserueth the Word of Christ; therefore no body is beloued of the Father: here the Maior is doubtfull, because this voice, Word, may be taken either for the word of the Law, or else for the word of the Gospell, which the Apostles did euer keepe, as Christ himselfe saith, and therefore they were beloued of the Father, and so consequently euery true Christian, that doth keepe the pure doctrine of Christ, is beloued of the Father: but the word of the Law saith, that euery one is cursed that abideth not in all.

**2**  
*Amphibologia.*

Amphibologie or doubtfull speech, is, when some whole sentence

sentence is doubtfull, and may be interpreted diuers wayes, as the Oracle of *Apollo*, in saying, that *Cressus* passing the Riuer of *Halis*, shall ouer-throw a great Empire: by which Oracle was meant, that hee should ouer-throw his owne Empire, and not the Persian Empire, which by wrong construing that Oracle, he hoped to subduc.

Composition or Coniunction, is the ioyning together of things that are to be seuered. As for example, two and three be euen and odde, but fīue maketh two and three, therefore fīue is both euen and odde: which kinde of argument is to be denied, because those things are ioyned together, which ought to be seuered. 3  
Compositio.

Diuision is, when things are seuered, which should be ioyned together, as, all the wise men of Greece are seven: *Solon* and *Periander* are wise men of Greece, therefore *Solon* and *Periander* are seven: here the Consequent is to be denyed, because *Solon* and *Periander* are seuered from the rest whereunto they should be ioyned. 4  
Diuisio.

The Fallax of Accent is, when words are not rightly and simply pronounced, as when wee doe adde to, or take from a word, any aspiration, letter, or syllable, and thereby alter the true signification thereof, as this Latine word, *Hara*, signifying a Swines cote, being pronounced without *H*, doth signify an Altar. In English let this be your example, Euery Hare is swift on foot, but this is a Hayer, (that is to say) a cloth to drie Malt, therefore it is swift on foot. Of like sort is this old iest of a Master, that said to his seruant: Go, heate this Capons legge: who immediately did eate it: then his Master being angrie, said, I bade thee heat it, with an h: no Sir (said the Seruant) I did eate it with Bread. Likewise, this Fallax may chance by not obseruing the right quantitie of syllables, in any word, as *Populus* hauing o, long, is a Popple tree, but hauing o, short, it signifieth a people. Or when a word vsed Interrogatiuely, is made to haue an Affirmatiue signification, as for example: *Caiphas* said to Christ, Art thou a King? *Ergo*, He confessed Christ to be a King. Or when a word pronounced ironically, is turned to good earnest, in speaking one thing and 5  
Accentus.



and meaning another, as thus: My Master said, Come hither, you honest man: *Ergo*, He said that I was an honest man; when indeed he called him Knaue.

6

Forma Orationis.

The Fallax of forme or manner of speech may be diuers wayes, as first, when words are falsly supposed to be like either in signification, in Case, or in Gender, or to be of one selfe Predicament, because they are like in termination, as *Poea*, in English a Poet, and *Poema*, in English a Poesie or Poeticall worke: these two words, because they end both in *a*: *Ergo*, they are both of the Masculine Gender. Also coloured and numbred are like in termination: *Ergo*, they are of one selfe Predicament, and yet the first belongeth to the Predicament of Qualitie, and the other to Quantitie. Secondly, when a word is vsed in one selfe argument, sometime according to his proper signification, and sometime as a terme of Arte: as for example, God is euery-where: euery-where is an Aduerbe, therefore God is an Aduerbe. A Mouse eateth cheefe, but a Mouse is a syllable: *Ergo*, a syllable eateth cheefe. Here Mouse in the Maior hath his proper signification, and in the Minor is vsed as a terme of Arte: and the like is to be said of the word Euery-where in the first example. Thirdly, when a word hath not his proper signification, or is not vsed according to the true phrase of speech wherein it is vttered, as thus: Whatsoever thou hast not lost, thou hast stil, but thou hast lost no Hornes: *Ergo*, thou hast Hornes. Here this word, to lose, hath not his proper signification, for wee are said to lose properly that which wee had, and not that which wee neuer had. And finally, this Fallax is called the common refuge and receptacle of all such kinde of Sophistrie. Hitherto of the Fallaxes in words, now of the Fallaxes in things.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Fallaxes in things.



F these Fallaxes there be seuen kindes (that is to say) *Fallacia Accidentis*, à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum Simpliciter, *Ignoratio Elenchi*, *Petitio principij*, *Fallacia Consequentis*, *Causa pro non causa*, *Plura interrogata pro uno responso*: Which may be Englished thus: The Fal-

lax of the Accident, the Fallax of speech respectiue, in stead of speech absolute, ignorance of the Elench, Petition of the principle, a cause that is not the cause indeed, and many questions comprehended in one.

Define what these be, and giue examples.

*Fallacia Accidentis*, may be diuers wayes: as first, when any thing belonging only to the substance of some thing, is attributed also to some accident of the said substance, and contrariwise as thus: Whatsoeuer thou hast bought, thou hast eaten, but thou hast bought rawe flesh: *Ergo*, thou hast eaten rawe flesh: here the Consequent is to be denied, because the Maior hath respect to the substance, and the Conclusion to the qualitie. Another example, What I am, thou art not, but I am a man: *Ergo*, thou art none. Here in this the Maior hath respect to the qualitie, and the Conclusion to the substance. Secondly, when Accidents are not rightly ioyned together, as when the qualities of the bodie are joyned with the qualities of the minde: as *Homer* is a Poet, and *Homer* is blinde: *Ergo*, *Homer* is a blinde Poet: heere the Conclusion is to be denied, because to be blinde, and to be a Poet, are diuers qualities, whereof the one belongeth to the minde, and the other to the body, and therefore are not rightly joyned together. Thirdly, as (*Melancthon* saith) when an accidentall cause is made a principall cause, as thus: *Elias* was an holy Prophet, but *Elias* was clad with Camels haire: *Ergo*, I being clad with Camels hayre, am a holy Prophet. Here the Conclusion

I.  
*Fallacia acci-*  
*dentis.*

is to be denied, because to be clad with Camels haire, was not the cause of *Elsas* holinesse. But me thinkes that this and such like examples doe belong rather to the Fallax, of *Causa pro non causa*, (whereof we shall speake hereafter) then to the Fallax of the Accident.

2  
Dilemm secundum quid.

The Fallax *A dicto secundum quid ad dictum Simpliciter*, chanceth when wee goe about to make a thing to seeme absolute, that is spoken in some respect, or to bee in all, when it is but in part, as a Moore hath white teeth: *Ergo*, a Moore is white. Againe, it may bee in respect, by reason of time, place, person, comparison, and such like. Of time, as thus: I saw *John* yesterday, but I saw him not to day: *Ergo*, I did see him, and not see him. Of place thus: It is not good to buy and sell in the Church: *Ergo*, it is not good to buy and sell. Of person thus: A Magistrate may kill a Thiefe: *Ergo*, euery man may kill a Thiefe. Of comparison, thus: Riches are not good to him that cannot vse them: *Ergo*, Riches are not good.

3.  
Ignoratio Elenchi.

Having now to speake of the Fallax, called the Ignorance of the Elench: I thinke good to call againe to your remembrance the definition of an Elench before briefly set downe, which is a Syllogisme rightly gathering a Conclusion contrary to the assertion of the respondent, which contrarietie consisteth of foure principall points or respects; whereof, if any be wanting, then the contrarietie is not perfect.

*Which be those foure points?*

First, that it be to one selfe thing. Secondly, in one selfe respect. Thirdly, in one selfe manner. And fourthly, in or at one selfe time: for if you be deceiued at any time by some false Elench, in thinking that it rightly gathereth a Conclusion meere contrary to your assertion, when it is not so indeed, by reason that it faileth in some part requisite and incident to a true Elench: then it may be rightly said that you are deceiued by ignorance of the Elench, which Fallax, as *Aristotle* sayth, comprehendeth almost all others, and therefore hee maketh a long and obscure definition of an Elench, rehearsing all the particularities thereof, nothing apt to be vttered in our English Tongue.

*Yet I pray you to giue examples of the foure chiefe points before mentioned.*

Of the first, let this bee your example: foure is double to two, but not to three: *Ergo*, foure is double and not double; this is not to one selfe thing. Of the second thus: This piece of timber is double in length to that piece, but it is not double to the same in breadth: *Ergo*, it is to one selfe thing, both double, and not double to one selfe thing, but not in one selfe respect. Of the third thus: This Prince ruleth mightily, but not mercifully: *Ergo*, he ruleth, and not ruleth; this is not in like manner. Of the fourth thus: I saw *Iohn* yesterday, but not this day: *Ergo*, I saw him, and saw him not; this is not in one selfe time. And all these foure wayes in mine opinion are comprehended in the second point; which is when any thing is spoken not absolutely, but in diuers respects: wherefore, it differeth not much from the Fallax of speech respectiue before declared, sauing that this Fallax is more generall, and comprehendeth more kinds of Fallaxes then that doth.

Petition of the Principle is, when the Antecedent doth not proue the consequent; which chanceth most commonly three manner of wayes: that is, eyther when the prooffe is as little knowne, as the thing that is to be proued. Secondly, when the prooffe is lesse knowne then the thing to be proued. Thirdly, when the prooffe, and the thing to be proued, doe not differ, but is all one speech, signifying one selfe thing, called of the Greekes *Tautologia*.

4  
Petitio prin-  
cipij.

*Giue example of these three wayes.*

Of the first thus: The Sunne moueth not, but standeth still in the midst of heauen, giuing light to all the world: *Ergo*, the earth is moueable; or thus: The Heauens are not made of Elementall matter, subiect to corruption: *Ergo*, the Heauens are incorruptible. Heere in both these examples the Antecedent is as doubtfull as the Consequent, and therefore prooueth nothing. Of the second way thus: Euery sensible bodie sometime sleepeth: *Ergo*, Man sometime sleepeth. Heere it is more to be doubted whether all sensible Bodies, all Beastes, Fowles and Fishes, doe sometimes sleepe or not, then whe-

ther man doth sometime sleepe: for it is an easier matter to know the nature and propertie of one speciall kinde, then of all, or many kindes. Of the third way thus: *Iohn* is learned: *Ergo*, *Iohn* is learned. The soule doth liue euer: *Ergo*, it is immortal.

5.  
Fallacia Consequen-  
tis.

The Fallax of the Consequent chanceth two manner of wayes, that is, eyther when we thinke the Consequent to be conuertible with the Antecedent, but it is not so in deede, or else when we thinke, that vpon the contrary of the Antecedent, the contrary of the Consequent must needs also follow.

*Giue examples of both these wayes.*

This is a man: *Ergo*, it is a sensible body: now if I would hereof by conuersion conclude thus: it is a sensible body: *Ergo*, it is a man: this were no good Consequent; for euery sensible body is not a man. Likewise, when it rayneth, the ground is wet: *Ergo*, when the ground is wet, it rayneth; for these speeches are not conuertible. Of the second way thus: It is a man: *Ergo*, It is a sensible body. It is no man: *Ergo*, it is no sensible body. Heere you see that this Proposition, It is no man, is the contrary of the first Antecedent, which saith, It is a man. Of which contrary, the contrary of the Consequent doth not necessarily follow: for though it bee no man, yet it may bee some other sensible bodie. This Fallax comprehendeth all such false Arguments, as doe not obserue the Rules of right and true Consequents before giuen.

6.  
Causa pro non  
causa.

The Fallax of *non causa pro causa*, is, when that thing is made to be the cause of the Conclusion, which is not the cause in deede: as Wine is naught, because it will make a man drunke. Of which drunkenesse, Wine is not the cause, but the intemperance of the man, and his immoderate vse thereof; for many things that be good of themselues may be abused, yea, euen the libertie of the Gospell, and yet the doctrine of the Gospell is not cause thereof, but the malice of man abusing the same.

7.  
Plura interroga-  
ta pro vno re-  
sponso.

The seuenth and last Fallax, is when vnadvisedly, and without vsing any distinction, you make an answer to many questions,



questions, as though they were but one; as for example, The Sophister, seeing two men standing together, whereof the one is blinde, and the other hath his sight, will aske you, perhaps, whether they see, or not; whereunto if you answer directly, cyther yea, or no, you are by and by taken: for if you say that they see, then you grant that the blind man also seeth; and if you say, that they doe not see, then you grant, that hee which seeth, is blinde; but if you answer, that the one seeth, and the other not, you shall by such distinction easily auoyd the Sophisters cauillation: for diuers questions huddled up in one, doe alwayes require diuers answers. And thus I end, with the order of confuting all false Elenches, and Fallaxes; the knowledge whereof is very necessary,

for the maintenance of the truth, which God

loueth, who is the fountaine of all truth;

yea, and very truth it selfe; to whom

be all honour, glory and prayse,

world without end,

*Amen.*

F I N I S.





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